Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Principals of Cybercos defrauded lending institutions out of more than $100 million in loan. In 2002, Huntington granted Cyberco a multi-million-dollar line of credit, and Cyberco granted Huntington a continuing security interest and lien in all of Cyberco's personal property, including deposit accounts. After discovering the fraud, the government seized approximately $4 million in Cyberco assets, including $705,168.60 from a Huntington Bank Account. Cyberco principals were charged in a criminal indictment with conspiring to violate federal laws relating to bank fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. Count 10 issued forfeiture allegations against individuals regarding Cyberco assets, including the Account. In their plea agreements, defendants agreed to forfeit any interest they possessed in the assets or funds. The district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture with regard to the assets, including the Account. Huntington filed a claim, asserting ownership interest in the forfeited Account. The district court found that Huntington did not have a legal claim. On remand, the district court again denied the claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A party who takes a security interest in property, tangible or intangible, in exchange for value, can be a bona fide purchaser for value of that property interest under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(B). View "United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to sell a furniture business to Mendoza in 2004. Westernbank provided partial funding and obtained a first mortgage. To secure a deferred payment of $750,000, Mendoza signed a mortgage in favor of plaintiff and a contract under which plaintiff consigned goods with expected sales value of more than $6,000,000. An account was opened at Westernbank for deposit of sales proceeds. Plaintiff alleges that Westernbank kept funds to which plaintiff was entitled for satisfaction of Mendoza’s debts to Westernbank. Mendoza filed for bankruptcy and transferred its real estate to Westernbank in exchange for release of debt to the bank. Plaintiff agreed to forgive unpaid debts in order to obtain relief from the stay and foreclose its mortgage, then sued Westernbank, employees, and insurers, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, and Puerto Rico law causes of action. After BPPR became successor to Westernbank, plaintiff agreed to dismiss the civil law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims and the RICO claim. The district court later dismissed remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-federal claims. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvare v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services and others (Club Vista) entered into a real estate development project with real parties in interest Scott Financial Corporation and others (Scott Financial). When a loan guaranteed by some of the Petitioners went into default, Club Vista filed an action against Scott Financial. During discovery, Scott Financial obtained a deposition subpoena for Club Vista's attorney, K. Layne Morrill. An Arizona court granted Morrill's motion to quash the subpoena. The Nevada district court, however, denied Morrill's motion for a protective order and permitted Scott Financial to depose Morrill as to the factual matters supporting the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Morrill's petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition in part after adopting the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which states that the party seeking to depose opposing counsel must demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means, is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case. Because the district court did not analyze the Shelton factors, the Court directed the district court to evaluate whether, applying the Shelton factors, Scott Financial may depose Morrill. View "Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

BMD was a subcontractor for Industrial, a subcontractor for Walbridge, the general contractor for construction of a factory near Indianapolis. Fidelity was surety for Industrial’s obligations to BMD. The project proceeded for about a year before the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. Walbridge failed to pay Industrial, Industrial failed to pay BMD, and Fidelity refused to pay BMD, which sued Fidelity on the bond. Their subcontract conditioned Industrial's duty to pay on its own receipt of payment. The district court held that the pay-if-paid clause required Industrial to pay BMD only if Industrial received payment from Walbridge, rejecting an argument that it controlled only the timing of Industrial's obligation. The court held that pay-if-paid clauses are valid under public policy and that Fidelity could assert all defenses of its principal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The subcontract expressly provides that Industrial's receipt of payment is a condition precedent to its obligation; it could have stated that BMD assumed the risk of the owner’s insolvency, but additional language was not necessary. Pay-if-paid clauses are valid under Indiana law and, under surety law, Fidelity may assert all defenses of its principal. Industrial was never obligated to pay BMD; BMD may not recover on the bond. View "BMD Contractors, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of MD" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action brought by Stonebrook Construction, LLC against Chase Home Finance, LLC where it sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The district court granted Chase's motion for summary judgment, holding that Stonebrook was precluded from placing a lien against the subject property because it did not properly register under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) Stonebrook appealed, arguing that Chase lacked standing to assert this defense and was not within the class intended to be protected by the ICRA. Alternatively, Stonebrook contended that the good-faith registration of one member of the LLC constituted actual or substantial compliance with the requirements of the ICRA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed: "the plain language of the Act unambiguously indicates that the Legislature intended to require all limited liability companies engaged in the business of construction to register as contractors and to preclude those that do not register from enforcing mechanic's liens. Although the result for Stonebrook is harsh, it is the result the Legislature intended. [The Court was] not at liberty to disregard this legislative determination as to the most effective means of protecting the public." Thus, the Court declined to vacate the district court’s decision. View "Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

