Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Regions Bank, in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or cotrustee of various trusts, Delores Ancell, and David Puckett filed two permissive appeals, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to challenge the Jefferson Circuit Court's orders denying the trustees' motions to dismiss in part Ernest Kramer's and Kenyon R. Kirkland's complaints filed against the trustees. In his complaint, Kramer alleged that the trustees' management of the assets held by the Kramer revocable trust constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, breach of contract, fraud, reckless misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, suppression, violation of the Alabama Securities Act. Finding that the trustees failed to support their argument with relevant legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "Regions Bank v. Ernest Kramer " on Justia Law

Rachelle Hunter received a loan from Highmark Federal Credit Union to purchase a home and property. A flood damaged the home a few years later, and Hunter had no flood insurance. Hunter filed suit against Highmark, arguing that Highmark was negligent in failing to warn her to purchase flood insurance and in failing to purchase the insurance at her expense. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hunter's negligence claim failed as a matter of law because she could not show that Highmark owed her a duty, and accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Hunter" on Justia Law

After a dispute over the purchase of a motor coach, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, a used car salesman, a used car dealership, and a bank, asserting claims of, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted. Defendants did not meet their discovery deadlines, and Defendants' counsel failed to attend several status conferences. The district court then entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction and later and awarded Plaintiff $74,154 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction under Mont. R. Civ. P. 37(b); (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the sanction orders; (3) did not err as a matter of law in calculating damages; but (4) failed to property calculate and award prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "Kraft v. High Country Motors Inc." on Justia Law

Salem Logistics entered into a loan agreement with Ark Royal Capital that required Salem to instruct its customers to send payments directly to an account maintained by Ark at Wachovia Bank. Salem subsequently agreed to provide freight bill auditing services to Variety Wholesalers. Salem requested that Variety send the amounts on the master invoices directly to the Wachovia account but did not inform Variety that the account was actually controlled by Ark. Variety later terminated its contract with Salem and filed suit for recovery of money it had forwarded to Salem that had not been paid to carriers. When Variety discovered the Wachovia account actually belonged to Ark, Variety added Ark as a defendant. The trial court entered summary judgment for Variety on its claim of conversion against Ark and for Ark on Variety's claim of constructive trust and ordered Ark to pay Variety $888,000. The court of appeals reversed and entered summary judgment for Ark on both issues. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on both issues, holding (1) summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved; and (2) accordingly, the trial court also erred in its award of damages to Variety. View "Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs." on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations. View "Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

In 2007, Scottie and Dawn Pederson (the Pedersons) and Rocky Mountain Bank (the Bank) entered into a construction loan agreement pursuant to which the Bank agreed to lend the Pedersons several thousand dollars. In 2008, the Pedersons and the Bank agreed to finance the construction loan through three short term loans. In 2009, the Pedersons tried to refinance their loans but were unable to do so. Due to alleged failures on the part of the Bank, the Pedersons brought suit against the Bank in 2011, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After it was served with the complaint, the Bank filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting the statutes of limitations had run on all of the Pedersons' claims. The district court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the Pedersons' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes of limitations began to run in 2008 because the Pedersons' claims had accrued and they had discovered the facts constituting the claims; and (2) by filing their complaint more than three years later, the Pedersons failed to commence their action within any of the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank" on Justia Law

Azhar Said on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant Abbasid, Inc. sued the Los Alamos National Bank and First National Bank of Santa Fe for negligence in paying and accepting checks intended for the business but that his now ex-wife Bina Shahani had deposited in her cousin's account for personal use. The case was removed from Texas state to federal court, then removed to the U.S. District Court for the district of New Mexico. The district court dismissed the negligence claim on the grounds that the Bank owed no duty of care to Abbasid and that the claim and was preempted by statute which imposed strict liability. After trial, the jury returned a special verdict that the Bank did not convert any of Abbasid's checks. Abbasid timely filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. Among the issues Abbasid raised on appeal: (1) the district court improperly denied its motion for new trial claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) the court improperly excluded evidence of the Bank’s check-handling policies. Finding that most of Abbasid's claims of error were not properly preserved or that any error was mooted by the verdict, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in the case.

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase.

When Rita Fix's son and daughter-in-law, Jeff and Marie, secured a loan from the First State Bank of Roscoe by obtaining a warranty deed for the property, the Bank assured Fix she could retain possession of the house. After Jeff and Marie conveyed the house and property to the Bank, the Bank sold the property and sought to remove Fix from the house. Fix sued the Bank for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Meanwhile, Fix, Jeff, and Marie were indicted on multiple criminal counts. The State attorney who brought the charges and who represented the Bank civilly offered to dismiss the criminal charges against Fix if she would deed the house back to the Bank. Fix then amended her complaint to include a claim of abuse of process against the Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment against Fix on her IIED claim. A jury then returned a verdict finding the Bank liable for abuse of process but awarded no damages to Fix. The Supreme Court reversed on the abuse of process claim, holding that the trial court provided the jury with the incorrect legal standard for the recovery of emotional damages. Remanded for a new trial.

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable.