Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Appellant Benefit Bank appealed from the circuit court's order finding that the mortgage it held to certain property was second and subordinate to the interest of Appellee Marilyn Rogers obtained in her divorce. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellee's interest was prior to Appellant's interest because the divorce court lacked authority to impose a lien on real property to secure alimony payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding (1) the divorce court did not lack the authority to impose the lien as it did, where it was stipulated to by the divorcing parties; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that the lis pendens filed by Appellee created or perfected a lien. View "Benefit Bank v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Minnesota homeowners, alleged that neither Aurora nor MERS were entitled to foreclose on the properties at issue and that W&G knowingly made false representations regarding Aurora's authority to foreclose. The court held that the district court properly found that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court also held that the district court was correct in determining that all of plaintiffs' claims against W&G lacked a reasonable basis in fact and law, therefore W&G was properly dismissed as fraudulently joined. The court partially reversed as to the dismissal of the quiet-title cause of action, but affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Murphy, et al v. Aurora Loan Services, et al" on Justia Law

The Savannah Bank, N.A., (Bank) sought to foreclose on a property owned by Appellant Alphonse Stalliard. Appellant argued that he should not be held liable for a loan closed by a person acting on his behalf under a power of attorney. Appellant alleged, inter alia, that Bank did not conduct reasonable due diligence and did not verify Appellant's ability to pay. He filed a motion seeking additional time for discovery. The master-in-equity denied the motion and ruled in Bank's favor. Appellant appealed that decision, arguing that summary judgment was improper and that the master should have permitted additional time for discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the master properly denied Appellant's motion. View "Savannah Bank v. Stalliard" on Justia Law

Home Loan Investment Bank appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court following a bench trial that confirmed the validity of the mechanic's liens to Jim's Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and Westbrook Tools, Inc. against Bedford Falls Associates for work performed at a commercial property. The Bank argued that the court erred as a matter of law and fact by concluding that the liens had priority over two mortgages granted to Bedford Falls for the acquisition and renovation of the property because it did not consent to the work performed by Jim's Plumbing or Westbrook Tools. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the Bank had sufficiently specific knowledge of Jim's Plumbing and Westbrook Tools's labor and materials to infer that the Bank consented to the labor and materials secured by the liens. View "Jim's Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Home Loan Inv. Bank" on Justia Law

LSED sought to rescind an agreement to purchase bond insurance from FGIC and recover its $13 million premium payment. LSED based its claim on failure of cause, a tenet of Louisiana law that required all contracts be supported by cause. Because the court found that the principal cause of the agreement between the parties was the purchase of bond insurance to protect the bondholders in the event of default, not to reduce the interest rate LSED paid to borrow money, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In Re: Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Pioneer Builders financed the purchase of an RV park (Property). At that time, the Property was subject to several existing recorded and unrecorded leases. When Pioneer attempted to foreclose on the property, some of the owners of the unrecorded leases (Defendants) argued that Pioneer could not foreclose on their lots because their interests in the Property were superior to Pioneer's. The district court found that, although Pioneer was entitled to foreclose on its loans, Pioneer had actual and constructive notice of the unrecorded leases. Accordingly, the court concluded that Pioneer's interest in the Property was inferior to the interests of the Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard regarding constructive notice and conflated the issue of whether Pioneer had notice of any recorded leases with whether it had notice of the unrecorded leases at issue. Remanded. View "Pioneer Builders Co. of Nev., Inc. v. KDA Corp." on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the good faith requirement of 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 extended to third parties and requires that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. The trial court found the interest of Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of Beaver City (Bank) in the livestock of cattle operation and debtor Lucky Moon Land and Livestock, Inc. (Lucky Moon) to be superior to that of another creditor of Lucky Moon, Defendant-Appellant Barretts' Livestock, Inc. (Barretts). The Bank alleged that in 2004 it perfected a security interest in all of Lucky Moon's livestock, including all after-acquired livestock, giving it a superior claim to cattle purchased by Lucky Moon from Barretts to satisfy the debt owed by Lucky Moon to the Bank. Barretts asserted that the Bank did not have priority over it because the Bank was not a good faith secured creditor. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, finding that the Bank's perfected security interest had preference over Barretts' unperfected security interest. Barretts appealed, contending that Bank did not have a superior security interest because: 1) the Bank's security interest never attached; and 2) the Bank had not acted in good faith. The Court of Civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Bank sought certiorari, contending that: 1) the case presents an issue of first impression as to when good faith under 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 should be determined; 2) Bank's security interest never attached; and 3) the Court of Civil Appeals' decision was inconsistent with a different decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on which the court relied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that 12A O.S. 2011 section 2-403 did not extend to third parties nor require that the third party be notified of a debtor's financial condition. View "Bank of Beaver City v. Barretts' Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these five separate putative class actions alleged that Wells Fargo and Wachovia Bank unlawfully charged them overdraft fees for their checking accounts, which were governed by agreements that provided for arbitration of disputes on an individual basis. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued that it did not waive its right to compel arbitration because it would have been futile to move to compel arbitration before the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The court concluded that Concepcion established no new law. Because the court concluded that it would have been futile for Wells Fargo to argue that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted any state laws that purported to make the classwide arbitration provisions unenforceable, the court affirmed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. View "Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal was whether an uncontroverted affidavit attesting to the statutory form "Affidavit of Sale under Power of Sale in Mortgage" was sufficient to show compliance with the power of sale for the purpose of establishing the right of possession by motion for summary judgment in a summary process action. A judge in the housing court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, and the defendant, Oliver Hendricks, appealed. Hendricks asserted error in the grant of summary judgment to Fannie Mae, where the statutory form failed to set forth "fully and particularly" the acts taken to exercise the power of sale in Hendricks's mortgage, as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 15. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the statutory form that Fannie Mae offered in support of its motion for summary judgment was sufficient within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 8, it made out a prima facie case of compliance with chapter 244, 14; and (2) because there was no genuine issue of material fact to be decided, Fannie Mae was entitled to summary judgment. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Hendricks" on Justia Law