Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas, filed suit against NatWest, claiming that NatWest provided material support and resources to a terrorist organization in violation of the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331(1)(A), 2333(a), and 2339B(a)(1), and collected and provided funds for the financing of terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2331(1)(A), 2333(a), and 2339C. Plaintiffs alleged that NatWest provided material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization by maintaining bank accounts and transferring funds for Interpal. The district court granted NatWest's motion for summary judgment. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether NatWest possessed the requisite scienter. The statute's requirement is less exacting, and requires only a showing that NatWest had knowledge that, or exhibited deliberate indifference to whether, Interpal provided material support to a terrorist organization, irrespective of whether Interpal's support aided terrorist activities of the terrorist organization. Because Hamas is an organization designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), plaintiffs can fulfill their burden by demonstrating either that NatWest had actual knowledge that Interpal provided material support to Hamas, or that NatWest exhibited deliberate indifference to whether Interpal provided material support. View "Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank" on Justia Law

In 2005, appellants Max and Peggy Espeland refinanced their home with E-Loan, Inc. Shortly thereafter, their loan was purchased by another bank and securitized. The Espelands eventually defaulted on the loan and their home was sold in a non-judicial deed of trust foreclosure. The Espelands brought an action in the superior court to void the sale, arguing mainly that inconsistencies in and multiple transfers of the loan and security documents caused defects in the chain of title. The superior court disagreed and granted summary judgment against the Espelands. The Espelands appealed. Thereafter, the Espelands moved for relief from judgment, citing fraud by the defendants. The superior court denied this motion. The Espelands filed a second appeal, and the Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals for decision. Because the Espelands did not produce any evidence of defects with the chain of title or with the foreclosure, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. Because after reviewing the record the Court saw no evidence of fraud or malfeasance, it affirmed the superior court’s denial of the motion for relief from judgment.View "Espeland v. OneWest Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, manufacturers of well-known luxury items, filed suit claiming that defendants were selling counterfeit versions of plaintiffs' products on the Internet. In the instant appeal, Bank of China, a nonparty appellant, challenged an August 2011 order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel the Bank to comply with a document subpoena and an asset freeze injunction and denying the Bank's cross-motion to modify the court's orders; a May 2012 order denying the Bank's motion to reconsider; and a November 2012 order holding the Bank in civil contempt and imposing monetary penalties. The court concluded that the Bank's claim that the district court was without authority to issue orders restraining defendants' assets pending adjudication was without merit; the court vacated the August 2011 and May 2012 orders so that the district court may consider on remand whether it may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Bank to compel compliance with its orders and if so whether it should exercise such jurisdiction, properly applying principles of comity; and the court reversed the November 2012 order holding the Bank in civil contempt and imposing civil monetary penalties. View "Gucci v. Bank of China" on Justia Law

