Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

McCluskey executed a promissory note for $330,186, on a Naperville property, with Wells Fargo as the mortgage holder. After service in foreclosure proceedings, McCluskey did not answer or plead. An order of default and judgment of foreclosure entered. After failed negotiations on a loan modification and a rescheduled sale date, Wells Fargo was the successful bidder on the property for a price of $235,985.69. Before Wells Fargo moved to confirm the sale, McCluskey moved to vacate the default judgment and set aside the sale under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the Foreclosure Law (15-1508(b)). The trial court denied her motion and confirmed the sale. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court could exercise discretion under civil procedure law, even after a judicial sale, if the movant could present a compelling excuse for lack of diligence and a meritorious defense. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. After a motion to confirm a judicial sale, foreclosure law governs and provides standards for exercise of discretion in dealing with a motion to vacate. At that point, it is not sufficient under the foreclosure statute to merely raise a meritorious defense to the complaint. In this case, the motion to vacate preceded the motion to confirm, so the trial court could have considered the motion to vacate under civil procedure law. Under these facts, however, the court did not err in denying the motion, even under that more liberal standard. McCluskey admitted her default, was properly served, and had notice of the default, the judgment of foreclosure, and the sale, then later raised pleading defenses for the first time.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v. McCluskey" on Justia Law

After Susan Cavanaugh defaulted on her loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home she shared with her husband, the bank that was the beneficiary of the deed of trust made two forestalled attempts at a trustee's sale. The bank then elected to proceed by judicial foreclosure. The district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure, finding that the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a statutory right of redemption. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a one-year right of redemption because their property was foreclosed by judicial procedure rather than by advertisement and sale; and (2) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a right of redemption because their property was a multi-family residence, as the Cavanaughs' home was a single family residence at the time the deed of trust was executed.View "Cavanaugh v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case.View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Edwin Miller Investments, LLC ("EMI") owned twelve acres of real estate used to secure a loan from BCBank, which assigned the note and deed of trust to CGP Development Co. ("CGP"). The State became the legal owner of eight acres of EMI's property after it paid $241,000 into court following a condemnation action. EMI defaulted on its loan, and CGP purchased the remaining four acres at a foreclosure sale. The circuit court ordered release of the $241,000 paid into court to CGP in partial satisfaction of CGP's lien. EMI and CGP disagreed as to which party was entitled to additional proceeds paid as damages to the four-acre residue as well as additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight acres. The circuit court concluded that CGP was entitled to all of the condemnation proceeds and dismissed EMI from the condemnation proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that CGP was entitled to all sums awarded for damage to the four-acre residue purchase by CGP; but (2) reversed the circuit court's finding that CPG was entitled to any additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight-acre tract and the court's dismissal of EMI from the condemnation proceedings. Remanded.View "Edwin Miller Invs. v. CGP Dev. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents, the Castro family, executed a mortgage encumbering their property that was assigned to Petitioner, U.S. Bank. When the Castros defaulted on their loan, U.S. Bank purchased the property at a foreclosure auction. Because the Castros failed to vacate the property as instructed, U.S. bank filed a two complaints for summary possession and ejectment against the Castros. The district court entered a judgment for possession and a writ of possession in favor of U.S. Bank and a separate order granting summary judgment for U.S. Bank. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the action was one in which title to real estate would come into question. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the Castros failed to demonstrate the action was one in which title to the subject property would come into question. View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Castro" on Justia Law

In post-judgment proceedings, a judgment creditor garnished the funds in bank accounts held by the judgment debtor jointly with the debtor's nondebtor children. The children petitioned for relief, claiming that the garnished funds belonged to them alone. The district court summarily denied the children's petition and claims, concluding that the claims were not properly made and were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment creditor may garnish only a debtor's funds that are held in a joint bank account, not the funds in the account owned solely by the nondebtor; and (2) because the children's claims to the funds were timely and properly made, the district court erred in dismissing their petition without a hearing. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the garnished funds actually belonged, and thus must be returned, to the nondebtor children.View "Brooksby v. Nev. State Bank" on Justia Law

Property Owner owned two adjacent lots, a house lot and a vacant lot. Property Owner mortgaged certain real property to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Property Owner then conveyed its house lot to an individual who, in turn, granted a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). Aurora Loan Services, LLC was the servicer for MERS. Aurora later informed Option One that it intended to foreclose on the house lot. Option One filed a complaint seeking a declaration that Option One had a valid first lien encumbrance on the house lot that was superior to the Aurora mortgage. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Option One. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Option One mortgage was a valid first lien on the house lot where (1) there was no dispute the Option One mortgage was properly recorded in the town records so any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, including Aurora, was charged with constructive notice of the Option One mortgage; and (2) a prior deed reference in the Option One mortgage description was sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee on notice that the Option One mortgage was intended to encumber both the house lot and the vacant lot.View "Option One Mortgage Corp. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Anne Sullivan-Thorne (Defendant) executed a mortgage on her house in favor of IndyMac Bank, FSB. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company filed an action against Defendant relating to damage done to the home. As part of the litigation, Defendant filed an action against IndyMac seeking to have all insurance proceeds payable to her alone. IndyMac counterclaimed against Defendant, alleging that Defendant had breached the note and mortgage and that Defendant had caused IndyMac not to receive payment of insurance proceeds in an amount sufficient to repair the property. The superior court dismissed IndyMac's counterclaim and entered a final judgment in which the court ordered that Cambridge re-issue the insurance proceeds and make them payable to Defendant alone. IndyMac later assigned the mortgage to Wilmington Trust Company (Plaintiff), who filed this action seeking a judgment of foreclosure against Defendant. The district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, finding that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that because Wilmington's foreclosure claim did not present matters that "were, or might have been, litigated" in the earlier action, the court erred in entering summary judgment for Defendant on claim preclusion grounds.View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sullivan-Thorne" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two separate actions that were consolidated. In the first action, a married couple raised allegations of fraud and other claims against Residential Finance Corporation (RFC), which had brokered two refinancings of the couple's residential mortgage. The first action was consolidated with a foreclosure case filed later against the couple. Appellant and RFC were named as third-party defendants in the foreclosure case. After consolidation, the case was bifurcated on the basis of subject matter for trial purposes and was scheduled to go to trial only on the refinancing issues. Judge Robert Nichols denominated Appellant as a codefendant in that trial. Appellant field an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Nichols from requiring him to be a defendant in the trial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not establish the elements for a writ of prohibition, as Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and Nichols did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Appellant.View "State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Kenneth and Shelley Burek, alleging that the Bureks had defaulted on a promissory note held by Wells Fargo, thus breaching a condition of a corresponding mortgage held by the bank. During trial, the superior court admitted into evidence the promissory note, mortgage, and loan modification agreement between the Bureks and Wells Fargo proffered by Wells Fargo in addition to other documents. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure for Wells Fargo, concluding that the bank failed to prove it was a holder of the note but that it was entitled to enforce the note as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the superior court's conclusion that Wells Fargo certified its proof of ownership of the mortgage note for purposes of Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6321 by demonstrating that it was a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 11, 3-1301.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek" on Justia Law