Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Haddad bought his condominium in 1991 and lived in the unit until 2005, when he began renting it out. In 2008, a law firm, representing the association, sent Haddad a notice of delinquency, stating that Haddad owed $803 in unpaid condominium assessments, $40 in late charges, and $55 in legal fees and costs. Haddad notified the firm that he disputed the amount demanded, that he had never missed a monthly dues payment, but that he had been “singled out and charged with various violations” by the management company. Correspondence continued for several months, with the amount owed increasing each month and Haddad contesting the charges. The law firm ultimately recorded a Notice of Lien, which was discharged about six months later. Haddad sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act, alleging use of a false, deceptive or misleading representation in the collection of a debt, and continuing collection of a disputed debt before verification of the debt. The district court rejected the claims on the ground that the debt was commercial because the unit was rented when collection began. The Sixth Circuit court reversed, holding that an obligation to pay assessments arose from the original purchase and constituted a “debt” under the FDCPA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment, finding that the firm had properly verified the debt and that the collection efforts were not deceptive or misleading. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, based on failure to properly verify the debt.View "Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC" on Justia Law

n November 2005, Appellant Richard Mitchell obtained title to property located in Alpharetta and executed a security deed in favor of MERS, who subsequently assigned the security deed to Wells Fargo as trustee. The property was foreclosed upon after Appellants Richard (and his wife Deborah) became delinquent on their mortgage payments. Wells Fargo purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Since that time, Appellants admitted that they made numerous "dilatory filings," proceeding pro se, in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In May 2010, Mitchell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for a bill of peace pursuant to OCGA 23-3-110 against Mitchell as a measure to end Mitchell's "meritless filings" in state court. The trial court issued an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell had not properly served Wells Fargo. The court also granted Wells Fargo's motion for a bill of peace, finding that the records of Fulton County courts reflected "nothing less than repeated and contemptuous behavior in the courts of this State" and that the lengthy history of filings in federal court showed a pattern of behavior by Mitchell consistent with his state filings. The court permanently enjoined Mitchell from filing any pleading or complaint related to the foreclosure and eviction from the property at issue for a period of five years unless Mitchell first received written approval from the court. Mitchell moved to set aside the order granting the bill of peace, which the court denied. The Mitchells appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently procured a mortgage on her home, and thereafter sought to foreclose on that mortgage, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the New York General Business Law, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, and common law. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, ruling that, because plaintiff failed to disclose these claims in a 2006 proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, her present suit was barred for lack of standing or by collateral estoppel. The court considered all of the parties' arguments and, except to the extent indicated, have found them to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment in regards to the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in her favor and the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing her claims under RICO, ECOA, New York Business Law 349, and for negligent misrepresentation. The court vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of TILA and for common-law fraud, and remanded for further proceedings.View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. As the receiver of the Buckhead Community Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sued nine former officers and directors of the bank, alleging that they were negligent with respect to the making of loans, which, according to the FDIC, led the bank, to suffer nearly $22 million in losses. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the business judgment rule relieved officers and directors of any liability for ordinary negligence. The FDIC responded that such a business judgment rule is no part of the common law in Georgia, and even if it were, it did not apply to bank officers and directors, insofar as the statutory law in Georgia explicitly requires bank officers and directors to exercise ordinary diligence and care. Unable to "discern clear and controlling precedent the federal district court asked: "[d]oes the business judgment rule in Georgia preclude as a matter of law a claim for ordinary negligence against the officers and directors of a bank in a lawsuit brought by the FDIC as receiver for the bank?" The Georgia Court answered that question in the negative. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Nutter, alleging that Nutter was liable for conspiring with Savings First to violate the Maryland Finder's Fee Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-801 to 12-809. Plaintiff borrowed from Savings First in a reverse mortgage transaction and then Nutter purchased the mortgage from Savings First. The court agreed with the district court that Nutter could not be a violator of section 12-804(e) because that statute regulates only mortgage brokers and Nutter was not a "mortgage broker" in the transaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nutter.View "Marshall v. James B. Nutter & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Prosperity Mortgage, alleging that the fees Prosperity Mortgage charged at closing violated the Maryland Finder's Fee Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-801 to 12-809. The court concluded that because Prosperity Mortgage was identified as the lender in the documents executed at closing, it was not a "mortgage broker" as the Act defines that term and therefore was not subject to the Act's provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants.View "Petry v. Prosperity Mortgage Co." on Justia Law

After Gordon Brown’s debt to Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America (Bank) became delinquent, Gordon petitioned to dissolve his twenty-three-year marriage to Judy Brown. The Browns executed a marital termination agreement that was incorporated into the marital dissolution decree. Pursuant to the dissolution judgment and decree, Gordon transferred to Judy several assets. When it was unable to collect from Gordon on the original judgment, the Bank brought this action under Minnesota’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA) to levy execution on the assets Gordon transferred to Judy, alleging that the transfers were made with the intent to defraud the Bank. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, determining that the transfers were voidable under MUFTA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting the Bank authority to levy execution on assets fraudulently transferred to the extent necessary to satisfy the Bank’s claim, holding that MUFTA applies to transfers made pursuant to an uncontested marital dissolution decree. View "Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against America West Bank, L.C. (the Bank) alleging, among other claims, improper acceptance of unauthorized signatures. The Bank tendered defense of the claim to its insurer under the terms of a financial institution bond. The Utah Department of Financial Institutions subsequently closed the Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. The FDIC mailed and published notices indicating that all claims against the Bank had to be submitted to the FDIC for administrative review. After the administrative claims review deadline, Plaintiff filed a proof of claim with the FDIC, which the FDIC disallowed because it was untimely filed. Plaintiffs then filed a notice of intent to prosecute. The district court granted the FDIC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative claims review process made available to them by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the administrative exhaustion requirements of FIRREA deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) Plaintiffs’ failure to avail themselves of the available claims review process did not amount to a violation of due process.View "Summerhaze Co., L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff briefly had a checking account with Union Planters Bank and had signed a signature card binding her to arbitration. Union Planters merged with Regions Bank. Years after closing her account, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. The lawyer she retained allegedly embezzled plaintiff's portion of the settlement and she sued Trustmark Bank, where the lawyer maintained his accounts, for negligence and conversion. Regions moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. Because the events leading to plaintiff's claim - a car accident, a settlement, and embezzlement of the funds through an account that a third party held with the bank - have nothing to do with her checking account opened years earlier for only a brief time, the notion that her claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement is "wholly groundless." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration.View "Douglas v. Trustmark National Bank" on Justia Law

Scott Greenleaf executed a promissory note to Residential Mortgage Services, Inc. (RMS). That same day, Greenleaf signed a mortgage on property securing that debt. The mortgage listed RMS as the lender of the debt and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the nominee for the lender. MERS subsequently assigned its interest in the mortgage and note to Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC). BAC then merged with Bank of America, N.A. (Bank). Five years later, the Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against Greenleaf. The district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. Greenleaf appealed, arguing that the Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the property. The Supreme Court agreed with Greenleaf and vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Bank proved its status as the holder of the note but failed to establish its ownership of Greenleaf’s mortgage; and (2) because the Bank failed to satisfy two of the Higgins foreclosure requirements, the Bank was not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in any event.View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law