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Cita Trust appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint against Fifth Third Bank in a commercial contract dispute action. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint as untimely and enforcing the contractual one-year limitation period. In this case, the agreement's limitation provision was reasonable, clear, and unambiguous. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cita leave to amend its complaint, because Cita did not properly move for leave to amend. View "Cita Trust Company AG v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's efforts to recover fraudulent transfers made as a part of a Ponzi scheme. The complaint alleged that because plaintiff's letter to the president of Washington Mutual had advised Washington Mutual and the FDIC of her claim, she was entitled to receive, and had not received, mailed notice of the bar date under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1821. The court held that, taken together, the allegations in the amended complaint showed that although plaintiff mailed a letter to the bank's subsidiary, she did not receive mailed notice of the bar date from the FDIC, and consequently she did not file her claim with the FDIC until months after the bar date had passed, despite being an experienced trustee actively pursuing related bankruptcy claims. View "Feldman v. FDIC" on Justia Law

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Fong, born in China in 1931, moved to San Francisco as a young man and became a real estate investor. Fong had a banking relationship with the Bank, where he had more than $3.5 million dollars on deposit. Loans involving the Bank, Fong, and UTGI, a California corporation formed by young investors who were family friends of Fong, whom Fong was assisting in establishing a real estate investment business, were not timely paid. The Bank liquidated assets Fong had pledged as collateral. In a suit claiming conversion and financial abuse of an elder under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, Fong alleged that he did not understand certain documents and that documents were forged. The trial court granted the Bank summary judgment and determined that as the “prevailing party” the Bank was “entitled to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,” of $202,069.75 and $6,290.05. The court of appeal reversed finding a triable issue of material fact regarding the genuineness of Fong’s signature on the documents authorizing repayment of a loan with respect to one of Fong’s conversion claims. View "Fong v. East West Bank" on Justia Law

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The district court erred in ruling that the coguarantors of a loan were not entitled to contribution from other guarantors of an underlying debt because the funds used to make the payments on the debt were provided to them by their respective parents. Here, the parents of the coguarantors provided funds to their children to pay part of the underlying debt. The funds were placed in accounts owned or co-owned by the coguarantors, who then paid down a debt with funds drawn from these accounts. The coguarantors sought contribution from the other guarantors of the underlying debt. The district court and court of appeals ruled against the coguarantors. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the coguarantors were entitled to contribution from other guarantors on the undisputed facts of this case. View "Shcharansky v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

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Relator filed a quit tam action under the False Claims Act against Chase, alleging that Chase falsely claimed compliance with a Settlement. Relator also alleged that Chase falsely claimed compliance with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The DC Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff was required to exhaust his contentions pursuant to the procedures of the Settlement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims regarding the Settlement on a related basis. In this case, the Monitor was aware of the practices and concluded that Chase was in compliance. To the extent that relator vaguely alleged that Chase sought credit for loans that otherwise did not qualify for relief under the Settlement, the complaint nowhere identified any ineligible loan Chase submitted for credit, alleged that the Monitor was unaware of any such loan's disqualifying characteristics, or claimed that the cumulative value of any such loans exceeded the $250 million buffer. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that relator failed to state a claim that Chase falsely certified HAMP compliance because he did not allege, with factual allegations in support, that the certifications were materially false. View "United States ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants on Bank’s complaint for a residential foreclosure, thus rejecting Bank’s allegations of error. On appeal, Bank argued that the district court erred in denying Bank’s motion to continue the trial and erred in determining that Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting loan servicing records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting the loan servicing records at issue pursuant to the business records exception; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bank’s motion for a continuance because Bank did not establish a substantial reason as to why a continuance would further the interests of justice. View "Keybank National Ass’n v. Estate of Eula W. Quint" on Justia Law

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In this case brought in connection with the sale of Plaintiffs’ home at a foreclosure sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ asserted negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims against Bank of America, N.A. and ReconTrust Company, N.A. pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court held (1) the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to state sufficient facts entitling them to relief on all essential elements of their asserted negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and MCPA claims; and (2) the district court did not err by not sua sponte converting ReconTrusts’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(d) upon the filing of an affidavit in support of Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition. View "Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

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The trial court in a second lawsuit against Defendants seeking reformation of a refinance deed of trust properly determined that the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel were satisfied and thus barred Plaintiffs from bringing the claims. Financial Institution, the former owner of a note for a refinance mortgage loan, sued Defendants, a married couple, for reformation of the refinance deed of trust because the wife had not signed the refinance deed of trust, leaving Financial Institution unable to institute foreclose proceedings against Defendants’ property. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. Three years later, the current owner of the note and the title insurer of the refinance mortgage loan (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Defendants for reformation of the refinance deed of trust. The trial court again in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from bringing and relitigating the claims in the second lawsuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court in the second lawsuit (1) properly declined to apply judicial estoppel to bar Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs were in privity with Financial Institution; and (2) correctly determined that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Plaintiffs from relitigating their claims in the second lawsuit. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Georg" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Fendon borrowed money from Bank of America, secured by a home mortgage. A borrower may rescind such a transaction for any reason within three days and for some reasons within three years, 15 U.S.C. 1635. Fendon alleges that he notified BOA on August 15, 2008; April 16, 2009; and June 17, 2010, that he was rescinding the loan, and that BOA ignored the first two notices and rejected the third. In 2011, BOA filed a foreclosure action. In 2016, a state court entered a final judgment confirming the foreclosure sale. Fendon filed suit under the Truth in Lending Act after the sale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Federal district courts lack authority to revise the judgments of state courts. Even damages relief, which would not disturb the state judgment, is untimely under the Act. If Fendon had filed suit before the foreclosure action, he might have had a strong argument that rescission could be enforced at any time but he did not. After BOA ignored his notices of rescission, he ignored BOA. By 2016, when he filed suit, the only possible relief was damages. BOA did not say or do anything after September 2008 that established either equitable tolling or estoppel. View "Fendon v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

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The Chois consulted in 2003 with defendants, who advised the Chois that an IRC 412(i) Plan retirement account would provide tax advantages, asset protection, and steady income. It required several steps including the purchase of “whole life” insurance for eventual exchange for American General Universal Life “Platinum” policies. The initial purchase was $1,275,000; a second purchase cost $439,000. The policies comprised 70-75 percent of the Plan portfolio. The IRS audited the Chois in 2006. Defendants changed their advice. Plaintiffs sued, alleging cash losses attributable to loss in value and that they were required to pay $440,000 in back taxes and interest, plus $60,000 in penalties, and faced future payments to the Franchise Tax Board of California and anticipated IRS penalties of $600,000. Defendants cross-complained for indemnity and comparative fault against American General. The trial court found the claims time-barred. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding a determination that the limitations period began to run in September 2007, when plaintiffs were “on notice” that the IRS would impose penalties, not in 2010 when penalties were assessed; the court declining to consider any tolling effect created by the ongoing fiduciary relationship; and application of the 2007 “notice” date as a bar to all claims. View "Choi v. Sagemark Consulting" on Justia Law