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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for HSBC in an action seeking to foreclose on defendant's property. The court held that HSBC was the holder of the home equity note and that defendant failed to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to HSBC's ownership of the note. The court also held that HSBC's suit was timely because defendant's bankruptcy suit tolled the statute of limitations for 127 days. Finally, the court held that defendant waived his argument that the district court erred when it signed and entered a final judgment that authorized a foreclosure sale of the property, without complying with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 309. View "HSBC Bank USA, NA v. Crum" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether Appellant Marilyn Newsome's claims could survive summary judgment against Appellees, People’s Bank and Chris Dunn. The claims addressed the issuance of cashier’s checks by People’s Bank and Chris Dunn without Newsome's signature or approval, the conservatorship account holder. Victoria Newsome had settled a medical malpractice case, but she was unable to manage her affairs. The trial court appointed Newsome, Victoria's mother, as conservator. A trial court denied a request to purchase a home for Victoria, and instead, ordered that a house be built for her. In the interim, the trial court ordered a mobile home to be purchased. With the help of Dunn, a Bank employee, Newsome opened a checking account for the conservatorship with the Bank. When Newsome opened the conservatorship account, she signed a Deposit Agreement as the sole authorized signor on the account. Newsome testified that she did not have any discussions with the Bank about who would be authorized to sign on the account. The Deposit Agreement also provided that Newsome had thirty days to review her statements for errors or unauthorized activity. The estate attorneys prepared court orders for release of funds to pay for construction of the house; the trial court would in turn approve the orders, and the attorney would deliver the orders to the Bank for release of funds. The Orders did not provide any guidance, particularly whether cashier's checks could be issued to disburse the money. Despite frequent visits to the bank herself, Newsome allegedly never sought monthly accounting of the conservator account. Newsome filed suit, alleging the Bank and Dunn were liable for failing to require Newsome's signature on any checks negotiated on the conservatorship account. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Newsome's case could indeed survive summary judgment, reversed the trial court in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newsome v. Peoples Bancshares" on Justia Law

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The Trusts initiated before FINRA an arbitration proceeding against the eight individuals who had owned Banque Pictet as partners and others, including Pictet Overseas, seeking to recover losses from custodial accounts with Banque Pictet. Pictet Overseas and the Partners then filed an action in federal district court, seeking to enjoin the arbitration, contending that, even if Rule 12200 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes required Pictet Overseas to arbitrate certain claims before FINRA, it did not require Pictet Overseas or the Partners to arbitrate the Trusts' claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the Trusts' claims were non-arbitrable and held that FINRA Rule 12200 did not require arbitration. In this case, the Trusts' claims did not arise in connection with Pictet Overseas' or the Partners' business activities. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order permanently enjoining the Trusts from arbitrating in a FINRA forum their claims against Pictet Overseas and the Partners. View "Pictet Overseas Inc. v. Helvetia Trust" on Justia Law

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In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs alleged that their mortgage servicers, SLS and Caliber, breached plaintiffs' loan contracts, as well as an implied coverage of good faith and fair dealing, by charging inflated amounts for force-placed insurance. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the cases under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, holding that the filed-rate doctrine applied because plaintiffs challenged a rate filed with regulators. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims were barred because the filed-rate doctrine precluded any judicial action which undermined agency rate-making authority. View "Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

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GHB Construction and Development Company, Inc. ("GHB"), sued West Alabama Bank and Trust ("WABT") seeking a judgment declaring that its materialman's lien against property owned by Penny Guin was superior to WABT's mortgage lien secured by the same property owned by Guin. Upon motion by WABT, the circuit court dismissed GHB's complaint. In reversing the circuit court, the Alabama Supreme Court found WABT's argument was based on authority that assumed that a mortgage lien was properly created before the creation of a materialman's lien; the issue then became whether future advances issued subsequent to the creation of the materialman's lien related back to the priority date of the mortgage lien.Because WABT's mortgage lien was created after GHB's materialman's lien, WABT's mortgage lien never had priority over GHB's materialman's lien. The earliest date the future advances issued by WABT to Guin could relate back to was October 16, 2015, the date of the first advance to Guin. "Even if WABT is correct in arguing that the advances made to Guin relate back to the date the mortgage lien was created, based on the allegations of the complaint, it is possible for GHB to prove that its materialman's lien was created before WABT's mortgage lien. Accordingly, we need not analyze WABT's argument; the authority relied upon by WABT is distinguishable from the present case." The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "GHB Construction and Development Company, Inc. v. West Alabama Bank and Trust" on Justia Law

