Petitioner, a bank, filed suit against Respondent seeking the outstanding balance remaining on a loan it made to him in 2012. Rather than litigate the matter, Respondent entered into an “Agreed Order Confessing Judgment” with the Bank for the full amount. The circuit court entered the order and dismissed the matter. Thereafter, the Bank’s vice president, who also arranged Respondent’s loan, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the confessed judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that after he learned of the vice president’s conviction, he suspected there were improprieties regarding his loan. The circuit court concluded that relief from judgment was justified, finding that the circumstances surrounding the loan made the loan questionable and that a decision on the merits was favored. Petitioner subsequently filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Respondent’s motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment. View "State ex rel. First State Bank v. Hon. F. Jane Hustead" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lender who takes possession of property but does not become the fee simple record owner of the property through foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is liable for homeowners’ association assessments. The resolution of the question was not addressed on appeal, however. Petitioner, a homeowners association, filed a complaint against Respondent, a bank, alleging that Respondent had failed to pay homeowners’ association dues since taking possession of property. The district court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner’s appeal from the district court to a circuit court was untimely. View "Brownstones at Park Potomac Homeowners Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Harrises bought tens of thousands of shares in Bancorp through a TD Ameritrade account. Six years later, the Harrises sought to hold some of their Bancorp stock in another form, registered in their name and reflected in a physical copy of a certificate signifying their ownership. TD Ameritrade refused to convert the Harrises’ form of ownership, stating that all Bancorp stock was in a “global lock,” prohibiting activity in the stock, including changing the Harrises’ form of ownership. The lock was created because someone had fraudulently created hundreds of millions of invalid shares of Bancorp stock. The Harrises sued, alleging that TD Ameritrade had violated SEC Rule 15c3-3 and Nebraska’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal.. Neither the SEC Rule nor Nebraska’s Commercial Code creates a private right of action to vindicate the alleged problem. View "Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs defaulted on their residential mortgage loan, they sought to enjoin BNY from foreclosing by claiming that the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to BNY was void. Plaintiffs also filed a false-lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002 against BNY and MERS. The district court granted BNY's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BNY’s efforts to foreclose on the ground that MERS’s assignment to BNY was void for violating the PSA. Because plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing BNY’s lien was in fact fraudulent, plaintiffs have failed to state a false lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ferguson v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that she was the victim of an identity theft scheme perpetrated by employees of Chase, and seeks to hold Chase liable for this identity theft under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380-1, 380-s. At issue was whether plaintiff's suit is preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. The court held that 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only those claims that concern a defendant’s responsibilities as a furnisher of information under the FCRA. The court concluded that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint advances claims against Chase for identity theft under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380‐l and 380‐s based on acts of identity theft perpetrated by Chase employees, as distinct from any erroneous or otherwise wrongful actions by Chase in furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies. These identity theft claims are not preempted because they do not concern Chase’s responsibilities as a furnisher. The court further concluded that, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief based on Chase’s erroneous or otherwise improper furnishing of information to consumer reporting agencies, those claims are preempted. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was assured by Bank that he would qualify for and receive a small business, government-backed loan. After Plaintiff was notified that no government-backed loan was available and aware that he had various potential causes of action against Bank, Plaintiff nonetheless sought and obtained a new commercial loan from the Bank and subsequently expressly waived all offsets and defenses. More than six years after Plaintiff first became aware that no government-backed loan was available, he filed a complaint alleging that he obtained the commercial loan in reliance upon the Bank’s representation that the government-backed loan was forthcoming. Bank raised the statutes of limitation as an affirmative defense and filed a compulsory counterclaim to collect on the amount owed on the commercial loan. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff chose to obtain a new commercial loan after learning no government-backed loan was available and repeatedly reaffirmed his obligations under the commercial loan and expressly waived any offsets and defenses to the loan and against Bank. Remanded. View "Ussery v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

A Bank issued two loans to an LLC guaranteed by two Guarantors. After the LLC defaulted, the Bank sued the LLC and the Guarantors for the outstanding indebtedness. Plaintiff then sold the properties at a foreclosure proceeding at which it was the sole bidder. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed all claims against the Bank. The Guarantors moved to join the LLC as a defendant in the action. The trial court entered an order ruling that joinder of the LLC was appropriate. The court then entered summary judgment against the Guarantors on the issue of their liability for payment of the deficiency. The LLC and the Guarantors then amended their answers to assert the anti-deficiency defense set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.36. After a trial, the court reduced the Guarantors’ liability pursuant to section 45-21.36, concluding that once the LLC was joined as a party, the Guarantors were entitled to benefit from the LLC’s use of section 45-21.36. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LLC was properly joined in this case; and (2) irrespective of the LLC’s presence in the litigation, the non-mortgagor Guarantors were entitled to raise the anti-deficiency defense. View "High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC" on Justia Law

On October 14, 2010, OneWest Bank sued Standard, as trustee, and unknown trust beneficiaries, to foreclose a “reverse equity” adjustable-rate mortgage on property held by the trust and executed in 2009. Standard filed an answer and counterclaim on July 19, 2011, seeking to rescind the mortgage, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 15 U.S.C. 1601. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Standard was not an “obligor” under TILA and was not entitled to rescind the transaction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The trustee has legal and equitable title to the property and is the only party with an ownership interest in the property since the beneficiary’s interest is in the trust itself and is considered personal property. Standard, was entitled to receive TILA disclosures, including notice of the right to rescind after it entered into the consumer credit transaction. Because TILA disclosures were not provided to Standard, the three-day right to rescind period was extended to three years. Standard timely exercised its right to rescind when it gave notice on June 2, 2011. View "Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Standard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower action against FRBNY, her former employer, and three of its employees. The district court dismissed the suit and determined, inter alia, that palintiff could not maintain claims against the employees under the banking agency whistleblower protection statute, 12 U.S.C. 1831j(a)(2). The court concluded that neither sharing an interest in the financial well‐being of a company nor sharing information about that company leads to a reasonable inference that the employees were performing services for the FDIC. Further, plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of plausibly showing that the employees were performing a service on behalf of the FDIC, as required under the whistleblower protection statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Segarra v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y." on Justia Law

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP filed a complaint for foreclosure against Scott and Kristina Greenleaf. Bank of America, N.A. (the Bank) was substituted for BAC after the entities merged. After a trial, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment based on the Bank’s lack of standing. On remand, the district court dismissed without prejudice the action due to the Bank’s standing defect. Scott appealed, arguing that the court was compelled to enter judgment in his favor because the Court vacated the Bank’s judgment after a completed trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court properly disposed of the case by entering a dismissal without prejudice. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law