Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against Wells Fargo after plaintiffs' application for a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was denied. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and therefore granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not plausibly stated a breach of contract claim; plaintiffs' negligence claim failed because there was no express or implied contract and therefore, no tort duty could arise as a matter of law; plaintiffs' Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 13-301(1), claim failed because Wells Fargo did not make misrepresentations when it stated that it needed more information to process plaintiffs' HAMP application; and the district court court properly dismissed the negligent misrepresentation and common law fraud claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Developers purchased forty acres with the intent to develop it. Appellants secured a mortgage on the property with a bank. Later Developers formed a municipal property owners' district (the District). Law Firm was retained by the District as legal counsel for the proposed issuance of improvement bonds to finance public improvements in the development. At issue in this case were certain bonds issued by the District that were sold to several banks (Appellants). Developer defaulted on payment of the capital improvement use fees on the bonds and subsequently defaulted on the original mortgage, and the property was sold. Appellants sued Law Firm, alleging that Law Firm had a duty to inform Appellants of the mortgage on the real property and that it failed to inform them. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Law Firm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found Law Firm was not liable under the Arkansas Security Act; (2) erred in granting judgment on the issue of attorney malpractice; and (3) correctly found Law Firm had no duty to Appellants under contract, negligence, or breach of a fiduciary duty. View "First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A." on Justia Law

To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, El Camino executed equipment leases with Cyberco, a corporation held out to be a computer sales and consulting business. Cyberco actually operated under several names and was engaged in fraud. Its affiliate, Teleservices, a shell corporation, was represented as an arms-length computer manufacturer. The equipment to be leased by El Camina, which likely never existed, was allegedly manufactured by Teleservices and delivered to Cyberco, which released payment to Teleservices. In 2002, Huntington established a banking relationship with Cyberco. Cyberco used its accounts to deposit funds from El Camino. Huntington investigated a series of overdrafts. Ultimately Cyberco elected to undergo a “gradual migration” from Huntington, and Huntington agreed to credit extensions for Cyberco during the transition. El Camino purchased more than $25 million in computer equipment. El Camino sued Huntington for conversion, aiding and abetting conversion, aiding and abetting fraud, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment on the first three claims, concluding that El Camino could not establish the requisite level of knowledge to sustain aiding and abetting and conversion claims. It later dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that findings, in a related bankruptcy case, that Huntington did not act in good faith, were irrelevant. View "El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Decedent created an inter vivos revocable trust. Until her death, Decedent served as the trust's sole trustee. At Decedent's request, Attorney drafted the trust documents and a pour-over will. Bank was named successor trustee of Decedent's trust. After Decedent died, the personal representative (Representative) of Decedent's estate sued Attorney and Bank. Against Attorney, the petition alleged claims of negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract based on the alleged failure of Defendants to protect Decedent's assets from tax liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions of summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that Representative's tort claims for legal malpractice did not survive Decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Representative's cause of action did not accrue until after Decedent's death, it did not qualify as a survival action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1801 and was therefore barred. View "Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Dorothy Halstein suffered from dementia. She owned a home worth between $235,000 and $320,000. While suffering demential, she owed approximately $75,000 to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), secured by a deed of trust on her home. Because of the cost of her care, her guardian did not have the funds to pay her mortgage. Quality Loan Services, acting as trustee of the deed of trust, foreclosed on her home. Quality sold the home for $83,087.67, one dollar more than Ms. Halstein owed. A notary falsely notarized the notice of sale by predating the notary acknowledgement. The falsification permitted the sale to take place earlier than it could have had the notice of sale been dated when it was actually signed. Before the foreclosure sale, Halstein's court-appointed guardian secured a buyer for her house willing to pay $235,000. There was not enough time before the scheduled foreclosure to close the sale with the buyer. Despite numerous requests, WaMu did not postpone the sale. A jury found that the trustee was negligent, and that the trustee's acts violated the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and that the trustee breached its contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed all but the negligence claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, and restored the award based on the CPA. View "Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Case appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendant St. Mary's Bank and denied his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims that the bank engaged in trespass and violated state law and the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The matter arose from the bank's foreclosure on property Plaintiff leased from his landlord, Jean Marcelin. Months before the foreclosure sale, pipes burst in an apartment above plaintiff's, causing a flood. The City of Manchester turned off water and electricity to the building. Plaintiff spoke about the problem to Marcelin, who denied that he still owned the property. Plaintiff then spoke about the problem to a Bank representative; the representative asked plaintiff to allow her, a plumber, and an electrician into the building. The plaintiff complied with this request. The City placed a legal notice on the property’s front door, stating that it was unsafe and prohibiting occupancy. Plaintiff had not resided at the property since the flood, though most of his possessions remained at the property. When the Bank allowed him access to the apartment to remove his possessions, plaintiff observed that his apartment door was "wide open" and subsequently alleged that many of his possessions were missing. Finding no error with the superior court order, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. View "Case v. St. Mary's Bank " on Justia Law

Prime Realty, Inc. (Prime) acted as general partner for two limited partnerships (collectively, the Partnerships). Without the Partnerships' limited partners' knowledge, Prime took out two loans from a bank (the Bank) and, by deed of trust, secured the loans with Partnerships' property. The Bank ultimately sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the loans. The Partnerships sued the Bank for conversion, alleging that the loans were for a nonpartnership purposes and, as such, Prime lacked authority to offer the Partnerships' property as collateral without the limited partners' consent under the Partnership agreements. The district court concluded that the Bank had converted the Partnerships' property and awarded the Partnerships damages and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Partnerships' complaint was timely; (2) the Bank converted the Partnerships' property; (3) the district court improperly awarded damages in the full amount of the proceeds applied to the loans because a portion of the first loan served a Partnership purpose; and (4) prejudgment interest was proper only in the amount the Bank applied to the second loan. View "Brook Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Mut. of Omaha Bank" on Justia Law

According to Braden Furniture Company, Inc., between 2003 and 2010, Bonnie Manning, an assistant bookkeeper, accessed Braden Furniture's accounting program and created over 200 unauthorized checks, totaling over $470,000, that she then deposited in her account at Union State Bank. The majority of the checks did not identify a payee. Braden Furniture sued Union State Bank, RBC Bank, and Manpower, Inc., alleging common-law negligence and wantonness and violations of sections 7-3-404(d), 7-3-405(b), and 7-3-406, Ala. Code 1975. Union State Bank moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Bank. Upon review, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether provisions in the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code ("the UCC") displaced common-law claims of negligence and wantonness when a drawer seeks to recover the loss of payment for unauthorized checks. Braden Furniture contended that the trial court erred in holding that the provisions of the UCC displaced its common-law claims of negligence and wantonness because, allowing its common-law claims to proceed did not "create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent" with the UCC. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment for Union State Bank in this regard. View "Braden Furniture Company, Inc. v. Union State Bank " on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law