Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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In an effort to save Quartz Mountain Aerospace, some of its investors and directors took out large loans from First State Bank of Altus for the benefit of the company. The Bank failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took over as receiver and filed suit to collect on the loans. The Borrowers raised affirmative defenses to the FDIC’s claims and brought counterclaims, alleging that the Bank’s CEO had assured them that they would not be personally liable on any of the loans. The district court granted summary judgment for the FDIC because the CEO’s alleged promises were not properly memorialized in the Bank’s records. The Borrowers appealed on two grounds: (1) that the district court should not have granted summary judgment before allowing them to conduct discovery, and (2) that the district court should have set aside the summary judgment because they presented newly discovered evidence of securities fraud by the Bank. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on both of the Borrowers' claims. View "FDIC v. Arciero, et al" on Justia Law

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Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

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Wells Fargo and Hindman were creditors of Clark, whose president and CEO was Hindman’s son. Wells Fargo agreed to extend credit to the companies if Hindman agreed to become a subordinated creditor. Hindman executed subordination agreements. In 2010 Hindman authorized a wire transfer of $750,000 from his personal investment account at Wells Fargo to Clark at the request of his son. By that time, however, his son purportedly had been stripped of authority to make business decisions by Clark. When authorized decision makers learned about the purported loan, they ordered Hindman’s son to reject the funds. Hindman’s son promptly instructed a Wells Fargo Bank vice‐president to stop the transaction, but $750,000 arrived in Clark’s accounts and was automatically used to pay down its Wells Fargo line of credit. Days later, the same Wells Fargo vice‐president transferred $750,000 from Clark’s account to Hindman’s account at a Florida bank at Hindman’s request. Wells Fargo claimed that Hindman’s receipt of the $750,000 violated subordination agreements because Clark repaid a debt to Hindman while it had outstanding obligations to Wells Fargo. Hindman maintained that a valid loan was never consummated because his son could not bind the company and authorized decision makers rejected the proposed loan. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment, reasoning that the district court failed to explain its rejection of Hindman’s plausible arguments. View "Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Hindman" on Justia Law

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Todd alleges that in 2012 he received a recorded telephone message from Collecto asking him to call and help the company locate his mother, Terry. He called; a Collecto representative told him that Terry owed AT&T money for cell phone service. Todd stated that he is not Terry, but the representative continued to discuss the alleged debt without asking how to reach Terry or asking Todd to pay the bill. Todd claimed that this interaction harmed him emotionally and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692b, which permits a debt collector to call a third party for help in locating a “consumer” but prohibits revealing the existence of the consumer’s debt to the third party. Section 1692f prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court concluded that Todd lacked standing under the Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Todd lacked standing under 1692b and failed to state a claim under 1692f. View "Todd v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

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AmEx is the world’s largest issuer of traveler’s checks, which never expire. AmEx and third-party vendors sell the checks at face value, and AmEx profits by investing the funds until the TC is redeemed. Although most are cashed within a year, AmEx uses the remaining uncashed checks for long-term, high-yield investments. Until recently, every state’s abandoned property laws presumed abandonment of uncashed traveler’s checks 15 years after issuance. This presumption requires the issuer to transfer possession of the funds to the state. In 2008 Kentucky amended KRS 393.060(2) to change thes abandonment period from to seven years. AmEx claims violation of the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause. Following a remand and amendment of the complaint to add a dormant Commerce Clause argument and a claim that the legislation did not apply retroactively to checks that were issued and outstanding prior to the effective date, the district court granted the state summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Hollenbach" on Justia Law

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Spring Street, seeking to recover against Bayou and its owner Douglas Lam on defaulted promissory notes, claimed that certain transfers that defendants made were fraudulent: (1) Bayou's transfer of "hard assets" to LT Seafood when LT Seafood took over Bayou's retail operations at the 415 East Hamilton location; (2) Douglas Lam's transfer of his 49% interest in LT Seafood to DKL & DTL; and (3) DKL & DTL's subsequent transfer of this 49% interest to Vinh Ngo. The court concluded that Spring Street could pierce DKL & DTL's corporate veil on the basis of fraud and impose individual liability on the LLC members. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Spring Street with regard to these claims. However, the court concluded that Ten Lam and Ngo have raised a genuine dispute of fact as to both which "hard assets" Bayou transferred to LT Seafood and the value of those assets on the date of the transfer. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in regards to Spring Street's fraudulent transfer claim against Lam and Ngo for the amount of $150,000 and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spring Street Partners v. Lam, et al." on Justia Law

