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The Supreme Court reversed the decision to award prejudgment interest to LeGrand and concluded that Celtic Bank was the prevailing party on the prejudgment interest issues. LeGrand Johnson Construction Company filed an action seeking to enforce its mechanic’s lien on property owned by B2AC, LLC for the unpaid value of construction services, and Celtic Bank, B2AC’s lender, sought to foreclose on the same property after B2AC failed to pay on its loan. The action resulted in a lien for $237,294 and an award of attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, the district court determined that LeGrand’s lien, rather than Celtic Bank’s lien, had priority and awarded LeGrand attorney fees and costs. The court then ruled that LeGrand was entitled to recover eighteen percent in prejudgment and postjudgment interest from Celtic Bank based on LeGrand’s contract with B2AC. The Supreme Court (1) reinforced its holding in Jordan Construction, Inc. v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 408 P.3d 296 (Utah 2017), that prejudgment interest is not available under the 2008 version of the Utah Mechanic’s Lien Act; and (2) vacated the attorney fee award because it was based, in part, on the notion that LeGrand had succeeded in establishing its right to prejudgment interest. View "LeGrand Johnson Construction Co. v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Wilmington Trust, holding that the lender was not entitled to foreclosure because it failed to prove that it provided adequate notice of intent to accelerate. The court held that Texas common law imposes notice requirements before acceleration that is clear and unequivocal. In this case, Wilmington Trust failed to meet its burden to show clear and unequivocal notice of intent to accelerate prior to filing suit. View "Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Rob" on Justia Law

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The day Krieger fell victim to a credit card scam and discovered a fraudulent $657 charge on his bill, he contacted his card issuer, Bank of America (BANA), and was told that the charge would be removed and that, pending “additional information,” BANA considered the matter resolved. Krieger’s next bill reflected a $657 credit. Over a month later Krieger learned that BANA was rebilling him for the charge. He disputed it again, in writing. After BANA replied that nothing would be done, he paid his monthly statement and then filed suit, citing the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), 15 U.S.C. 1666, which requires a creditor to take certain steps to correct billing errors, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, which limits a credit cardholder’s liability for the unauthorized use of a credit card to $50. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal by the district court, first rejecting a claim that Krieger’s complaint was untimely. Only when BANA decided to reinstate the charge did the FCBA again become relevant, so that the 60-day period began to run. A cardholder incurs “liability” for an allegedly unauthorized charge when an issuer, having reason to know the charge may be unauthorized, bills or rebills the cardholder for that charge; the issuer must then comply with the requirements of section 1643, and when a cardholder alleges those requirements were violated, those allegations may state a claim under TILA section 1640. View "Krieger v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Santander Bank, N.A. in this complaint challenging Santander’s foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Santander had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements before it conducted the foreclosure sale. A justice of the superior court granted Santander’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Santander complied with the notice requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-27-4(a) and 34-27-4)b. View "Adams v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Because existing New York law does not clearly settle whether claims for interest on principal continue to accrue after a claim for the principal itself is time‐barred, the Second Circuit certified questions pertaining to that issue to the New York Court of Appeals: 1. If a bond issuer remains obligated to make biannual interest payments until the principal is paid, including after the date of maturity, see NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 17 N.Y.3d 250, 928 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2011), do enforceable claims for such biannual interest continue to accrue after a claim for the principal of the bonds is time‐barred? 2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," can interest claims arise ad infinitum as long as the principal remains unpaid, or are there limiting principles that apply? View "Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza" on Justia Law

