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Plaintiffs filed suit against their loan servicer, Rushmore, in state court for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and injunctive relief. After removal to federal court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that Rushmore violated the Minnesota statutory requirements for handling foreclosures pursuant to Minn. Stat. 582.043, and added U.S. Bank as a party. The Minnesota Supreme court answered a certified question and held that the lis pendens deadline contained in section 582.043, subd. 7(b) cannot be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The Eighth Circuit held that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision resolved this appeal, because plaintiffs failed to file the lis pendens within their redemption period as required by section 582.043, subd. 7(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Litterer v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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Lossia used a Flagstar Bank checking account to initiate Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions--electronic payments made from one bank account to another. Common ACH transactions include online bill pay and an employee’s direct deposit. The account agreement states: Our policy is to process wire transfers, phone transfers, online banking transfers, in branch transactions, ATM transactions, debit card transactions, ACH transactions, bill pay transactions and items we are required to pay, such as returned deposited items, first—as they occur on their effective date for the business day on which they are processed.” National Automated Clearing House Association Operating Rules and Guidelines define an ACH transaction's effective date as “the date specified by the Originator on which it intends a batch of Entries to be settled.” In practice, this date is whatever date the merchant or bank submits the transaction to the Federal Reserve, which includes this settlement date in the batch records that it submits to the receiving institution (Flagstar), which processes the transactions in the order that they were presented by the Federal Reserve in the batch files. Lossia asserted that the order in which Flagstar processed his transactions caused him to incur multiple overdrafts rather than just one. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Flagstar; the plain language of the agreement does not require Flagstar to process transactions in the order that the customer initiated them. View "Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for Wells Fargo in a third lawsuit arising between the parties involving the foreclosure of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff alleged that the bank violated Minn. Stat. 582.043 when it continued with foreclosure proceedings after he had submitted an application for a loan modification, and Wells Fargo brought a counterclaim against him for breach of a prior settlement agreement. The court held that plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata because he could have brought the claim during the 2013 foreclosure litigation and he had an opportunity to litigate the claim fairly and fully if he had timely raised it. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings for Wells Fargo on the bank's counterclaim where plaintiff was not discharged from his obligation to perform under the settlement agreement. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend on futility grounds. View "Lansing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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This mandamus proceeding arose from a dispute about a contract’s forum-selection clause. Trinity Bank loaned money to Apex, a drilling company. Michael Lachner, a part owner of Apex and the relator in this case, signed a personal guaranty of the loan. Apex defaulted on the loan, and Lachner defaulted on the guaranty. Trinity filed an action asserting separate breach of contract claims against Apex (on the loan) and Lachner (on the guaranty). Apex made no appearance, and a default judgment was entered against it. Lachner filed a motion to dismiss the action against him under ORCP 21 A(1), because the action was not filed in San Francisco as required by the forum-selection clause. Neither party disputed the meaning of the forum-selection clause, only whether it should be enforced. The trial court denied the motion, without making any findings or conclusions of law, stating that it “ha[d] discretion in [the] matter.” After review of the clause at issue, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the clause should be enforced. The Court found none of the circumstances identified in Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P3d 328 (2015) (as grounds for invalidating a contractual forum-selection clause) were present here. “Trinity’s objections amount to little more than dissatisfaction with the forum selection clause. The trial court’s factual findings indicate that Oregon might be a marginally more convenient place than California to litigate the case, but that is not the applicable legal standard. . . . As counsel for Trinity conceded at oral argument, it is not unfair or unreasonable to litigate the case in California. For that reason, the trial court did not have discretion to deny Lachner’s ORCP 21A (1) motion to dismiss based on the forum-selection clause: The law required the court to dismiss the action. It was legal error not to do so.” A peremptory writ of mandamus issued. View "Trinity v. Apex Directional Drilling LLC" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Wells Fargo, a mortgage servicer, in an action alleging that Wells Fargo failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the accuracy of its credit reporting of her mortgage loan, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The court held that plaintiff could not prevail on her claim against Wells Fargo under section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA without identifying some fact in the record establishing that the information Wells Fargo reported regarding her account was inaccurate or incomplete. In this case, regardless of whether plaintiff may have been confused about how her account would be reported to the credit rating agencies, and whether Wells Fargo could have better explained to her how the account would be reported, she did not meet her payment obligations under the note. Finally, any omissions did not render plaintiff's credit report misleading. View "Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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The 2007 mortgage crisis pushed to near-default the government-sponsored Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), collectively, “the Enterprises.” The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. 