Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, in two separate appeals, challenged the grant of motions to dismiss in favor of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The court affirmed the district courts' conclusion that 12 U.S.C. 4617 precluded judicial review of a Directive issued by the FHFA to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. The court also held that plaintiffs have failed to show that it was likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that their claims against the OCC would be redressed by vacatur of the Bulletin at issue, and therefore, the claims against the OCC were properly dismissed for lack of standing. View "Town of Babylon v. Federal Housing Finance Agency; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the bank's motion to strike a jury demand in the complaint filed against it by Plaintiff Thomas L. Busby and to enter an order granting the Bank's motion, thereby enforcing Busby's waiver of a jury trial. The dispute arose from a construction loan to which Plaintiff Busby guaranteed. The loan agreement contained the jury trial waiver in the event of a dispute between the parties. The borrower defaulted on the loan, and the bank sought payment from Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the bank, alleging multiple counts of fraud, misrepresentation and breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to have the jury demand stricken. Accordingly the Court granted the petition, issued the writ, and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the bank's motion. View "Busby v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a county sheriff can meet the constitutional obligation of providing notice of a sheriff's sale to a plaintiff by letter directing the plaintiff's attorney to monitor a website for a listing of the date, time, and location of sale. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice by publication to a party with a property interest in a foreclosure proceeding via a sheriff's office website is insufficient to constitute due process when that party's address is known or easily ascertainable. Remanded. View "PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Prater" on Justia Law

Javell, the owner of a mortgage brokerage, and Arroyo, Javell’s employee and loan processor, were convicted of two counts of mortgage-based wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) based on their actions in procuring a fraudulent mortgage during an FBI sting operation. Javell was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Javell argued the district court violated Bruton, and Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the post-arrest statements made by Arroyo and by failing to properly instruct the jury about the rules of non-imputation. According to Javell, Arroyo’s post-arrest statements directly implicated Javell and had the jury not heard those statements, Javell would not have been convicted. Noting a “plethora” of other evidence, including recordings, the court rejected the argument. View "United States v. Javell" on Justia Law

Tracy and Steve Lind filed this suit after Defendants attached funds in the Linds' joint bank account pursuant to Minnesota's garnishment laws. The Linds alleged that Defendants deprived Tracy of her due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court dismissed both claims, concluding (1) Tracy had received constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity for a hearing; and (2) the Linds failed to allege any independent violation of the FDCPA in the complaint. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Tracy had actual notice and an opportunity for a postdeprivation hearing, her due process rights were not violated when Defendants attached funds from the Linds' joint bank account pursuant to the Minnesota garnishment statutes; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing the Linds' FDCPA claim, as the Linds alleged no specific acts that demonstrated violations of the Act. View "Lind v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

David and Glenette Nothum sought a writ prohibiting the circuit court from compelling them to testify in a judgment debtor's examination conducted pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 513.380. The court ordered the Nothums to testify despite their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and held them in contempt when they refused to do so, finding that the immunity granted to the Nothums pursuant to section 513.380.2 was coextensive with their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court granted a permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Nothums to testify, as the immunity in this case did not include derivative use immunity and, so, was not coextensive with the Nothums' constitutional privilege. View "State ex rel. Nothum v. Circuit Court (Walsh) " on Justia Law

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law

Washington Trust Bank (WTB) was the trustee of the trust created by Althea Bowman's last will and testament. Althea's four surviving children were the trust beneficiaries. Three of these beneficiaries argued to the district court that the Trustee exceeded its authority by encumbering a commercial property held by the trust with a deed of trust, and advancing funds to a fourth beneficiary. In that transaction, separate divisions of WTB acted as trustee (Trustee) and as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. Two of the beneficiaries appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal because the Court concluded the Bowmans lacked standing and they asserted claims that were not ripe. View "Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank" on Justia Law

Security Financial Fund, LLC, ("Security Financial") extended to Byron and Marilynn Thomason ("the Thomasons") a series of loans evidenced by five promissory notes, which were secured by three deeds of trust and two mortgages on real property. As a result of the Thomasons' non-payment on two prornissory notes secured by the mortgages, Security Financial foreclosed on those notes. While the foreclosure was still pending, the Thomasons filed a separate action against Security Financial and others, addressing all the promissory notes executed in favor of Security Financial by the Thomasons. That action sought recovery for breach of contract and fraud, among other theories. Both actions were consolidated. On appeal from the district court's decision to grant Security Financial's Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the claims that the Thomasons asserted in their fraud case, the Thomasons contended, among other things, that the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to foreclose on the secured property and abused its discretion. The Supreme Court concluded that all of the Thomasons' claims were waived or frivolous, and accordingly affirmed the Final Judgment in favor of Security Financial. View "Security Financial Fund v. Thomason" on Justia Law

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Darby Bank & Trust Co., appealed an order of the district court that remanded the underlying case the action to state court. The district court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the FDIC had not been formally substituted as a party in the state court action prior to removal. After review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. The Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the FDIC is "substituted as a party" in a state court proceeding under 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution, and may at that point remove the action to federal court." View "North Savannah Properties, LLC, et al v. FDIC" on Justia Law