Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, 1692f, by charging and attempting to collect interest at a rate higher than permitted under the law of her home state and that defendants violated New York's usury law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349; N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-501; N.Y. Penal Law 190.40. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendants. The court reversed the district court's holding that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 85, preempts plaintiff's claims because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, and because application of the state law on which plaintiff's claim relies would not significantly interfere with any national bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the court to address in the first instance whether the Delaware choice-of-law precludes plaintiff's claims. Finally, the court also vacated the district court's denial of class certification. View "Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

After refinancing a home mortgage in 2007, Beukes, mailed a notice of rescission in 2010, which was rejected. Beukes stopped making payments. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee for the lender, published notices of a mortgage foreclosure sale. MERS ultimately purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Beukes sued, seeking rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), claiming that the amount disclosed as the finance charge on the loan understated the amount they were actually charged by $944.31. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit held an appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, (2015), then affirmed the dismissal. Because Beukes mailed notice within three years, the right of rescission had not expired, but the finance charge disclosed in 2007 did not vary from the actual finance charge by more than one-half of one percent of the total amount financed, so it must be treated as accurate. Therefore, the right to rescind expired three business days after delivery of the disclosures. Beukes did not timely attempt to exercise any expanded right to rescind arising from section 1635(i)(2) that might have been available after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. View "Beukes v. GMAC Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Eighth Circuit held that the Petersons’ claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601, was time-barred by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f) because of their failure to file a lawsuit within three years of their transaction with Bank of America. In 2015, the Supreme Court held that another court had erred in holding that a borrower’s failure to file a suit for rescission within three years of the transaction’s consummation extinguishes the right to rescind and bars relief. Following remand by the Court, the Eighth Circuit vacated it earlier judgment and remanded. View "Bank of America v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America (BOA). On behalf of BOA, Udren Law Offices initiated foreclosure proceedings. The body of the Foreclosure Complaint listed not-yet-incurred fees as due and owing, which, Kaymark alleged, violated state and federal fair debt collection laws and breached the mortgage contract. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of claims that the disputed fees constituted actionable misrepresentation under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, but affirmed dismissal of all other claims. By attempting to collect fees for legal services not yet performed in the mortgage foreclosure, Udren violated FDCPA section 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10), which imposes strict liability on debt collectors who “use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and section 1692f(1) by attempting to collect “an[] amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The court analogized to similar claims in a debt collection demand letter. View "Kaymark v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained loans to purchase their home in 2005, each secured by a deed of trust. Wells Fargo had the senior lien, and Chase had the junior lien. Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property, but the proceeds were not enough to pay off Chase’s loan. About a year later, Chase sent plaintiffs a letter, stating that plaintiffs still “owe[d]” $67,002.04 and offering to accept $16,750.56 “as settlement for [their] loan balance.” The letter purported to offer a short window of opportunity to resolve the] delinquency before the debt was accelerated. In its final sentence, the letter disavowed any “attempt to collect a debt or to impose personal liability” that “was discharged.” Chase sent a similar second letter. Chase and PRS also made collection calls to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Chase and PRS on behalf of a potential class, claiming that Chase’s right to enforce its loan against them personally had been extinguished and that defendants’ letters and calls were misleading for implying that the debt was still owed. Plaintiffs cited California’s Rosenthal Act, Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal held that a borrower may sue the debt collector under the FDCPA and may sue the junior lienholder or its debt collector under the Rosenthal Act and UCL, but may not sue for violations of CLRA. View "Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Despite having only a few hundred dollars in her checking account at SunTrust Bank, Appellant cut herself a check for nearly $10,000, resulting in a sizable overdraft. SunTrust hired a Maryland law firm, Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates (MR&A) to bring a debt collection suit. MR&A filed suit on SunTrust’s behalf in a general district court in Virginia. The general district court entered judgment in favor of MR&A. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint against SunTrust and MR&A (collectively, Appellees), alleging that Appellees violated Maryland consumer protection laws and that MR&A violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The federal district court dismissed Appellant’s suit for failure to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the counts alleged in Appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief. View "Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

Exactly three years after borrowing money to refinance their home mortgage, the Jesinoskis sent the lender a letter purporting to rescind the transaction. The lender replied, refusing to acknowledge the rescission’s validity. One year and one day later, the Jesinoskis filed suit, seeking a declaration of rescission and damages. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings, concluding that a borrower can exercise the Truth in Lending Act’s right to rescind, 15 U. S. C.1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsuit within three years of the date the loan was consummated. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s language: a borrower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do so,” indicates that rescission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his intention. The statute says nothing about how that right is exercised and does not state that rescission is necessarily a consequence of judicial action. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sharon McGill sued defendant-appellant Citibank, N.A. for unfair competition and false advertising in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her Citibank credit card account. She brought claims under California’s unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising law (FAL), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief to prevent Citibank from engaging in its allegedly unlawful and deceptive business practices. Citibank petitioned to compel McGill to arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration provision in her account agreement. The trial court granted the petition on McGill’s claims for monetary damages and restitution, but denied the petition on the injunctive relief claims. Citibank appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of McGill’s claims to arbitration. View "McGill v. Citibank" on Justia Law

In 2011, Schriener obtained a residential mortgage from Quicken Loans that was secured by a deed of trust. Quicken Loans acquired the deed of trust that the parties used from Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. for a fee. Quicken Loans assisted Wolters Kluwer in preparing the deed of trust by providing necessary information. The deed of trust, however, was not written or reviewed by an attorney licensed to practice law in Missouri. In connection with Schriener’s residential mortgage, Quicken Loans charged him an “origination charge” of $575.00 and “adjusted origination charges” of $1,705.63. These charges are reflected on the parties’ HUD-1 settlement statement. The HUD-1 did not list a fee for the preparation of the deed of trust. Schriener filed a putative class action, alleging that Quicken Loans improperly engaged in law business under Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.020; violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010; and was unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, based on Shriener’s concession that Quicken did not charge him for the deed of trust. View "Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to rescind a loan she entered into with the trustee of a mortgage investment trust, and the district court granted rescission, finding that the mortgaged property was plaintiff's "principal dwelling" and the trustee failed to give plaintiff adequate notice of her right to rescind. In this case, the trustee failed to comply with two requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635, and a related regulation where he instructed plaintiff to sign simultaneously the loan documents and a postdated waiver of her right to rescind the transaction and the trustee failed to give plaintiff two copies of the notice of her right to rescind. The court concluded that the record fairly supports the district court's findings of fact; plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the trustee failed to give plaintiff clear and conspicuous notice of her right to rescind; but the district court lacked the discretion to deny plaintiff statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a determination of the amounts owed. View "Harris v. Schonbrun" on Justia Law