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After plaintiff's foreclosure action was dismissed, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay attorney fees to defendants, finding certain provisions in the deed of trust she signed authorized the fee award. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the deed of trust authorized the addition of attorney fees to the loan amount, not a separate award to pay fees. The court also held that the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act provided no independent basis for ordering plaintiff to pay attorney fees. Accordingly, the trial court's order compelling plaintiff to pay attorney fees was reversed and the matter remanded. View "Chacker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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After the magistrate judge concluded, on remand, that defendants met the remaining requirements to foreclose on their mortgage under Texas law, the Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. The court held that the magistrate judge defied a previous mandate and contravened the law of the case doctrine by concluding that the court's prior opinion was clearly erroneous and that failure to correct the error would result in manifest injustice. In this case, the magistrate judge found no impediment to foreclosure other than a supposed defect in the assignment, and any such imperfection did not change the fact that MERS and its successors and assigns were entitled to foreclose on defendants' property. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Burke" on Justia Law

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12 U.S.C. 1715z-20(j) can not be read to prevent foreclosure pursuant to a reverse-mortgage contract that, by its terms, permits the lender to demand repayment immediately following a borrower's death, even if his or her non-borrowing spouse continues to live in the mortgaged property. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute addressed and limited only the Secretary's authority—specifying the types of mortgages that HUD "may not insure"—and thus did not alter or affect the rights that a lender independently possessed under a reverse-mortgage contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Live Well's motion to dismiss because, even if HUD should not have insured the mortgage at issue, section 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit Live Well's right to foreclose under the terms of its valid mortgage contract. View "The Estate of Caldwell Jones, Jr. v. Live Well Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

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Federal law bars “any person who has been convicted of any criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust” from becoming or continuing as an employee of any institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 12 U.S.C. 1829(a)(1)(A) (Section 19) without regard to the age of the convictions. Disqualified persons may apply to the FDIC for waivers. Banking institutions may sponsor waiver applications. Wells Fargo, an FDIC-insured bank, requires job applicants to answer whether they had a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty. In 2010, Wells Fargo instituted a fingerprint-based background check for current and potential employees, which returns all criminal convictions. In 2012, Wells Fargo re-screened its entire Home Mortgage division, then terminated employees verified to have Section 19 disqualifications, without informing them of the availability of waivers or offering to sponsor waivers. Wells Fargo terminated at least 136 African Americans, 56 Latinos, and 28 white employees because of Section 19 disqualifications, and withdrew at least 1,350 conditional job offers to African Americans and Latinos and 354 non-minorities. In a suit, alleging race-based employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the court granted Wells Fargo summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Even if Wells Fargo’s policy of summarily terminating or not hiring any disqualified individual creates a disparate impact, the bank’s decision to comply with the statute’s command is a business necessity under Title VII. View "Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Pittman's mortgage note requires that Pittman pay $1,980.42 monthly. iServe initially serviced the loan. Pittman failed to make two payments in 2011. iServe granted Pittman a Trial Modification Plan (TPP) under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program. Pittman was to make three $1,357.80 payments in 2012; “[a]fter all trial period payments are timely made ... your mortgage will be permanently modified.” Pittman made the payments but the TPP was never made permanent in writing. Pittman continued to make reduced payments. Servicing of the loan was assigned to BSI, which sent Pittman a notice of default. Pittman’s attorney, Borman discovered that iServe did not report the modification to the Treasury Department. In January 2013, iServe emailed BSI that“[t]he borrower … made all payments on time, contractually entitling him to a permanent mod [sic] in April 2012.” BSI told Pittman to continue the trial payment amount. In 2014, Pittman obtained a credit report, which showed that both servicers had reported his payments as past due. Pittman sent letters to credit reporting agencies disputing the information. The loan servicers concluded that the payments were untimely as reported. In addition, BSI had not made property tax payments from Pittman's escrow account. Pittman sued, alleging negligent and willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681n, 1681o. The court granted the servicers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The reasonableness of the investigations is a question for the trier of fact to resolve. Pittman’s missed payments did not constitute a substantial breach, so Michigan’s first substantial breach rule does not prevent Pittman from bringing a breach of contract claim against BSI. View "Pittman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law