In 2011, IndyMac Bank foreclosed on a certain property. JAS, Inc. purchased the property and subsequently initiated a quiet title action. Defendants Countrywide Home Loans and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) defaulted. Bank of America (BOA), which had acquired Countrywide in 2008, was not named as a party defendant and did not appear in the proceeding. Final judgment was issued quieting title to the property in JAS’s name. Countrywide and MERS subsequently moved to have the entries of default entered against them set aside, and BOA filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding and sought to have the default entered against Countrywide set aside. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in granting BOA’s motions to intervene and to set aside the default judgment entered against Countywide, as BOA met the express requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and Countrywide had no present interest in the subject property at the time suit was filed; and (2) did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting MERS’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered against it, as MERS established good cause to set aside the default judgment.View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Richard Hardie borrowed money from Brattleboro Savings & Loan Association in order to purchase a vacation home in Weathersfield. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and included a "second home rider" clause, asserting that the property was not a primary residence. Hardie was married to intervenor-appellee Lisa Mangini at the time, but was the sole owner of the property, and Mangini did not sign either the promissory note or the mortgage. Hardie twice refinanced the property without Mangini's participation, both with second home riders. By 2007, Hardie and Mangini's marriage was deteriorating. Mangini left the couple's New Jersey home and moved into the Weathersfield property. In 2008, Mangini filed for divorce in Vermont. In her divorce filing, Mangini claimed that the property had become her primary residence as of May 2007. Also in the divorce filing, Mangini requested "an award of the Weathersfield home and the adjoining land either without any encumbrances, or, in the alternative, that [Hardie] be responsible for paying off and releasing the mortgage[] to [Brattleboro Savings]." While Mangini was occupying the property and the divorce was pending, Hardie refinanced the mortgage on the Weathersfield property. The 2008 refinancing was completed without Mangini's participation, and Hardie again claimed that the property was a second home. In 2011, Brattleboro Savings commenced a foreclosure action on the property, naming only Hardie as a defendant. Despite not being named in the foreclosure case, Mangini filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she had established a homestead interest in the property prior to the 2008 mortgage, and that therefore the 2008 mortgage was "inoperative to convey" her homestead interest. Brattleboro Savings filed two motions for summary judgment, one requesting a foreclosure judgment against Hardie and the second seeking judgment against Mangini on her homestead claim. Mangini filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, detailing for the first time her claim that she had acquired an equitable interest in the property by her divorce filing. Brattleboro Savings appealed a superior court's decision denying its motions for summary judgment and granting Mangini's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that Mangini held title to the Weathersfield property free and clear of a mortgage to plaintiff. The superior court ruled that the mortgage was inoperative because Hardie, mortgaged the property without the participation of Mangini in violation of 27 V.S.A. section 141(a). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of Mangini's motion for summary judgment and the denial of Brattleboro Saving's motions for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Brattleboro Savings & Loan Assn. v. Hardie, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal concerns Ex-Im Bank's efforts to execute on a $21 million judgment in its favor against Grenada. Grenada had waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court but, nonetheless, Ex-Im Bank has encountered obstacles in attempting to enforce the judgment in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court concluded that: the question whether the Grynberg Funds may be attached is moot because those funds have already been disbursed; the district court properly vacated the restraining notices against the Restrained Entities because, with one possible exception, the Restrained Funds are not "used for commercial activity in the United States"; and because the record does not provide an adequate basis to determine whether the IATA Funds are used for commercial activity in the United States and whether they belong to Grenada, the court vacated the denial of post-judgment discovery to these funds, and remanded for the district court to reassess whether to permit further discovery. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth Bank filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, judicial foreclosure, and other relief against Van Buren Group, LLC, a corporation that organized the construction of thirty condominiums in Oxford. Four purchasers and two members moved for summary judgment, which the chancellor granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the four purchasers; however, it reversed and remanded as to the two members. The Supreme Court granted BancorpSouth’s subsequent petition for writ of certiorari. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that that an issue of material fact existed with respect to the purchasers. Therefore, the Court reversed the chancery court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Brantley, Jr." on Justia Law

First Citizens BancShares, Inc. (FC North), a bank holding company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina, adopted by forum selection bylaw (the “Forum Selection Bylaw”) the same day it announced it had entered into a merger agreement to acquire First Citizens Bancorporation, Inc. The Forum Selection Bylaw selected as the forum the federal or state courts of North Carolina instead of the state or federal courts of Delaware. The City of Providence filed complaints challenging as invalid the Forum Selection Bylaw and asserting various claims against the FC North board of directors concerning the proposed merger. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss both complaints for failure to state a claim, holding (1) the Forum Selection Bylaw is facially valid; and (2) it is not unreasonable, unjust, or inequitable to enforce the Forum Selection Bylaw in this case. View "City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s property was subject to a mortgage. Plaintiff discussed refinancing with a predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as a mortgage broker and his firm, whom Plaintiff referred to as “agents” of Wells Fargo. Based on these discussions, Plaintiff began making improvements to increase the property’s appraised value. Ultimately, Plaintiff was unable to refinance her mortgage. Plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo, alleging, among other claims, a violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 397-A:2(VI) (count one) and promissory estoppel (count five). The district court dismissed counts one and five of Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding both claims were inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that although she could not claim a private right of action under section 397-A:2(VI), she did state a claim for common law fraud. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed any state law fraud claim that Plaintiff belatedly attempted to advance and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim. View "Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law