Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Three trade associations representing state-chartered banks challenged Colorado’s decision to opt out of a federal law, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA), which sets national standards for interest rates that state banks may charge. In 2023, Colorado exercised its opt-out right under DIDA and announced it would enforce its own interest-rate caps on loans made to Colorado borrowers, including those made by out-of-state banks. The trade associations argued that Colorado’s opt-out should only apply to loans made by banks physically located in Colorado, not to loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado residents.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado agreed with the trade associations. It granted a preliminary injunction preventing Colorado officials from enforcing the state’s interest-rate caps against out-of-state banks making loans to Colorado borrowers. The district court found that the plaintiffs had a viable cause of action under Ex parte Young, were likely to succeed on the merits, and would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also determined that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the phrase “loans made in such State” in DIDA’s opt-out provision refers to loans in which either the lender or the borrower is located in the opt-out state. Therefore, Colorado’s opt-out applies to loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado borrowers, and DIDA no longer preempts Colorado’s interest-rate caps for those loans. The Tenth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction, finding that the district court erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "National Association of Industrial Bankers v. Weiser" on Justia Law

Custodia Bank, a Wyoming-chartered, nonmember bank with a business model focused on digital assets, applied for a master account with the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (FRBKC). Although FRBKC acknowledged Custodia’s statutory eligibility for such an account, it ultimately denied the application, citing concerns that Custodia’s crypto-focused operations posed undue risk to the Federal Reserve’s payment systems. Custodia then filed suit against both FRBKC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, arguing that federal law required the Federal Reserve to grant master account access to all eligible institutions, regardless of risk.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming initially allowed Custodia’s statutory entitlement claims to proceed, while dismissing constitutional claims. After FRBKC formally denied Custodia’s application, Custodia amended its complaint to focus on statutory entitlement under the Monetary Control Act and related statutes. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the relevant statutes did not create a nondiscretionary duty to grant master accounts to all eligible applicants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the plain language of the Federal Reserve Act and the Monetary Control Act grants Federal Reserve Banks discretion to approve or deny master account applications from eligible entities. The court found that neither the statutes nor subsequent amendments mandated automatic access for all qualifying institutions. The court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Custodia’s claims against the Board for lack of final agency action. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Custodia Bank v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors" on Justia Law

The case concerns the former President and CEO of a New Orleans-based commercial bank, who was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and making false entries in bank records. The evidence at trial showed that he, along with other bank employees and borrowers, engaged in a scheme to misrepresent the creditworthiness of certain borrowers. This allowed the bank to issue loans to insolvent individuals, who then used the proceeds to pay off overdue and overdraft loans, thereby concealing the true financial state of the bank’s loan portfolio. The defendant did not dispute the existence of these loans but argued that he lacked the intent to defraud the bank.After the bank failed in 2017, resulting in significant losses to the FDIC, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant and several co-conspirators. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, while the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 170 months in prison and ordered to pay substantial restitution. The district court denied his post-trial motions for acquittal, arrest of judgment, and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the admission of lay and summary testimony, and the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the government’s handling of privileged emails. The Fifth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, the jury instructions were proper and tracked the relevant law, the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, and the government’s conduct regarding privileged material did not warrant dismissal. The court affirmed the jury’s verdict in full. View "USA v. Ryan" on Justia Law

A group of borrowers in California brought a class action against Flagstar Bank, alleging that the bank failed to pay interest on their mortgage escrow accounts as required by California Civil Code § 2954.8(a). Flagstar did not pay interest on these accounts, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted the California law, and therefore, it was not obligated to comply. The plaintiffs sought restitution for the unpaid interest.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court ordered Flagstar to pay restitution and prejudgment interest to the class. Flagstar appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Lusnak foreclosed Flagstar’s preemption argument. However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to correct the class definition date and the judgment amount due to errors in the statute of limitations tolling and calculation of damages.On remand from the United States Supreme Court, following its decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it could overrule Lusnak in light of Cantero. The court held that Cantero did not render Lusnak “clearly irreconcilable” with Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, the panel lacked authority to overrule Lusnak. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the NBA does not preempt California’s interest-on-escrow law, but vacated and remanded the judgment and class certification order for modification of the class definition date and judgment amount. View "KIVETT V. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB" on Justia Law

