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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint against Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC for failure to state a claim, holding that First Circuit law barred Plaintiffs' claims. The district judge concluded that Fidelity was immune from suit based on an immunity provision in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(3)(A). On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that Eleventh Circuit precedent, which holds that BSA immunity requires good faith dealing, applied because the case came to the First Circuit via a transfer order from a court in the Eleventh Circuit and that, even if First Circuit caselaw applied, Fidelity could not get BSA immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) First Circuit law, rather than Eleventh Circuit law, governed this case; and (2) the First Circuit's opinion in Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 320 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003), applied and gave Fidelity BSA immunity. View "AER Advisors Inc. v. Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court in this interlocutory appeal regarding what preclusive effective to give in this action to the findings and judgment rendered by an English court in a prior action brought by Plaintiff against the named defendant, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that none of the parties was entitled to the claimed preclusive effect. The English action resulted in a $243,023,089 judgment, plus interest, against the named defendant, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. Plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, later commenced the instant action against Sebastian and Alexander Vik, the sole shareholder and sole director of Sebastian. Plaintiff sought to pierce Sebastian's corporate veil and hold Vik personally liable for his corporation's judgment debt. All parties claimed, unsuccessfully, an entitlement to a preclusive effect as a result of the final judgment rendered in the prior English action. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that the parties were not entitled to have this action decided in their respective favor on the basis of the alleged preclusive effect of the English judgment. The Supreme Court adopted the Appellate Court's opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues and affirmed. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that defendant was liable for amounts owed in a consent judgment stemming from loan defaults. Defendant had signed a general guaranty for a company that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial advisor. His friend purportedly failed to mention that the guaranty would make defendant liable for millions of dollars of debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was unable to pay. The court held that the FDIC's creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bank's assets thereto fell within its broad power; there was no clear error in finding that defendant's agent delivered the guaranty with his implied actual authority because defendant signed the guaranty, understood its contents, and gave express authority to conduct business; and there was no error in finding that the bank did not fail in its duty to ensure that the agent acted with implied actual authority and in rejecting defendant's fraud in the factum defense. View "Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the superior court authorizing a permanent receiver to distribute the proceeds from the sale of 25 Burnside Avenue in Narragansett in accordance with the receiver's recommendations, holding that the order is vacated to the extent that it deducted the entire balance of an outstanding mortgage from Kevin Hunt's share of the proceeds. The property in this case was owned by Kevin and Alice Hunt as tenants by the entirety. After the family court dissolved the Hunts' marriage, Bank scheduled a sale of the property to foreclose upon the mortgage. Alice filed a petition for receivership to protect her equity interests in the property, and the property was placed into temporary judicial receivership. The receiver eventually sold the property and filed a final report and a recommendation on allowance of claims. The superior court entered an order adopting the receiver's recommendations. The Supreme Court held that the superior court justice (1) did not err when he concluded that the net proceeds were to be distributed equally between Kevin and Alice; (2) erred when he attributed the mortgage wholly to Kevin; and (3) did not err by ordering Kevin to pay rent retroactively. View "In re 25 Burnside Avenue, Narragansett, R.I." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the HOA in an action brought by the bank after the HOA conducted a foreclosure on residential property. Under Nevada law, HOAs are granted a lien with superpriority status on property governed by the association and the portion of the lien with superpriority status consists of the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and any unpaid maintenance and nuisance abatement charges. Under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, the panel held that the bank's tender of nine months of HOA dues ($423) satisfied the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. The panel also held that the HOA had no good faith basis for believing that the bank's tender was insufficient. The panel held that Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, was no longer controlling and rejected the bank's argument that the Nevada HOA lien statute violated the Due Process Clause, in light of SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon. The panel held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not facially unconstitutional on the basis of an impermissible opt-in scheme, and the bank received actual notice in this case. Finally, the panel agreed with Nevada precedent that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not preempted by the federal mortgage insurance program. View "Bank of America v. Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

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Walter Ward took out a secured loan in 2007 without indicating whether he signed the deed of trust (DOT) conveying his property to the lender in his individual capacity or in his capacity as sole trustee of the trust in which his property was held. That DOT was never recorded. Years later, the lender's successor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) asked for a replacement to foreclose. Walter refused, prompting Chase to sue. The trial court sustained two general demurrers to Chase's complaint, entered a judgment of dismissal, and awarded contractual attorney fees and costs to Walter's son, David Ward, the successor trustee of the trust that held the property. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Chase could reframe its action by amendment to omit a fatal allegation in its original complaint. Because the Court conclude it could, notwithstanding the sham pleading doctrine, the court should have granted leave to amend. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the postjudgment order and direct the court to enter a new order sustaining the general demurrers with leave to amend. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward" on Justia Law

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The FDIC brought two enforcement proceedings against the Bank and three of its directors, and subsequently issued a final order penalizing the Bank. The Bank petitioned for review of both orders under 12 U.S.C. 1818(h)(2) and also filed suit in federal district court, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of the same enforcement proceedings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly dismissed the Bank's lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Thunder Basin factors reinforced the district court's conclusion that the review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction over the Bank's claim. In this case, a finding that the review scheme precludes district court jurisdiction would not foreclose all meaningful judicial review of the Bank's constitutional claims; the Bank has not shown that its suit was wholly collateral to the agency proceedings; and the agency expertise factor pointed toward finding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bank of Louisiana v. FDIC" on Justia Law

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James and Beryl Wicker signed a mortgage agreement for their residence in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania in favor of Countrywide Bank, FSB (Countrywide) in February 2008. The mortgage agreement indicated that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) would act as nominee for Countrywide and its successors and assigns and was designated as the mortgagee. In an assignment of mortgage recorded in November 2011, MERS, as nominee for Countrywide, assigned the mortgage to Bank of America. In May 2012, Bank of America filed a mortgage foreclosure action against the Wickers alleging that the Wickers defaulted on their mortgage as of September 1, 2010. It further averred that it had provided the Wickers with the statutorily required foreclosure notice on September 21, 2011. Bank of America then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. In so doing, the trial court narrowed the issues for trial to determining whether Bank of America had provided proof of: (1) the required foreclosure notices; (2) the date of default; and (3) the amount of indebtedness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider the application of Pennsylvania’s business records exception to the rule against hearsay, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 6108. The parties agreed that then-current Pennsylvania precedent allowed a records custodian to authenticate documents even if the witness did not personally record the specific information in the documents. The parties disagreed, however, as to whether a records custodian could lay a foundation for documents incorporated into the files of the custodian’s employer when the information in the documents was recorded by a third party, a process which was allowed under the similar but not identical Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), pursuant to the so-called adopted business records doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of the records custodian and admitting the documents under the facts of this case. View "Bayview Loan v. Wicker" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by the plan administrator of R&G Financial Corporation (Administrator) alleging that negligence and breach of fiduciary duties owed to R&G Financial (the Holding Company) caused the failure of R-G Premier Bank of Puerto Rico (the Bank) and the Holding Company's resultant loss of its investment in the Bank, holding that the complaint must be dismissed because the claims the Administrator asserted for the Holding Company were the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) under 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A). R&G Financial entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy after the Bank, its primary subsidiary, failed. Previously, Puerto Rican regulators had closed the Bank and named the FDIC as the Bank's receiver. After the Bank failed, the Administrator filed this suit against six of the Holding Company's former directors and officers and their insurer. The FDIC intervened. The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding that, under section 1821(d)(2)(A), the FDIC succeeded to the Administrator's claims. View "Zucker v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing this putative class action against a bank after concluding that the bank's "Sustained Overdraft Fees" for overdrawn checking accounts were not "interest" under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., holding that the bank's overdraft fees were not interest under the Act. Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging that Citizens Bank's Sustained Overdraft Fees violated the Act because they constituted interest at a rate above that allowed by Rhode Island, the state in which the bank was located. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that flat excess overdraft fees like the fee at issue in this case are not interest under the Act. View "Fawcett v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law