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During the 2008 financial crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency and authorized it to place into conservatorship the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), 12 U.S.C. 4617(a) and empowered the U.S. Treasury to purchase their “obligations and other securities” through 2009. In exchange for a cash infusion and fixed funding commitment for each enterprise, Treasury received senior preferred shares and extraordinary governance and economic rights, including the right to receive dividends tied to the amount of Treasury’s payments. As Fannie and Freddie’s capital needs grew, Treasury agreed to modify the original agreements. The First and Second Amendments primarily increased Treasury’s funding commitment. The third modification, made after Treasury’s purchasing authority expired, set Treasury’s dividend rights equal to the companies’ outstanding net worth. Plaintiffs, private shareholders of Fannie and Freddie, sued, claiming that the Agency violated its duties by agreeing to the net‐worth dividend and by unlawfully succumbing to the direction of Treasury and that Treasury exceeded its statutory authority and failed to follow proper procedures. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 4617(f) bars “any” judicial interference with the “exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator.” The purpose of the conservatorship is the “reorganizing, rehabilitation, or winding up” of the companies’ affairs, not just the preservation of assets. Wiping out Treasury’s acceptance of the original agreements or the Third Amendment would undermine the conservatorships. View "Roberts v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

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R.E.E. & C. Capital Management Services, Inc. (buyer) appealed a trial court order granting People’s United Bank’s motion to compel buyer to complete the purchase of a foreclosed commercial property. Buyer raised three arguments: (1) it was not a party to the foreclosure sale, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to compel it to purchase the property; (2) the trial court erred in declining to apply the statutory remedy; and, (3) the trial court erred in ordering specific performance because an adequate remedy at law exists. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined a high bidder’s successful bid in a judicial sale, and the court’s subsequent confirmation of the foreclosure sale pursuant to 12 V.S.A. 4954(a), renders a buyer a limited party such that the court is authorized to issue orders directing the buyer’s action relative to the property’s purchase. The Court found 12 V.S.A. 4954 (e) did not limit the Bank’s remedies: “the legal right to an agreement’s completion does not arise exclusively from Vermont’s foreclosure statutes.” However, the Supreme Court found that while specific performance was a permissible remedy in some instances, the trial court did not engage in the analysis of whether this case was one of those instances. Therefore, the trial court’s order of specific performance was an abuse of its discretion, leading the Supreme Court to reverse and remand this case for the trial court to perform that analysis. View "People's United Bank, NA v. Alana Provencale, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court’s judgment dismissing US Bank’s complaint against HLC Escrow, Inc. and First American Title Insurance Company, vacating only its dismissal of US Bank’s claim against First American alleging violation of Maine’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), which the First Circuit concluded was timely filed. US Bank, the current holder of a 2007 mortgage that incorrectly identified a parcel of unimproved land rather than the correct parcel of improved land that encompassed the mortgagors’ residence, sued the closing agent and the title insurer in 2016. The complaint included causes of action for negligence and “duty of care” against HLC Escrow, and negligence, unilateral mistake, and violation of USCPA against First American. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, concluding that Maine’s six-year statute of limitations for civil actions barred US Bank’s claims. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal with respect to US Bank’s USCPA claim against First American and otherwise affirmed, holding that the USCPA claim was timely for statute of limitations purposes but that the remainder of US Bank’s claims were untimely filed. View "US Bank, N.A. v. HLC Escrow, Inc." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court’s judgment dismissing US Bank’s complaint against HLC Escrow, Inc. and First American Title Insurance Company, vacating only its dismissal of US Bank’s claim against First American alleging violation of Maine’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), which the First Circuit concluded was timely filed. US Bank, the current holder of a 2007 mortgage that incorrectly identified a parcel of unimproved land rather than the correct parcel of improved land that encompassed the mortgagors’ residence, sued the closing agent and the title insurer in 2016. The complaint included causes of action for negligence and “duty of care” against HLC Escrow, and negligence, unilateral mistake, and violation of USCPA against First American. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, concluding that Maine’s six-year statute of limitations for civil actions barred US Bank’s claims. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal with respect to US Bank’s USCPA claim against First American and otherwise affirmed, holding that the USCPA claim was timely for statute of limitations purposes but that the remainder of US Bank’s claims were untimely filed. View "US Bank, N.A. v. HLC Escrow, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia: 1) Whether Georgia's apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. 51-12-33, applies to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers; 2) whether section 51-12-33 abrogated Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert; and 3) whether, in a negligence action premised upon the negligence of individual board members in their decisionmaking processes, a decision of a bank's board of directors is a "concerted action" such that the board members should be held jointly and severally liable for negligence. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Loudermilk" on Justia Law