A borrower in Rhode Island financed a home purchase with a mortgage from a national bank. The mortgage required the borrower to make advance payments for property taxes and insurance into an escrow account managed by the bank. The bank did not pay interest on these escrowed funds, despite a Rhode Island statute mandating that banks pay interest on such accounts. Years later, the borrower filed a class action lawsuit against the bank, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment for failing to pay the required interest under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the bank that the National Bank Act preempted the Rhode Island statute. The court reasoned that the state law imposed limits on the bank’s federal powers, specifically the power to establish escrow accounts, and thus significantly interfered with the bank’s incidental powers under federal law. The court did not address class certification or the merits of the unjust enrichment claim, focusing solely on preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., which clarified the standard for preemption under the National Bank Act. The First Circuit held that the district court erred by not applying the nuanced, comparative analysis required by Cantero. The appellate court found that the bank failed to show that the Rhode Island statute significantly interfered with its federal banking powers or conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the borrower’s claims to proceed. View "Conti v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, two banking organizations, challenged a guidance document issued by a federal agency that oversees insured banks. The guidance, known as FIL 32, addresses the practice of charging multiple non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees when a single transaction is presented for payment more than once. The guidance warns that such practices may pose a risk of being considered unfair or deceptive under federal law, particularly if customers are not adequately informed or given an opportunity to avoid additional fees. The plaintiffs argued that this guidance effectively acts as a binding regulation, requiring compliance measures and increasing their risk of enforcement, and that it was issued without following required rulemaking procedures.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the guidance. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not redressable and that the guidance did not constitute a final agency action subject to judicial review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on the alternative ground that the plaintiffs’ claims were not ripe for judicial review. The appellate court held that the guidance was not a final agency action because it did not impose binding obligations or legal consequences, nor did it compel the banks to take or refrain from specific actions. The court found that the guidance merely outlined supervisory expectations and risk-mitigation practices, without creating enforceable rules or safe harbors. The court also determined that withholding judicial review would not cause significant hardship to the plaintiffs, as the enforcement risk existed independently of the guidance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Minnesota Bankers Assoc. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Two former officers and directors of a Texas community bank faced regulatory action after the bank failed in 2013 following significant losses during the 2008 financial crisis. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) alleged that the individuals engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices, breached fiduciary duties, and filed materially inaccurate reports. The OCC’s claims centered on three main strategies: the bank’s practice of making loans to finance purchases of its holding company’s stock (which were then counted as capital), aggressive and risky sales of real estate owned by the bank, and improper accounting for nonaccrual loans. These actions allegedly overstated the bank’s capital and masked its true financial condition, ultimately resulting in substantial losses.After the OCC initiated an enforcement action in 2017, the matter was reassigned to a new Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC. The new ALJ ratified prior rulings, conducted a hearing, and issued a recommendation. The Comptroller adopted most of the ALJ’s findings but imposed industry bans and civil penalties on both petitioners, concluding that their conduct warranted prohibition from banking and monetary sanctions. The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the OCC’s enforcement action fell within the public rights doctrine, so the petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The court also found that the ALJ’s appointment was constitutionally valid, the enforcement action was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, and the agency’s evidentiary and procedural rulings were supported by substantial evidence. The court further upheld the Comptroller’s decision to impose prohibition orders and civil penalties, finding the preponderance of the evidence standard appropriate for such administrative proceedings. View "Ortega v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

A business owner, who held a 50% stake in a group of skilled-nursing and real estate companies, personally guaranteed a $77 million loan arranged by a bank for those companies and others managed by his business partner. The loan was part of a refinancing effort after the companies’ prior lender declared a default. The owner signed both an initial guaranty agreement and a subsequent reaffirmation of that guaranty. Within a year, the companies defaulted on the new loan, and it was later revealed that the business partner had engaged in fraudulent check-kiting. The bank demanded repayment from the guarantors, including the owner, who then argued that he had been fraudulently induced into signing the guaranty because the bank failed to disclose material financial risks related to his partner and the companies.The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the bank, finding that the owner had waived defenses under the guaranty agreement, that the bank owed no duty to disclose information about the companies’ financial condition, and that the owner could not establish fraudulent inducement. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that as a surety, the owner could assert a defense based on the bank’s alleged failure to disclose facts that materially increased his risk, adopting the “doctrine of increased risk” from Section 124(1) of the Restatement (First) of Security.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The court held that, under Ohio law, parties to an arm’s-length transaction do not owe each other a duty to disclose unknown facts that materially increase risk, unless a special relationship of trust or confidence exists. This rule applies regardless of whether one party is a guarantor or surety. The court reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank. View "Huntington Natl. Bank v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Baldwin County, Alabama, stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation and discovered three occupants: Timothy Buchanan, Jaleeshia Robinson, and Tyre Crawford. A search of the vehicle revealed forged and stolen identification cards, credit cards, and checks, as well as equipment for producing counterfeit checks. Buchanan admitted to cashing fraudulent checks using stolen or forged identification, and evidence showed he was in frequent communication with his co-defendants about the scheme. Robinson, who cooperated with the government, testified that Buchanan’s role was to cash checks, while she and Crawford created the fraudulent documents and stole checks from mailboxes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama presided over Buchanan’s jury trial. The jury acquitted him of one count of aggravated identity theft but convicted him on conspiracy to commit bank fraud, possession of five or more identification documents with intent to use or transfer, possession of counterfeited or forged securities, a second count of aggravated identity theft, and possession of stolen mail. The district court sentenced Buchanan to 116 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution. Buchanan challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for several convictions, the application of a sentencing enhancement for sophisticated means, and the calculation of restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Buchanan’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his convictions under an aiding and abetting theory, and that his aggravated identity theft conviction was not plainly erroneous under Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023), because the use of another’s identification was central to the predicate offense. However, the court vacated the sentence in part, finding error in the application of the sophisticated means enhancement and in the restitution calculation, and remanded for further proceedings on those issues. View "United States v. Buchanan" on Justia Law