4511, established an independent agency, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to regulate the Enterprises and the Federal Home Loan Banks. FHFA’s Director placed the Enterprises under the Agency’s conservatorship. SFR owns Nevada properties, acquired from homeowners’ associations (HOAs) following foreclosures on liens for unpaid association dues. FHFA obtained a summary judgment declaration that HERA's Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(3) preempts any Nevada law that would permit a foreclosure on a superiority lien to extinguish a property interest of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac while they are under FHFA’s conservatorship, that the HOA Sale did not extinguish the Enterprises’ interest in the properties and did not convey the properties free and clear to SFR, and that title to the properties is quieted in either Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s favor insofar as the Defendants’ interest, if any, is subject to the interest of the Enterprises or the interest of the Enterprises’ successors. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under HERA, FHFA possessed enforceable interests in the properties at the time of the HOA foreclosure sales. Nevada law did not provide SFR with a constitutionally-protected property interest in purchasing the houses with clear title, and, even assuming such an interest, SFR had adequate procedural protections. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding that a cause of action for acknowledgment of a debt must be “specifically and clearly” pleaded “in plain and emphatic terms” because this holding conflicts with Tex. R. Civ. P. 47(a), which provides that a pleading is “sufficient” if it gives “fair noice of the claim involved.” A Trust sued Defendants seeking payment on a debt. Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the Trust’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the Trust had not properly pleaded acknowledgment. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that while the Trust had raised acknowledgment in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it had failed to plead acknowledgement as a cause of action because it had not done so “specifically and clearly” and in “plain and emphatic terms.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Trust provided fair notice to Defendants of its claim on their acknowledgment and thus satisfied Rule 47, and the court of appeals erred in requiring a higher standard. View "DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose out of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, and centered on the ownership of a federal tax refund. The tax refund was issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI), a thrift holding company that had, under the terms of a written “Tax Allocation Agreement,” filed consolidated returns on behalf of itself and several subsidiary corporations. The tax refund was the result, however, of net operating losses incurred by United Western Bank (the Bank), one of UWBI’s subsidiaries. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated this adversary proceeding against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, alleging that the tax refund was owned by UWBI and was thus part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. The FDIC appealed to the district court, which reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The Trustee appealed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the tax refund belonged to the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. FDIC" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose out of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, and centered on the ownership of a federal tax refund. The tax refund was issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI), a thrift holding company that had, under the terms of a written “Tax Allocation Agreement,” filed consolidated returns on behalf of itself and several subsidiary corporations. The tax refund was the result, however, of net operating losses incurred by United Western Bank (the Bank), one of UWBI’s subsidiaries. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated this adversary proceeding against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, alleging that the tax refund was owned by UWBI and was thus part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. The FDIC appealed to the district court, which reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The Trustee appealed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the tax refund belonged to the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. FDIC" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether a certificate of title was entered when a deed was accepted by the Office of the Assistant Registrar of the Land Court and stamped with a new certificate of title number. Plaintiff-mortgagor brought this action against Defendant-purchaser arguing that the non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain property was not lawfully conducted. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff’s arguments to invalidate the foreclosure sale were untimely because they were not raised before the issuance of a new certificate of title. Plaintiff argued in response that a new certificate of title had not been issued, and therefore, Plaintiff was not prevented from challenging the non-judicial foreclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that the issuance of a new certificate of title number was sufficient to provide Defendant with statutory protection. The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) assignment of a new certificate of title number is not the statutory equivalent of an entry of a certificate of title, and therefore, the evidence in this case did not establish that a certificate of title had been entered; (2) accordingly, Plaintiff was not barred from bringing this action; and (3) an issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya" on Justia Law