Justia Banking Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va.
Plaintiffs obtained loans from Defendant, a bank. Plaintiffs later, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, filed a complaint alleging that Defendant's loan transactions violated North Carolina's unfair and deceptive practices statute. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that they paid loan discount fees but did not receive discounted loans and that the fees they were charged in connection with origination of their loans were unnecessary and unreasonable. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their loan discount claims and excessive pricing claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1. The court of appeals affirmed entry of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' loan discount claims but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the excessive fees claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed in regards to Plaintiffs' loan discount claims; and (2) Plaintiffs' excessive pricing claims were not recognized by section 75-1.1. Remanded. View "Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va." on Justia Law
Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
In 2004, Plaintiffs refinanced their home by means of a loan from Downey Savings and Loan Association (Downey), a federal insured financial institution. In 2008, Plaintiffs' monthly loan payment doubled. Later that year, Downey was closed and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. U.S. Bank subsequently assumed all of Downey's loans and mortgages. After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage loan, U.S. Bank conducted a foreclosure sale and recorded a foreclosure deed. Plaintiffs, in turn, sued U.S. Bank, claiming that the loan made by Downey violated various state consumer protection laws and that the foreclosure was unlawful. U.S. Bank removed the case to federal district court, which granted summary judgment to U.S. Bank. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act's exhaustion requirement applied to Plaintiffs' consumer protection claims, and therefore, Plaintiffs' failure to file those claims with the FDIC divested the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) the transfer of a mortgage, authorized by federal law, obviates the need for a specific written assignment of the mortgage that state law would otherwise require, and thus, the foreclosure sale in this case was lawful. View "Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law
Miller, et al. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., et al.
This case involved the foreclosure sale of certain property owned by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of their claims against BAC and NDE under the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex. Fin. Code 392.304(a), the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.41 et seq., and Texas common law. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against BAC for misrepresenting the status or nature of the services that it rendered. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the TDCA claims under section 392.304(a)(14) as to that basis, remanding for further proceedings. Consequently, the court also reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' request for an accounting from NDE. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Miller, et al. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., et al." on Justia Law
Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A.
Until 2001, the federal Truth in Savings Act (TISA), 12 U.S.C. 4310 et seq., allowed civil damages to be sought for failure to comply with its requirements. The provision authorizing lawsuits was later repealed, however. After Congress's repeal of section 4310, Plaintiffs filed a class action against Bank of America, alleging unlawful and unfair business practices based on violations of TISA disclosure requirements. The trial court sustained the Bank's demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Congress's repeal of section 4310 reflected its intent to bar any private action to enforce TISA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TISA posed no impediment to Plaintiffs' claim of unlawful business practice under California's unfair competition law, where by leaving TISA's savings clause in place, Congress explicitly approved the enforcement of state laws such as the unfair competition law. View "Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law
Charvat v. Mutual First Fed. Credit Union
Plaintiff filed putative class actions under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1693, alleging that Mutual First and First National violated the Act because defendants' ATM machines did not have "on machine" notice of a transaction fee. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's claim of statutory damages was sufficiently related to his injury to confer standing where defendants did not provide him with the required "on machine" notice and then charged him a prohibited fee following an ATM transaction that he initiated and completed. Further, plaintiff's injury was fairly traceable to defendants' conduct where, if defendants had not violated the Act's notice requirement, plaintiff would not have been forced to choose between engaging in a transaction without the required notice and walking away. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Charvat v. Mutual First Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance IL, LLC
Green sued under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1606, claiming that U.S. Cash Advance misstated her loan’s annual percentage rate. The lender requested arbitration under the loan agreement, which referred to “binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.” The agreement was signed in 2012; the Forum has not accepted new consumer cases for arbitration since 2009, when it settled a suit alleging bias in merchants’ favor. The lender asked the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. 5. The judge declined, stating that identification of the Forum as arbitrator was “integral.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the agreement calls for use of the Forum’s Code of Procedure, not for the Forum itself to conduct proceedings. The court noted that the lender will have to “live with” the judge’s broad discretion in choosing an arbitrator, who might be familiar with practices in the payday loan industry or open to use of claimant classes in arbitrations, perhaps on a theory “that a consumer who would not voluntarily waive her rights under the Truth in Lending Act probably should not be deemed to have implicitly waived her right to the only procedure that could effectively enforce those rights.” View "Green v. U.S. Cash Advance IL, LLC" on Justia Law
Reed, Jr., et al. v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
Plaintiffs filed suit against Chase under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1641(g), alleging that Chase did not comply with disclosure requirements when it did not inform them that it had been assigned an interest in their mortgage. The court concluded that the assignment was an "administrative convenience" within the meaning of section 1641(f) because the assignment allowed Chase to perform foreclosure, a requirement of servicing the loan. Accordingly, Chase was not subject to the disclosure requirements and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase. View "Reed, Jr., et al. v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law
Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law
Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals brought claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., related to their mortgage transactions. The court held that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of section 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court. Because neither plaintiffs accomplished rescission in this way within three years of their respective transactions, their right to rescind expired and the district court correctly entered summary judgment on these claims. Further, plaintiffs were not entitled, as a matter of law, to money damages for the banks' refusal to rescind, although their claim was cognizable, where the violation - that each set of plaintiffs were given one, rather than two TILA disclosures - was not facially apparent on the loan documents as set forth in section 1641. View "Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law
FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge
Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law