Justia Banking Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., as receiver for R-G Premier Bank of P.R. v. Estrada-Rivera
Appellant signed a loan agreement with Bank for a line of credit for his business (Business). Appellant later defaulted on the loan, and Bank brought a collection action against Appellant, his wife, their conjugal partnership, and Business. The FDIC subsequently took over the Bank as receiver and obtained summary judgment in its favor on the collection action. The district court also dismissed Appellants' counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Appellants had not timely taken the steps necessary to maintain an action against the FDIC. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted on the collection action because factual disputes did not remain concerning Bank's role in causing Appellants to breach their loan agreement and whether Appellants should be released from their obligations under that agreement; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Appellants' counterclaims on jurisdictional grounds, as the Bank had insufficient assets to make any distribution on the claims of general unsecured creditors, including Appellants if they prevailed on their counterclaim, and therefore, the claim was not redressable. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., as receiver for R-G Premier Bank of P.R. v. Estrada-Rivera" on Justia Law
Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank
Plaintiffs filed suit against Wells Fargo under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691-1691f. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' FDCPA claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege that Wells Fargo was a debt collector under section 1692a(6). The court reversed, however, the district court's dismissal of the ECOA claim where the complaint's allegations that Wells Fargo took an adverse action without complying with ECOA's notice requirements were enough for the ECOA claim to survive a motion to dismiss because the parties agreed that Wells Fargo did not send plaintiffs an adverse action notice. View "Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law
Zadrozny, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their first amended complaint and the district court's denial of leave to further amend their complaint. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants improperly initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings after plaintiffs failed to comply with the mortgage obligations financing their residence. Because the provisions of the deed of trust foreclosed the pleading of a plausible "show me the note" claim by plaintiffs, the district court appropriately dismissed this claim; the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims premised on the unauthorized appointment of a successor trustee and/or the lack of proof of ownership of the note where these claims lacked legal and factual plausibility; because Arizona law countenances the trustee sale as conducted, plaintiffs failed to allege any plausible claims premised on the PEB Report or the UCC; plaintiffs' constitutional challenges of A.R.S. 33-811(b) were rejected by the court; plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims were barred by A.R.S. 12-543(3); and denial of leave to amend was within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Zadrozny, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al." on Justia Law
Badrawi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage
Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo violated Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 by failing to record a notice of pendency of foreclosure before publishing the foreclosure notice. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute did not provide plaintiff with relief in this case because there was no dispute that Wells Fargo properly served plaintiff with notice in compliance with Minn. Stat. 580.03 and, since she received personal service of the foreclosure notice, she could not have been among those for whose benefit the separate notice requirement of Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 was enacted. View "Badrawi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law
Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick
Respondent refinanced the mortgage on his home with a loan he obtained from Petitioner. Because Respondent failed to make his monthly loan payments in accordance with the parties' agreement, Petitioner invoked its right to initiate a foreclosure sale of the house. After the foreclosure sale, the property was sold to Petitioner. Because Respondent refused to vacate the house, Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action. In response, Respondent asserted various counterclaims against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court conditionally granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's counterclaims and additionally certified two questions for the Supreme Court's consideration regarding whether Respondent timely asserted his counterclaims. The Supreme Court concluded that the counterclaims were not timely. View "Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick" on Justia Law
Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc.
Hrivnak filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, and Ohio consumer-protection law, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.01–.99, 4165.01–04, seeking statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages exceeding $25,000, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was based on the conduct of debt management companies and a law firm in dunning hi on credit card debts. The defendants made an offer of judgment of $7,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees, under Civil Rule 68. Hrivnak rejected the offer. The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that the offer rendered the suit moot. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing defendants’ argument as asserting that claims with little to no chance of success should be dismissed as moot whenever they are mixed in with promising claims that a defendant offers to compensate in full. View "Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law
Meyer, et al v. U.S. Bank National Assoc.
Plaintiffs sued U.S. Bank after the Bank enforced its rights under a revolving credit agreement on which plaintiffs failed to make timely payment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Bank, ruling that plaintiffs, by signing forbearance agreements, released all claims against the Bank, and rejected the contention that these agreements were void because of duress caused by an alleged forgery. The alleged forgery was immaterial to the claims because plaintiffs failed to pay the loan by the maturity date, and the Bank was entitled to enforce its rights under the revolving credit agreement. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged forgery was immaterial and affirmed the judgment. View "Meyer, et al v. U.S. Bank National Assoc." on Justia Law
Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law
You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question.
View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law
Austin v. Bank of America N.A.
This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute.
View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law