Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Nancy Ramsey filed a complaint against Baxter Title Company and the company's owner, James Lemieux, for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care and for punitive damages arising from a real estate transaction. The superior court dismissed Ramsey's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ramsey's complaint did not allege the kind of close, confidential relationship necessary for a court to find the existence of a fiduciary duty; and (2) Baxter Title and Lemieux did not owe Ramsey a duty of care to explain to her that the loan she secured was more favorable to the lender than to her. View "Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co." on Justia Law

Cleveland sued financial institutions, alleging that by securitizing subprime mortgages and foreclosing on houses, defendants allegedly contributed to declines in property values, shrinking tax base, and increased criminal activity, causing a public nuisance. The district court dismissed, finding preemption by state law and failure to demonstrate that defendants unreasonably interfered with a public right or were the proximate cause of alleged harm. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland filed another suit in state court against non-diverse institutions, alleging public-nuisance, violation of the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, (RICO analogue), by inaccurately claiming title to mortgages and notes in foreclosures in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.32. Cleveland also sought to recover (Ohio Revised Code 715.261) costs incurred maintaining or demolishing foreclosed houses. While the case was pending, banks sought a declaratory judgment that Cleveland’s public-nuisance claim was preempted by the National Bank Act and an injunction against the suits. The district court suggested that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed. Subsequently, the state court dismissed Cleveland’s public-nuisance and OCAA claims; appeal is pending. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the first case, so that declaratory relief is now moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the second suit; the district court had jurisdiction.View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Six banks (the Banks) alleged that the negligent misrepresentation of Respondent, James H. Bedard, Inc., caused them to be damaged when the Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the City of Brainerd defaulted on bonds held by the Banks. Specifically, the Banks purchased $3.3 million in bonds from the City, which helped finance a development project in the City. In deciding to purchase the bonds, the Banks relied on an appraisal and feasibility study prepared by Bedard. The Banks filed a negligent misrepresentation claim against Bedard, alleging that Bedard's study overstated the value of the project and the rate at which the land would sell. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the Banks failed to plead their negligent misrepresentation claim against Bedard with particularity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Banks specifically pleaded facts underlying each of the elements of their negligent misrepresentation claim, the Banks pleaded the "ultimate facts" of their claim and thus satisfied the particularity requirement under Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Remanded. View "Hardin County Savings Bank v. City of Brainerd Hous. & Redevelopment Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the president and owner of Company. Plaintiff and Company were sued by an employee for sexual harassment, among other claims. Plaintiff retained Law Firm to represent him and Company. The district court entered judgment against Company. The court later granted Company's motion for a new trial, and the parties subsequently settled. Plaintiff was the personal guarantor on the loans and credit lines provided by lenders to Company. After the original jury verdict, banks and lenders refused to continue extending credit to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff's real estate holdings crumbled, causing Plaintiff to lose dozens of commercial and residential properties. Plainiff then sued the attorney who acted as lead defense counsel and Law Firm (collectively, Appellees), contending that Appellees committed a series of negligent errors during their representation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that his loss of net worth was proximately caused by the actions of Appellees. View "Hamilton v. Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff co-established Company. Plaintiff later sold his majority interest pursuant to an agreement calling for payments to Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff a security interest in Company's assets. Company subsequently applied for credit with Bank, which transaction made Plaintiff's security interest in Company's assets subordinate to Bank's. Thereafter, Company went out of business, leaving loans unpaid. Plaintiff brought claims against Bank for negligence, constructive fraud, actual fraud, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court granted Bank's motion for judgment on the evidence on all claims, including finding that Bank owed no duty to Purcell. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the issues of duty but reversed the trial court's judgment on the evidence as to Purcell's remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was not sufficient evidence presented in this case to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence on Purcell's claims of fraud, deception, and tortious interference with a contract; and (2) Purcell's relationship with Bank as a subordinate creditor did not give rise to a duty of care required to prove Purcell's claims of negligence and constructive fraud. View "Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

After JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) initiated foreclosure proceedings on Appellants' home and subsequently bought the property at a sheriff's sale, Appellants filed suit against Chase, doing business as Washington Mutual, seeking damages under theories of promissory estoppel and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims. Appellants subsequently filed a second suit against Chase and Washington Mutual, alleging causes of action relating to purported misrepresentations and alleged failure to disclose information and Chase's alleged failure to provide adequate notice of the sheriff's sale and to respond to two qualified written requests in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA). The district court dismissed all claims against Washington Mutual without prejudice and all claims against Chase with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) other than their claim under RESPA, the claims set forth in Appellants' complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) as for the RESPA claims, Appellants failed to show how the complaint could be amended to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Hintz v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("the BAP") certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "In Alabama, is a 'default' judgment premised upon discovery sanctions or other post-answer conduct of the defendant sufficient to support the application of issue preclusion in a later proceeding?" Debtor-Defendant Anthony Malfatti was one of three principals of TA Financial Group ('TAF') purportedly designed to assist credit card holders in arbitration of disputes with the card issuers. The arbitration providers were selected by the card holders from a list provided by TAF. Among the arbitration providers was Arbitration Forum of America, Inc. ('AFOA'). AFOA was not conducting legitimate arbitrations; every arbitration resulted in an award in favor of the card holder, which was then reduced to judgment. Malfatti claims he was unaware that AFOA's practices and the judgments stemming therefrom were illegitimate. At some time after the banks involved learned of the judgments, they filed cross-complaints against the card holders to set aside the judgments as fraudulently obtained. In September 2005, the banks, including Bank of America, N.A. (USA) filed Amended Third Party Complaints against, among others, Malfatti and TAF, alleging tortious interference with contract, abuse of process, wantonness, and civil conspiracy, and sought an injunction against further arbitrations. The Banks moved for default judgments against Malfatti and TAF for failing to comply with discovery orders, repeated failures to appear for depositions, and failure to respond to written discovery. Malfatti and TAF filed a motion to set aside the defaults. The court found Malfatti and TAF to be jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages, awarded punitive damages against Malfatti, and found Malfatti to be liable for punitive damages awarded against TAF under the alter ego doctrine. Malfatti filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy the Banks filed an adversary proceeding alleging the debt owed to them by Malfatti was nondischargeable. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: "[f]or purposes of determining whether an issue is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Alabama law makes no distinction between a simple default and a penalty default." View "Malfatti v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Wescott Agri-Products, Inc., a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA)-licensed wholesale supplier of perishable agricultural commodities, sold produce to a company that later ceased business operations after Sterling State Bank seized the company's assets because it failed to make scheduled loan payments. Wescott demanded payment from the bank, claiming the bank had seized assets subject to trust under the PACA, but the bank refused. Wescott sued the bank, asserting various claims, including violations of the PACA and a conversion claim. The district court granted the bank summary judgment on Wescott's conversion claim and summary judgment in favor of Wescott on its PACA claim. Wescott then appealed the district court's denial of attorney fees on costs. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Wescott attorney fees and costs, as the fees were excessive and unreasonable, and Wescott's unprofessional conduct in the case did not warrant an award of fees. View "Wescott Agri-Products, Inc. v. Sterling State Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant's mother (Miller) opened a checking account with Bank. Appellant alleged that Miller added him as joint owner of the account with right of survivorship. After Miller died, Appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account. Miller's Estate brought an action against Appellant, alleging that the funds Appellant had withdrawn from the account belonged to the Estate. The probate court determined that Miller was the sole owner of the checking account and that the funds Appellant had withdrawn were the property of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later sued the Bank, seeking damages for breach of contract and negligence for failing to retain the records that would show his ownership of the account. Appellant also sought punitive damages. The superior court dismissed the action based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, concluding that the precise issue of ownership was common to both proceedings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the breach of contract and punitive damages claims; but (2) vacated as to the negligence claim, holding that Appellant's negligence claim against the Bank was not barred by collateral estoppel, as the probate court did not adjudicate the factual issues related to this claim. View "Gray v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This case presented a battle between banks over the proceeds of the sale of cattle by a financially strapped borrower who had financial dealings with both banks. When Security Savings Bank (Security) obtained the proceeds of the sale, Peoples Trust and Savings Bank (Peoples) claimed a security interest in the proceeds and sued for conversion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples. After Security appealed, Peoples commenced garnishment proceedings against Security to enforce its judgment, and Security paid the underlying judgment. The court of appeals then determined that Security had waived its right to appeal and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant faced with post-judgment garnishment does not waive a pending appeal by paying the judgment in order to avoid further enforcement proceedings; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Peoples had a security interest in the proceeds superior to Security's interest and that Peoples did not waive its superior position through its course of conduct. View "Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v. Sec. Savings Bank" on Justia Law