Salem Logistics entered into a loan agreement with Ark Royal Capital that required Salem to instruct its customers to send payments directly to an account maintained by Ark at Wachovia Bank. Salem subsequently agreed to provide freight bill auditing services to Variety Wholesalers. Salem requested that Variety send the amounts on the master invoices directly to the Wachovia account but did not inform Variety that the account was actually controlled by Ark. Variety later terminated its contract with Salem and filed suit for recovery of money it had forwarded to Salem that had not been paid to carriers. When Variety discovered the Wachovia account actually belonged to Ark, Variety added Ark as a defendant. The trial court entered summary judgment for Variety on its claim of conversion against Ark and for Ark on Variety's claim of constructive trust and ordered Ark to pay Variety $888,000. The court of appeals reversed and entered summary judgment for Ark on both issues. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on both issues, holding (1) summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved; and (2) accordingly, the trial court also erred in its award of damages to Variety. View "Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs." on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Vision Bank in the bank's action seeking to enforce the Eagertons' obligations under certain guaranty contracts. "Dotson 10s, LLC" was organized to operate a tennis club in Fairhope. Dotson 10s executed a note and security agreement with Vision Bank, and the bank obtained in exchange, unlimited personal guarantees from John and Elizabeth Dotson, and limited guarantees from the Eagertons. The Dotsons executed a second loan to which the Eagertons were not a party. The Dotsons defaulted on both loans, and the bank sued the Dotsons as the primary obligors, and the Eagertons as personal guarantors. Dotson 10s then filed for bankruptcy protection. Part of the reorganization plan provided in part that the two loans would be combined and paid in full. Dotson 10s subsequently defaulted on the bankruptcy plan. The properties were foreclosed and sold, with the proceeds applied to the consolidated loan. The circuit court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the bank against Dotson 10s, but denied the motion as to the Eagertons. The bank argued that the Eagertons were still responsible under their guaranty contracts for the deficiency remaining on the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the creation of the consolidated loan without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the bank, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Eagerton v. Vision Bank " on Justia Law

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company. View "Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when Mirant, an energy company, sought to expand its European operations by acquiring nine power islands from General Electric. When the power island deal fell through, Mirant made payments pursuant to a guaranty and soon thereafter sought bankruptcy protection. Mirant, as debtor-in-possession, sued Commerzbank and other lenders in bankruptcy court to avoid the guaranty and to recover the funds Mirant paid pursuant to the guaranty. After Mirant's bankruptcy plan was confirmed MCAR, plaintiff, substituted into the case for Mirant. Commerzbank and other lenders, defendants, filed a motion to dismiss based on Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court subsequently denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's alleged lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Both sides appealed. While the court agreed that the district court correctly determined that there was standing to bring the avoidance claim, the court vacated the judgment of dismissal because the district court erroneously applied Georgia state law rather than New York state law to the avoidance claim. View "MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are personal investment holding corporations owned by two related Panamanian shareholders. Defendants, of who there are two distinct groups, are (1) a related group of banking corporations operating under the umbrella of Banco Santander, which provide banking, investment, and other financial management services; and (2) certain individual officers/employees of Santander. This dispute arose from plaintiff's investment of an undisclosed sum of money with defendants. At issue was whether a district court, having found a valid contract containing an arbitration clause existed, was also required to consider a further challenge to that contract's place within a broader, unexecuted agreement. Having considered those circumstances in light of Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and other relevant precedent, the court found that the district court properly construed the law regarding arbitrability in dismissing plaintiff's suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Solymar Investments, Ltd., et al. v. Banco Santander S.A., et al." on Justia Law