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Northern Grain Equipment, LLC entered into contracts with Thimjon Farms Partnership and Hagemeister Farms to construct grain-handling systems on their respective properties. Neither Thimjon nor Hagemeister were customers of First International Bank & Trust. Both Thimjon and Hagemeister made down payments to Northern Grain, which were deposited in Northern Grain's account at First International. Northern Grain never constructed the grain-handling systems and discontinued business. Thimjon and Hagemeister brought separate actions against First International, alleging First International's decision to cease loaning money to Northern Grain resulted in Northern Grain breaching its contracts with Thimjon and Hagemeister and that First International intentionally misled Northern Grain to the detriment of Thimjon and Hagemeister. First International moved for summary judgment. While the motion was pending, Thimjon and Hagemeister moved to amend their complaints to add a claim for deceit and to seek exemplary damages. The district court denied the motion to amend, granted First International's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing Thimjon's and Hagemeister's claims with prejudice. Thimjon and Hagemeister appealed, arguing the district court erred by granting First International's motion and by denying their motion to amend. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First International Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

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At the heart of this appeal was a mechanic's lien filed against the Black Rock North Development in Coeur d?Alene, Idaho, and an uncompleted golf course community development. American Bank (the Bank) was the lender to BRN Development, Inc. (BRN). BRN hired Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest (Wadsworth) to construct a golf course. BRN failed to pay Wadsworth for a portion of the work it performed, and Wadsworth filed a mechanic's lien against the property. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Wadsworth's claim of lien was subordinate to the Bank's mortgage interest in the property. In order to proceed with a foreclosure sale, the Bank posted a lien release bond in order to secure the district court's order releasing Wadsworth's lien. The Bank was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. The district court ruled that priority of the parties? claims against the property was irrelevant once the property was replaced by the lien release bond as security for Wadsworth's claim and the Bank (by way of the bond) was responsible for payment of Wadsworth's lien claim. The Bank appeals that decision, arguing that Wadsworth should have been prevented from recovering against the lien release bond because its interest would have been extinguished if it had attempted to foreclose its mechanic's lien and the bond merely served as substitute security in place of the property. Wadsworth cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in holding that Wadsworth waived its right to file a lien for the unpaid retainage on the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court allowing Wadsworth to recover against the lien release bond and vacated the district court's judgment in favor of Wadsworth. View "Americn Bank v. Wadsworth Golf" on Justia Law

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American loaned $429,991 to Saberline to pay an insurance premium; Saberline agreed that, if it defaulted on the loan, American could cancel the policy and obtain return of any unearned premiums. USIG brokered the deal. American would deliver funds to USIG’s account at Cornerstone; USIG would forward the money to the insurer. Instead of placing the money in a trust account for Saberline, USIG told American to deposit the funds in USIG’s general operating account at Cornerstone. USIG was indebted to Cornerstone and had authorized it to sweep the operating account and apply anything over $50,000 to the debt. As a result, when American deposited Saberline’s premiums, Cornerstone reduced USIG’s debt. Saberline defaulted. American canceled the policy and attempted to recover the premium. USIG repaid American with funds drawn from a different bank, but then filed for bankruptcy, turning that transfer into a preference payment. American settled with the bankruptcy trustee, reserving its right to pursue a conversion claim against Cornerstone. A magistrate judge issued a declaratory judgment that American had a superior security interest in the disputed funds and that Cornerstone was liable for conversion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Premium Finance Company Act, Tenn. Code 56-37-101, gave American a senior perfected security interest in the contested funds. View "American Bank, FSB v. Cornerstone Cmty. Bank" on Justia Law

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BNY, as Trustee of an investment portfolio of collateralized loan obligations, initiated an interpleader action to resolve a contract dispute between certain shareholders and the manager of that portfolio, Franklin. At issue were the terms of the indenture and, specifically, terms governing distribution of a Contingent Collateral Management Fee, which was payable to Franklin only if distributions reached a twelve percent internal rate of return (IRR). The court granted the partial summary judgment to Franklin and the denial of summary judgment to the Shareholders, as well as the award of attorneys fees and costs. The court vacated, however, the award of statutory prejudgment interest with instruction to award prejudgment interest actually accrued on the fee owed to Franklin, to be paid from the court's account. View "Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. CDO Plus Master Fund, Ltd." on Justia Law