Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Respondent obtained a home mortgage loan from Lender. Lender obtained a mortgage lender bond from Petitioner and later filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Code. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint naming Petitioner as defendant solely as surety for Lender. At the time this suit was filed, Lender was bankrupt and judgment proof. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the bond conditions had not been satisfied because Respondent had not obtained a judgment against the bond principal, Lender. The circuit court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the bond at issue was a judgment bond and that the unambiguous bond language requires an aggrieved party to obtain a judgment against the principal before maintaining an action against the surety of the bond. View "Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. James" on Justia Law

Between 2009 and 2012, Sunshine and Purdy, a Kentucky dairy farmer, entered into “Dairy Cow Leases.” Purdy received 435 cows to milk, and, in exchange, paid monthly rent to Sunshine. Purdy’s business faltered in 2012, and he sought bankruptcy protection. Sunshine moved to retake possession of the cattle. Citizens First Bank had a perfected purchase money security interest in Purdy’s equipment, farm products, and livestock, and claimed that its perfected security interest gave Citizens First priority over Sunshine with regard to the cattle. Citizens argued that the “leases” were disguised security agreements, that Purdy actually owned the cattle, and that the subsequently-acquired livestock were covered by the bank’s security interest. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Citizens, finding that the leases were per se security agreements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the terms of the agreements expressly preserve Sunshine’s ability to recover the cattle. Whether the parties strictly adhered to the terms of these leases is irrelevant to determining whether the agreements were true leases or disguised security agreements. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the parties sufficiently explained the legal import of Purdy’s culling practices or put forward any evidence that the parties altered the terms of the leases making them anything but leases.View "In re: Purdy" on Justia Law

Irwin, a holding company, entered bankruptcy when its two subsidiary banks failed. The FDIC closed both in 2009. Their asset portfolios were dominated by mortgage loans, whose value plunged in 2007-2008. Irwin’s trustee in bankruptcy sued its directors and officers (Managers). The FDIC intervened because whatever Irwin collects will be unavailable to satisfy FDIC claims. Under 12 U.S.C. 821(d)(2)(A)(i), when taking over a bank, the FDIC acquires “all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution, and of any stockholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution.” The claims assert that the Managers violated fiduciary duties to Irwin by not implementing additional financial controls; allowing the banks to specialize in kinds of mortgages that were especially hard-hit; allowing Irwin to pay dividends (or repurchase stock) so that it was short of capital; “capitulating” to the FDIC and so that Irwin contributed millions of dollars in new capital to the banks. The district judge concluded that all claims belong to the FDIC and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, but vacated with respect to claims that concern only what the Managers did at Irwin: supporting the financial distributions, informing Irwin about the banks’ loan portfolios, and causing Irwin to invest more money in the banks after they had failed. View "Levin v. Miller" on Justia Law

Thomas and Chapman were part of a scheme to fleece real estate lenders by concocting multiple false sales of the same homes and using the loan proceeds from the later transactions to pay off the earlier lenders. They were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud. Thomas was also convicted of aggravated identity theft for using an investor’s identity without permission to craft a phony sale of a home that the victim never owned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting: challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; a claim by Thomas that there was no proof that he created or used the falsified documents at issue; Chapman’s claim that there was no evidence that he was the Lamar Chapman identified by the evidence, because no courtroom witness testified to that effect; Chapman’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the government dropped a co-defendant from the indictment; and a claim that the government failed to turn over unspecified exculpatory evidence. The court noted testimony from several victims, an FBI investigator, an auditor, and an indicted co-defendant who had already pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

This case arose when an investment advisor committed fraud by opening a doing-business-as ("d/b/a") bank account using the name of his employer when he did not have the employer's authority to do so. The employer's insurance company subsequently filed suit against the bank, alleging that the bank negligently failed to inquire into whether the former advisor had authority to open the d/b/a account. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit because the bank owed no recognized duty to the employer.View "National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hometown Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Goodwill filed suit against PNC seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a prepayment charge in excess of $300,000 under the terms of its agreement with PNC. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Goodwill owed PNC a prepayment fee. Because Goodwill gave notice of its intent to make prepayment during the ten-year period of the loan during which interest on the outstanding principal was accruing at the Initial Rate of 4.79 percent per year, Goodwill owed a prepayment charge.View "Land of Lincoln Goodwill Indus. v. PNC Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging, among other things, fraud and unfair business practices in the origination of plaintiffs' residential mortgage loans, and negligence in the subsequent servicing of the loans. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint failed to allege fraud for which defendants are responsible and in concluding that defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiffs in the review of their applications for a loan modification. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action for fraud against defendants where the complaint alleged that the loan documents concealed the terms of plaintiffs' loans and plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing defendants' liability for the alleged fraud. Accordingly, the court reversed as to plaintiffs' first, second, and sixth causes of action and remanded for further proceedings.View "Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his wrongful foreclosure suit involving a promissory note and an associated Deed of Trust on property in Fort Worth, Texas. The district court granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss after determining that all of plaintiff's claims relating to U.S. Bank's standing to foreclose failed as a matter of law, and plaintiff failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation on the part of U.S. Bank. The court concluded that the district court properly granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to assert a claim for common-law fraud under Texas law and section 12.002 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.View "Reece v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants, alleging that they violated Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607, by creating a joint venture (Prosperity) to skirt RESPA's prohibition on kickbacks while failing to disclose this business arrangement to its customers. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion denying plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs' failed to move for judgment as a matter of law before the jury reached its verdict and because of the highly deferential lenses through which the court must review the issues before it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who guaranteed loans for their husbands' company, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Community on their claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq. The court concluded that the text of the ECOA clearly provides that a person does not qualify as an applicant under the statute solely by virtue of executing a guaranty to secure the debt of another. Therefore, a guarantor does request credit and therefore cannot qualify as an applicant under the unambiguous text of the ECOA. Consequently, the court concluded that a guarantor is not protected from marital-status discrimination by the ECOA. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Community on plaintiffs' ECOA claim or their ECOA-based affirmative defense. Plaintiffs' argument that the district court erred in striking their demand for a jury trial is moot.View "Hawkins, et al. v. Community Bank of Raymore" on Justia Law