Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

The United States appealed the district court's dismissal of a superseding indictment because it did not state a crime against defendant for knowingly and willfully making false statements to a financial institution insured by the FDIC and knowingly making false statements for the purpose of influencing the action of a bank insured by the FDIC. Defendant made the allegedly false statements on loan applications to refinance his residence where he failed to list an illegal campaign loan under "outstanding debts." The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that defendant's statements were literally true because the illegal loan was an absolute nullity and consequently was not a debt that ever existed.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.

This case stemmed from the taking of property in downtown Los Angeles to comply with a federal court order to improve the quality of bus services and involved California's "quick-take" eminent domain procedure, Code of Civil Procedure 1255.010, 1244.410, where a public entity filing a condemnation action could seek immediate possession of the condemned property upon depositing with the court the probable compensation for the property. At issue was Section 1255.260's proper interpretation. The court of appeals in this case held that, under the statute, if a lender holding a lien on condemned property applied to withdraw a portion of the deposit, and the property owner did not object to the application, the lender's withdrawal of a portion of the deposit constituted a waiver of the property owner's claims and defenses, except a claim for greater compensation. The court found the court of appeal's conclusion was inconsistent with the relevant statutory language and framework. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Defendant Peter Bernegger and his co-defendant were charged in a six-count indictment with various counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy for inducing investors to invest money in two start-up companies based on several misrepresentations. Bernegger was convicted of mail and bank fraud and was sentenced to seventy months in prison and ordered to pay restitution of approximately $2 million. The Fifth Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to sever the bank fraud count from the mail and wire fraud counts; (2) the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment or abuse its discretion in denying Bernegger the opportunity to cross-examine a witness about an alleged discrepancy in Bernegger's testimony; (3) the district court did not plainly err by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte based on the format of the indictment; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding Berneggar guilty of mail fraud; and (5) because the district court clearly erred in calculating the total loss amount, the restitution amount was incorrect and was therefore modified to reflect the correct total loss amount of $1,725,000.

Defendant-Appellant Alan Tukes appealed his federal conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) at the time of the crime. At trial, a prosecutor asked the bank’s branch manager: “Now, the Compass Bank, is that a bank that is federally insured by the [FDIC]?” She responded: “Yes, it is.” When asked whether the bank “has” any documentation proving its insured status, she replied: “Yes. We have a certificate.” When asked whether the certificate “hangs” in the branch, the manager replied in the affirmative. The district court admitted the certificate, dated November 8, 1993, into evidence. The government offered no additional evidence of the bank’s insured status. At summation, Defendant argued that the government had not proven that the bank was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit concluded "it is clear that a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured at the time of the robbery." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

This case stemmed from the enactment of St. 2010, c. 258, on August 7, 2010, which prohibited institutional lenders and certain financial institutions who owned foreclosed properties from evicting residential tenants without just cause. At issue was whether the act required dismissal of a no-cause summary process case that was already pending when the act went into effect, or whether the application of the act to such a case was impermissibly retroactive. The court held that the provision of the act that prevented eviction without just cause was properly applied to protect all residential tenants on foreclosed properties who, on or after August 7, 2010, had yet to vacate or be removed from the premises by an eviction, even where the owner purchased the property before the act's effective date, and initiated a summary process action before that date. Because the tenant, in this case, was still residing on the property on August 7, 2010, and the owner was seeking to evict him without just cause, the court held that the Housing Court judge properly applied the act to dismiss the pending claim for possession.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant had a personal bank account at Fulton Financial Corporation (Fulton), of which his wife could be a joint holder. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order enjoining both defendant and his wife from using the funds or removing them from Fulton, pending a final disposition of its claim that the funds were wrongfully removed by defendant from plaintiff's account. The court held that while the complaint stated a colorable claim, the court was unpersuaded that irreparable harm would result absent the entry of a restraining order, ex parte. The court also held that where, as here, the plaintiff sought to freeze the funds of an account legally held, not only by the alleged wrongdoer but jointly by an innocent third party, a request for ex parte action raised concerns of due process. Therefore, since plaintiff failed to show that irreparable harm would occur absent entry of a temporary restraining order ex parte, the court deferred decision on the restraining order request pending service and an opportunity for defendant to be heard.

Appellant was the target of a grand jury investigation seeking to determine whether he used secret Swiss bank accounts to evade paying federal taxes. The district court granted a motion to compel appellant's compliance with a grand jury subpoena dueces tecum demanding that he produce certain records related to his foreign bank accounts. The court declined to condition its order compelling production upon a grant of limited immunity, and pursuant to the recalcitrant witness statute, 28 U.S.C. 1826, held appellant in contempt for refusing to comply. The court held that because the records sought through the subpoena fell under the Required Records Doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable, and appellant could not invoke it to resist compliance with the subpoena's command. The court also held that because appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege was not implicated, it need not address appellant's request for immunity. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Count One of the multi-count indictment in this case charged Robert and Patrick Singletary, and others, with conspiring between 1997 and September 16, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three offenses: (1) to defraud a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344; (2) to make false representations with respect to material facts to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001; and (3) to defraud purchasers of residential property and mortgage lenders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Singletarys eventually pled guilty to Count One to the extent that it alleged a conspiracy to commit the section 1343 offense in addition to the section 1001 offense. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the sum of $1 million. The court held that the district court failed to determine by a preponderance of the evidence which of the 56 mortgages the loan officers handled was obtained through a false "gift" letter, a false "credit explanation" letter, or a false employment verification form; and where fraud was found, to determine the extent of the actual loss HUD could have incurred due to the mortgage's foreclosure. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution provisions and remanded for further proceedings.

In connection with an assessment of a taxpayer for unpaid taxes, the IRS began searching for the taxpayer's assets and issued a summons to a bank for a related third party's account information. The taxpayer and third party argued that 26 U.S.C 7609 required the IRS to notify them, which would have enabled them to seek a court order quashing the summons. Applying Ip v. United States, the court held that under the circumstances of the case, no notice was necessary. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.