Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging, among other things, fraud and unfair business practices in the origination of plaintiffs' residential mortgage loans, and negligence in the subsequent servicing of the loans. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint failed to allege fraud for which defendants are responsible and in concluding that defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiffs in the review of their applications for a loan modification. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action for fraud against defendants where the complaint alleged that the loan documents concealed the terms of plaintiffs' loans and plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing defendants' liability for the alleged fraud. Accordingly, the court reversed as to plaintiffs' first, second, and sixth causes of action and remanded for further proceedings.View "Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

After Elliott defaulted on his mortgage GMAC Mortgage sued to foreclose. The circuit court granted GMAC summary judgment on his right to foreclose, finding (1) Freddie Mac was the owner of the promissory note (Note), and GMAC was the Note’s holder and servicer; and (2) GMAC, as holder and service, had authority to enforce the Note. Elliott appealed, arguing that GMAC lacked standing at the time it initiated foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting GMAC’s motion for summary judgment because GMAC ultimately provided a properly indorsed bearer Note, mortgage, and evidence of default, thus providing evidence that GMAC had standing.View "Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Elliott" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association (the Bank) filed an amended complaint for residential foreclosure against Thomas Manning. The case progressed through its pretrial stages. Eventually, the superior court dismissed the Bank’s foreclosure complaint with prejudice as a sanction for the Bank’s failure to comply with the court’s discovery order. The Bank appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint under the circumstances and that the court erred at several points as the case proceeded through its procedural steps. The Supreme Court agreed with the Bank and vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the order dismissing the Bank’s complaint with prejudice was an abuse of the court’s discretion.View "U.S. Bank N.A. v. Manning" on Justia Law

A mortgagee (Plaintiff) obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure against the mortgagor of certain property. More than thirty days after the time in which to redeem the subject property had expired, Plaintiff filed a motion for a deficiency judgment seeking to collect money damages from the guarantors of the mortgage note. The guarantors objected to the request for a hearing in damages, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from obtaining any additional remedy from the guarantors under Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-1, under which the foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to further action against persons liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, note or obligation who are, or may be, made parties to the foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in favor of the guarantors, holding that section 49-1 had no effect on Plaintiff’s ability to recover the remaining unpaid debt from the guarantors because the guarantors were not parties to the foreclosure claim, as the guarantors’ liability arose separately under their guarantee.View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Winthrop Props., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007 Rufini purchased his Sonoma residence with a $600,000 loan. Rufini and his fiancée lived in the home until they separated. In June 2009, CitiMortgage approved Rufini for a loan modification and told him he would receive a permanent modification after making timely trial payments of $2787.93 in July, August and September. Rufini timely made the payments at the modified rate through December. In January, 2010, CitiMortgage informed him that his permanent loan modification agreement would be ready in three days. Three months later, with still no written agreement, he rented out his house to offset expenses In August Rufini learned that Citibank was denying his loan modification, because the home was not owner-occupied. He attempted to make timely mortgage payments at the modified level, but CitiMortgage returned his checks. Rufini received a notice of default in September 2010, followed by a notice of trustee’s sale scheduled for January 2011. He contacted CitiMortgage and obtained its agreement to delay the foreclosure. CitiMortgage assigned Semien to Rufini’s account, but Rufini was unable to contact him on the phone for three and a half weeks. On April 11 Rufini was informed his modification was “in final state of completion.” On May 4, his house was sold at auction. The trial court dismissed Rufini’s complaint alleging “breach of contract—promissory estoppel,” breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair business practices, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court reversed and remanded the claims of negligent representation and under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law. View "Rufini v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

Appellant used NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. to apply for a mortgage and paid NVR Mortgage a broker fee. More than three but fewer than twelve years later, Appelalnt sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (collectively, NVR) for allegedly violating Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Appellant and similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6), which is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question of law in the negative, holding that an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to the default three-year statute of limitations. View "NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen" on Justia Law

n November 2005, Appellant Richard Mitchell obtained title to property located in Alpharetta and executed a security deed in favor of MERS, who subsequently assigned the security deed to Wells Fargo as trustee. The property was foreclosed upon after Appellants Richard (and his wife Deborah) became delinquent on their mortgage payments. Wells Fargo purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Since that time, Appellants admitted that they made numerous "dilatory filings," proceeding pro se, in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In May 2010, Mitchell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for a bill of peace pursuant to OCGA 23-3-110 against Mitchell as a measure to end Mitchell's "meritless filings" in state court. The trial court issued an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell had not properly served Wells Fargo. The court also granted Wells Fargo's motion for a bill of peace, finding that the records of Fulton County courts reflected "nothing less than repeated and contemptuous behavior in the courts of this State" and that the lengthy history of filings in federal court showed a pattern of behavior by Mitchell consistent with his state filings. The court permanently enjoined Mitchell from filing any pleading or complaint related to the foreclosure and eviction from the property at issue for a period of five years unless Mitchell first received written approval from the court. Mitchell moved to set aside the order granting the bill of peace, which the court denied. The Mitchells appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Scott Greenleaf executed a promissory note to Residential Mortgage Services, Inc. (RMS). That same day, Greenleaf signed a mortgage on property securing that debt. The mortgage listed RMS as the lender of the debt and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the nominee for the lender. MERS subsequently assigned its interest in the mortgage and note to Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC). BAC then merged with Bank of America, N.A. (Bank). Five years later, the Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings against Greenleaf. The district court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Bank. Greenleaf appealed, arguing that the Bank lacked standing to foreclose on the property. The Supreme Court agreed with Greenleaf and vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Bank proved its status as the holder of the note but failed to establish its ownership of Greenleaf’s mortgage; and (2) because the Bank failed to satisfy two of the Higgins foreclosure requirements, the Bank was not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in any event.View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf" on Justia Law

In 2006, Ingram executed a promissory note in favor of Loancity in the amount of $212,500 to finance the purchase of property in Providence and executed a mortgage on the property. The documents identified Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” After a series of assignments in 2009, Deutsche Bank held both the note and the mortgage to the property. Ingram failed to make the required payments. OneWest, under power of attorney for Deutsche Bank, mailed notice that a foreclosure sale on the property was scheduled for March 25, 2010. The foreclosure sale was advertised in the Providence Journal. At the scheduled sale, Deutsche Bank purchased the property for $95,066.40. Ingram sought declaratory relief and to quiet title to the property. The superior court dismissed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting various allegations of improper procedure.View "Ingram v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc" on Justia Law

Wellesly owned real property subject to a first deed and a junior mechanic's lien. The holder of the mechanic's lien subsequently filed suit to foreclose its lien, arguing that the lien was not eliminated by a foreclosure. The court held that, under well-established California law, the senior beneficiary's lien and title ordinarily do not merge when a deed in lieu of a foreclosure is given if there are junior lienholders of record; the foreclosure after acceptance of the deed was therefore valid and eliminated all junior liens, including plaintiff's mechanic's lien; and the third party now owns the property free of all such junior encumbrances. Accordingly, the court reversed the superior court's foreclosure order on the mechanic's lien.View "Decon Group v. Prudential Mort." on Justia Law