Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3 (Deutsche Bank) filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Theron Matthews. Deutsche Bank claimed at that time to hold the note and mortgage, and that the note and mortgage were indorsed in blank. However from the face of the note attached to the Petition, no such indorsement was found. The Bank then filed a document entitled "Assignment of Real Estate Mortgage" with the County Clerk of Creek County six months after the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. A trial court granted partial summary judgment in Deutsche Bank's favor against Defendant a month later. Defendant appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing Deutsche Bank failed to demonstrate standing. Finding that the Bank did not have the proper supporting documentation in hand when it filed suit, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee HSBC Bank USA, NA, claimed to be the holder of a note and mortgage on Defendants-Appellants Wesley and Pamela Lyon's house, and initiated foreclosure proceedings against them. HSBC filed a first amended petition late 2008, adding additional defendants, but continued to assert its status as the "present holder of said note and mortgage." The Lyons, noting the facial deficiencies of the unindorsed note filed in the original action, asserted HSBC's lack of standing. The trial court denied HSBC's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court allowed the bank time to file an amended petition. HSBC filed its second amended petition again asserting its status as the holder of the note by reason of an indorsement and the assignment of the mortgage. A review of the note attached to the second amended petition demonstrated a blank indorsement from the original lender "without recourse to the bearer" and signed by a vice president of the assigning bank. HSBC then filed a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in early 2011, which was granted two months later by the trial court. Defendants argued on appeal that the bank still lacked standing to bring suit, and that the summary judgment ruling was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted the bank's motion for summary judgment because it had established in its amended petition that it was the current holder of the note, and that the Lyons had not made any payments on the house since 2008.

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendants-Appellants Natacha and Jevester Bryams, Jr. Deutsche Bank claimed at that time to hold the note and mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. A review of the note showed no indorsement. In its brief in support of motion for summary judgment Deutsche Bank attached a document entitled "Assignment of Mortgage." This assignment of mortgage was acknowledged and stamped as being recorded with the County Clerk of Tulsa County on January 26, 2010--over one month after the filing of the foreclosure proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, and the Byrams appealed, arguing that the bank failed to demonstrate it had standing to bring the foreclosure action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the bank needed to show it became "a person entitled to enforce" its note prior to foreclosing. There was a question of fact as to when and if the bank became so entitled, and the Court concluded summary judgement was not an appropriate disposition of the case. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust filed a foreclosure action against Defendant-Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh. Appellant and his wife Debra executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company in 2002. In 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. Several months later, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra executed a quitclaim deed to Defendant. Defendant defaulted on the note in 2009, and the bank shortly thereafter filed its petition to foreclose. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claimed it was the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owned any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claimed Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there were significant questions of fact such that summary judgment was not an appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellants Eleanor and Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer petitioned the Supreme Court to challenge the Court of Civil Appeals' decision which upheld the trial court's determination regarding Appellee-Trustee JP Morgan Chase Bank's previously-adjudicated ability to draw on the trusts's principal. The trust in question named Appellant Eleanor Reed as beneficiary, and authorized payments of up to half of its income payable quarterly, for her support and well-being. In 1998, Reed filed a Petition for Instructions in district court in Tulsa County, requesting the court determine what distributions were permitted under the Trust. Specifically, Reed sought instructions for the co-trustee, Bank One Trust Company, N.A., to pay certain of Reed's expenses from the Trust's principal. In 2007, Reed and three of her four children, Robert Reed, Diane Martin and Meredith Farmer, filed suit to modify the terms of the trust to allow Appellee JP Morgan Chase to make payments from the remaining half of the trust's principal. Appellants stated that Reed was "an incapacitated person afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, and her condition constitutes an emergency condition which will necessitate her being housed in a nursing home. She is wheel-chair bound, 84 years old, and in precarious health." Appellants maintained that Testator would have wanted Reed, his only child, to have the use of the remaining Trust funds to provide for her well-being. Appellees objected to the suit, arguing that the Testator's intent regarding the payment from principal had been determined in a 1998 Order and, as such, the claims asserted in the Amended Petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no connection between the 1998 Order and the issue presented to it on appeal: "[w]hile we agree that the subject matter, the parties, and the capacity of the parties remain the same, we cannot agree that the cause of the action is the same as that in the 1998 matter. The focus of the 1998 lawsuit was to provide instructions to the trustee to make payments from half of the Trust corpus on behalf of Reed. This payment was expressly provided for in the Trust instrument. In the present action, Appellants [sought] due to an unforeseen medical emergency, to modify the express terms of the Trust and to show that Testator would have intended Reed's present needs be cared for even if it meant invading the remaining half of the Trust corpus." The Court vacated the appellate court's opinion in this matter and remanded the case back to the trial court for determination of whether modification should be allowed under the terms of the trust.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appearance of impartiality/conflict of interest in disciplinary proceedings before the Oklahoma Real Estate Appraiser Board (the Board) required invalidation of the proceedings. In December of 2005, Appellee real estate appraiser Beverly Bowen appraised a parcel of real property for her client BancFirst (Bank). By July of 2007, after having sat vacant for 19 months, the property sold at a sheriff's sale which resulted in a loss to the private mortgage insurer (insurer). The insurer filed a grievance against the appraiser with the Board alleging possible appraisal fraud. The insurer hired another local appraiser, JoElla Jones (Jones/review appraiser), to reappraise the property nineteen months after Bowen's initial appraisal. Apparently, the property remained unoccupied the entire time, and it may have been vandalized. Jones reviewed Bowen's work. She valued the property at $197,000.00 or $58,000 below Bowen's appraisal. While the dispute between the bank and the insurer regarding the property's value was ongoing, the bank discovered that Jones had a personal and direct history with Bowen: the appraisers had known one another for more than 26 years. Learning this information prompted the bank to write a letter to the insurer notifying them of the unmistakable conflict of interest and alleging that if a mistake in an appraisal occurred, it was made by the review appraiser. Soon thereafter, the Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Bowen. Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, a probable cause committee (committee) of the Board held a hearing. The Board adopted the committee's findings of fact and conclusions of law but modified the disciplinary recommendation. The trial court held another hearing reversing the Board's discipline, finding that the appearance of impropriety was so apparent on the face of the record that reversible legal error occurred. The Board appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the fact of this case, the disciplinary proceedings required invalidating proceedings because of the appearance of impartiality. The Court affirmed the trial court.