Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Dragon Systems, Inc. (Dragon), a voice recognition software company that faced a deteriorating financial situation, hired Goldman Sachs (Goldman) to provide financial advice and assistance in connection with a possible merger. In 2000, Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. (Lernout & Hauspie) acquired Dragon. When it was discovered that Lernout & Hauspie had fraudulently overstated its earnings, the merged company filed for bankruptcy, and the Dragon name and technology were sold from the estate. Plaintiffs, two groups of Dragon shareholders, filed suit against Goldman, alleging negligent and intentional misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. A jury found in favor of Goldman on Plaintiffs’ common law claims, and district court found that Goldman had not violated chapter 93A. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly articulated the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claims and correctly applied that standard to its factual findings; and (2) Plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to a new trial on their common law claims because of evidentiary errors and erroneous jury instructions were without merit. View "Baker v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, St. Louis County adopted an ordinance that implemented a foreclosure mediation program requiring lenders to provide residential borrowers an opportunity to mediate prior to foreclosure. Two bankers filed suit against the County seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the ordinance was invalid. The circuit court sustained the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County possessed the charter authority to enact the ordinance, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the County’s police power, the ordinance was not preempted by state law, and the fees associated with the ordinance did not violate the Hancock Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was void and unenforceable ab initio because the County exceeded its charter authority in enacting the ordinance. View "Mo. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo." on Justia Law

Property Owners filed a lawsuit against a Mortgage Company, claiming that, by preparing deeds of trust and promissory notes for the Property Owners, the Mortgage Company (1) violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.010.2 and 484.020 by engaging in the "law business"; (2) committed an unlawful practice in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act; and (3) was unjustly enriched because it charged for services it did not perform or did not perform lawfully. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mortgage Company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Property Owners did not dispute that the Mortgage Company did not charge a separate fee or vary its customary charges for preparation of legal documents, there were no disputed material facts, entitling the Mortgage Company to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a judgment entered after a demurrer by three banks to plaintiff’s second amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The three banks were US Metro Bank, Wilshire State Bank, and Pacific City Bank. An employee of a corporation with responsibility to gather incoming checks made payable to the corporation and deposit those checks into the corporation’s bank account (in this case, the corporation’s accounting manager) stole some of the incoming checks and took them to a check cashing service where she forged the signature of one of the officers of the corporation and received hard cash in return. After discovery of the thefts, the corporation fired the accounting manager and tried to recoup at least some of its losses. In this case, the corporation’s recoupment effort included suing its own bank, the three check cashing services where the employee took the checks, and the three banks which received those checks from the check cashing services for deposit into those companies’ own accounts. The legal issue presented in this appeal was one of first impression in California: Does the interposition of the check cashing services between (a) the employee who stole the checks and (b) the three banks who took the checks from three check cashing companies and credited the accounts of those check cashing companies, relieve the banks of all duty of care under section 3405 of California’s Commercial Code? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: the three banks were the first banks to process the checks through the banking system, and, as “first banks,” they had a duty of care in the processing of those checks “‘to make certain all endorsements [were] valid; banks subsequently taking the paper have a right to rely on the forwarding bank.’” Check cashing companies are not banks, and should not be treated as banks for purposes of California’s Uniform Commercial Code. View "HH Computer Systems v. Pacific City Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the Bank violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1963 et seq., by failing to post an external notice of fees on its ATMs. While the suit was pending but before class certification, Congress amended the EFTA to eliminate the external notice requirement. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim and denied class certification. The court concluded that plaintiff has standing to bring her claim where Congress's determination that consumers were entitled to the fee information they need to decline a transaction before investing the time needed to initiate it protects a substantive, if small, right, and its deprivation is an injury-in-fact that allows plaintiff to pursue her claim; the Bank's attempt to "pick off" plaintiff's claim before the court could decide the issue of class certification fits squarely within the "relation back" doctrine, which saves her claim from mootness at this stage; the EFTA amendment eliminating the "two notice" provision does not apply retroactively to plaintiff's claim; and the EFTA amendment poses no more a barrier for putative class members than it does for plaintiff, for claims alleging violations before the amendment was enacted. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of class certification and remanded for further considerations. View "Mabary v. Home Town Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The district court approved a settlement agreement between representative plaintiffs and Bank of America in a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. The underlying litigation stemmed from Bank of America's negotiations with Merrill Lynch in 2008, which resulted in the two financial institutions merging in 2009. The court concluded that the district court did not violate the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi), 78u-4(a)(4), when it awarded reimbursement costs to representative plaintiffs; the notice of the statement of average amount of damages per share was not constitutionally deficient in violation of appellants' due process rights and the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in approving the notice; the award of attorneys' fees was reasonable and appellants failed to identify any specific abuse of discretion on the part of the district court; and appellants' remaining arguments are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Security Service Federal Credit Union (“SSFCU”), appealed a district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants- Appellees, including First American Mortgage Funding, LLC (“FAM”) and First American Mortgage, Inc.; and Stewart Title of California, Inc., Orange Coast Title Company of Southern California, and Lawyers Title Company (together, the “Closing Agents”). In August 2003, SSFCU’s predecessor in interest, New Horizons Community Credit Union, entered into a Funding Service Agreement with FAM, under which FAM originated 26 loans to individual borrowers for the purchase and construction of residential properties in Colorado and California. The Closing Agents performed closing procedures. SSFCU maintained that the FAM Defendants and Closing Agents, through a variety of acts and omissions, wrongfully induced New Horizons to fund these loans to straw borrowers. SSFCU further contended that the loan transactions were a vehicle to misappropriate some $14 million in loan proceeds. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether SSFCU had the right to pursue those claims pursuant to a 2007 Purchase and Assumption Agreement (“PAA”) between SSFCU and the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), as the liquidating agent for New Horizons. Both the NCUA and SSFCU argued that under the terms of the PAA, the NCUA transferred the “right, title and interest” in the loans and various other assets to SSFCU, including the claims at issue. As the parties to the agreement, the NCUA and SSFCU both understood that a transfer of “the right, title and interest” in the loans was intended to transfer any and all claims relating to those loans. On the other hand, the PAA also provided that “except as otherwise specifically provided” the NCUA retained the “the sole right to pursue claims . . . and to recover any and all losses incurred by the Liquidating Credit Union prior to liquidation.” According to the Defendants, absent a valid assignment from the NCUA, SSFCU could not sue on the claims contained in its Fourth Amended Complaint. The district court agreed with the Defendants. According to the district court, the NCUA retained all claims associated with New Horizons’ losses, it could rely upon the cooperation of SSFCU in pursuing those claims, and, therefore, SSFCU was not a proper party to pursue those claims. The district court did not address an affidavit from the NCUA (through its agent) that cast considerable doubt on its interpretation. The district court held that SSFCU was not a proper plaintiff to assert the claims set forth in its Fourth Amended Complaint and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the Defendants were neither parties to (or in privity with any party to) nor third-party beneficiaries of the PAA. "The PAA reflects no intent to benefit the Defendants, let alone allow them to enforce it. Essentially, the Defendants are seeking to enforce a right they contend the NCUA has—an exclusive right to the claims asserted by SSFCU3—which is contrary to the doctrine of prudential standing." View "Security Services v. First American Mortgage" on Justia Law

Construction Manager subcontracted with Subcontractor to do work on a construction project. After the project was substantially complete, Subcontractor recorded a mechanic’s lien for unpaid work on the project. Subcontractor then filed a complaint against Construction Manager as the general contractor of the project, the owner of the property (Landowner), and the bank that financed the project (Bank) to enforce its mechanic’s lien. Construction Manager did not enter an appearance in the case. The circuit court subsequently granted an application filed by Landowner and Bank and released the real estate that had been subject to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien. Bank filed a motion to dismiss the mechanic’s lien claim on the basis that Subcontractor failed to timely serve Construction Manager, who it alleged to be a necessary party to the mechanic’s lien enforcement action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the mechanic’s lien claim with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Construction Manager, as the general contractor, was not a necessary party to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien enforcement action. Remanded. View "Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the collapse of SIV, managed by Cheyne and structured by Morgan Stanley. PSERS and Commerzbank appealed from the final order of judgment denying class certification, dismissal of Commerzbank's claim for lack of standing; and dismissal of PSERS's claim because its presence as a party would destroy complete diversity, the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the denial of class certification and dismissal of PSERS; held that it was not a permissible exercise of discretion for the district court to limit Commerzbank's ability to establish its standing; certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that Commerzbank had acquired from a third party that had purchased securities a fraud claim against Morgan Stanley; and certified the question whether, if Commerzbank has standing, a reasonable trier of fact could hold Morgan Stanley liable for fraud based on the present record. View "Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System v. Morgan Stanley" on Justia Law

The Bank commenced this adversary proceeding in Restivo's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, seeking a judgment declaring that the security interest it acquired on January 4, 2005, had priority over the IRS's tax lien filed on January 10, 2005, regardless of the fact that it did not record its security interest until after the IRS had filed notice of its tax lien. The district court granted the Bank priority. The court rejected the district court's holding that Md. Code. Ann., Real Prop. 3-201 gives the Bank retroactive priority over the IRS, concluding that 26 U.S.C. 6323(h)(1)(A)'s use of the present perfect tense precludes giving effect to the Maryland statute's relation-back provision. However, the court affirmed the judgment based on the ground that under Maryland common law, the Bank acquired an equitable security interest in the two parcels of real property on January 4, regardless of recordation, because its interest became protected against a subsequent lien arising out of an unsecured obligation on that date and that therefore its security interest had priority over the IRS's tax lien under sections 6323(a) and 6323(h)(1). View "Susquehanna Bank v. United States/Internal Revenue" on Justia Law