Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), an act that governs the disposition of failed financial institutions' assets, divests a court of jurisdiction to consider any defense or affirmative defense not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process. The Supreme Court concluded that while FIRREA's jurisdictional bar divests a district court of jurisdiction to consider claims and counterclaims asserted against a successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process, it does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses raised by a debtor in response to the successor in interest's complaint for collection. In this case, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Successor in Interest on its breach of contract and breach of personal guaranty claims against Debtor, as Debtor's affirmative defenses were not barred by FIRREA. Remanded. View "Schettler v. RalRon Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claim that Deutsche and others violated various consumer protection laws in connection with a mortgage plaintiffs secured on their home. Plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to relief on account of violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667(f), and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 1026; North Carolina usury law, N.C. Gen. State 24; the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCUDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1; and North Carolina's Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-50. Plaintiffs also claimed a breach of contract and that Deutsche lacked the authority to enforce the loan. The court held that plaintiffs' TILA claim was not time-barred; plaintiffs adequately pled the elements of their usury claim and the claim was ripe for adjudication; similarly, plaintiffs' NCUDTPA claims should also be allowed to proceed; res judicata no longer barred plaintiffs from litigating whether Deutsche had authority to enforce the note; and plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in denying their motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e) was moot. View "Gilbert, Jr., et al. v. Residential Funding LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging that Chase failed to comply with its obligations under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) by declining to issue him a permanent loan modification. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that HAMP did not provide a private cause of action and that, even if his claims were independent of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. The court applied the factors under Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inves. to Hamp and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 12 U.S.C. 5201-5261, holding that there was no implied right of action. Therefore, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims. To the extent plaintiff's claims fell outside of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. Rejecting plaintiff's remaining claim of promissory estoppel, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), requires that electronically printed receipts not display more than the last 5 digits of the card number, but does not define "card number." A Shell card designates nine digits as the "account number" and five as the "card number" and has 14 digits embossed on the front and 18 digits encoded on the magnetic stripe. Shell printed receipts at its gas pumps with the last four digits of the account number. Plaintiffs contend that it should have printed the final four numbers that are electronically encoded on the magnetic stripe, which the industry calls the "primary account number." Plaintiffs did not claim risk of identity theft or any actual injury, but sought a penalty of $100 per card user for willful failure to comply. The district court denied Shell summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Shell did not willfully violate the Act.View "Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Van Straaten" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over certain property subject to a foreclosure. At issue was whether the parol evidence rule required that a person who claimed to hold a "purchase money mortgage" must prove his purchase money mortgage holder status solely by reference to the mortgage instrument itself. The court concluded that, in this case, the recorded deed and purchase money mortgage established that the sellers' mortgage satisfied, at least prima facie, all three requirements of 25 Del. C. 2108. Moreover, the mortgage contained no subordination language that would relinquish priority to the third party lenders. Therefore, the presumption that the sellers' mortgage was a purchase money mortgage entitled to statutory priority standards stood unrebutted. By applying the parol evidence rule to reach a contrary conclusion, the Superior Court erred as a matter of law. View "Galantino v. Baffone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Midland Funding obtained judgments against Plaintiff Susan Ballou in two cases. The small claims court entered installment payment orders pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-356d. Defendant, the Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., which represented Midland in small claims court, did not apply for an order of postjudgment interest in either of the two cases, and the small claims court did not issue an order of postjudgment interest in either case. Defendant thereafter sought a bank execution against Plaintiff for the judgment amounts and directed the state marshal to add postjudgment interest of ten percent to the amount of the judgments. Plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. district court disputing the amount of the debts. At issue before the court was whether postjudgment interest accrues automatically on any unpaid balance under a judgment for which the court has entered an installment payment order. The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted certification to answer this question and held that section 52-356d(e) does not provide for the automatic accrual of postjudgment interest on all judgments in which an installment payment order has been entered by the court. View "Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C." on Justia Law

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13. View "Kekauoha-Alisa, et al. v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his civil action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim was covered by the FDCPA but that he did not allege acts that violated the FDCPA. Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the statement on the May 2009 notice that BAC was plaintiff's "creditor" was a false representation and was made by a "debt collector" as defined by section 1692a. Therefore, the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under the FDCPA and the judgment of the district court was vacated and remanded. View "Bourff v. Lublin, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M&T Bank, alleging that it improperly charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied M&T Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court held that, under the delegation provision, the decision of whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement was a decision for an arbitrator, and the district court erred in making the decision itself. Further, the court believed that it was prudent for the district court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, so the court did not reach whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Given v. M&T Bank Corp, et al." on Justia Law