Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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In 2004, Foster, a real estate investor, purchased Florida property, with a $1.1 million loan secured by a PNC mortgage. Foster and PNC had multiple disputes. PNC acquired force‐placed insurance. While the parties disputed that issue, Foster only made payments in the amount originally specified in a 2010 modification although the payments had increased as a result of the force‐placed insurance policies. In 2012, PNC began returning Foster’s payments as incomplete payments. As of May 2019, PNC claimed Foster owed more than $1.75 million. PNC reported delinquent payments to credit agencies; Foster’s credit score dropped.Foster’s lawsuit included a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for PNC’s failure to investigate the two credit reporting disputes; a breach of contract claim regarding the force‐placed insurance policies; a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim for the insurance; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim for the alleged mishandling of the escrow account. PNC counterclaimed to seek judgment on the loan. After determining that Foster’s affidavit was conclusory and speculative as to proof of insurance and his loan payments and that his evidence of damages was too general and conclusory, the district court granted PNC judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but found that the FCRA claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. Foster did not establish an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to PNC’s conduct. View "Foster v. PNC Bank, National Association" on Justia Law

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Fannie Mae purchases mortgage loans from commercial banks, which enables the lenders to make additional loans, finances those purchases by packaging the mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities, then sells those securities to investors. In 1968, Fannie Mae became a publicly-traded, stockholder-owned corporation. Freddie Mac also buys mortgage loans and securities and sells those mortgage-backed securities to investors. In 1989, Freddie Mac became a publicly traded, stockholder-owned corporation. In the 2008 recession, both entities suffered precipitous drops in the value of their mortgage portfolios. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) was established and authorized to undertake extraordinary measures to resuscitate the companies, 12 U.S.C. 4511(b)(1).Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders sought to nullify an agreement (the “third amendment”) between FHFA and the Treasury Department that “secured unlimited funding" from Treasury in exchange for "almost all of Fannie’s and Freddie’s future profits.” The third amendment was authorized by FHFA’s Acting Director, who was serving in violation of the Appointments Clause. Shareholders also claimed that they are entitled to retrospective relief because the Supreme Court held in 2021 that FHFA’s enabling statute contained an unconstitutional removal restriction. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Acting Director was not serving in violation of the Constitution when he signed the third amendment. The court remanded for determination of whether the unconstitutional removal restriction inflicted harm on shareholders. View "Rop v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

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Borrower took out a $5.6 million dollar bridge loan, with 8.5% interest per annum, secured by a deed of trust on real property. They defaulted on a monthly payment of $39,667, triggering late fee provisions: a one-time 10% fee assessed against the overdue payment ($3,967) and a default interest charge of 9.99% per annum assessed against the total unpaid principal balance. Borrower filed a demand for arbitration, alleging the loan was in violation of Business & Professions Code 10240 and the late fee was an unlawful penalty in violation of section 1671. The arbitrator rejected both claims and denied the demand for arbitration. Borrower petitioned to vacate the decision, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded their authority by denying claims in violation of “nonwaivable statutory rights and/or contravention of explicit legislative expressions of public policy.”The court of appeal reversed the denial of that petition. The trial court erroneously failed to vacate an award that constitutes an unlawful penalty in contravention of public policy set forth in section 1671. Liquidated damages in the form of a penalty assessed during the lifetime of a partially matured note against the entire outstanding loan amount are unlawful penalties. There is no precedent upholding a liquidated damages provision where a borrower missed a single installment and then was penalized pursuant to such a provision. View "Honchariw v. FJM Private Mortgage Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Barbara and Alexis Branch on the Central Trust Bank's petition for a deficiency judgment in relation to a promissory note and security agreement financing the Branches' vehicle, holding that the circuit court erred.The Bank's pre-sale notice of disposition in this case stated the vehicle would be sold at a private sale. The circuit court, however, held that the dealer-sonly auction at which the vehicle was sold was a public sale and that the Bank failed to provide the Branches with "reasonable notification" after the sale of the vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that the Branches did not receive any pre-sale notice of the disposition was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the circuit court misstated the law when it required the Bank to provide the Branches with "reasonable notification" of the sale of the collateral. View "Central Trust Bank v. Branch" on Justia Law

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Hurst sought a loan modification in 2018. Caliber notified Hurst that her application was complete as of April 5, 2018, that it would evaluate her eligibility within 30 days, that it would not commence foreclosure during that period, and that it might need additional documents for second-stage review. On May 1, Caliber requested additional documents within 30 days. Although Hurst responded, she did not meet all of Caliber’s requirements. On May 31, Caliber informed Hurst that it could not review her application. Hurst sent some outstanding documents on June 7, but her application remained incomplete. Caliber filed a foreclosure action on June 18. Hurst spent $13,922 in litigating the foreclosure but continued working with Caliber. Caliber again denied the application as incomplete on August 31 but eventually approved her loan modification and dismissed the foreclosure action.Hurst filed suit under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that Caliber violated Regulation X’s prohibition on “dual tracking,” which prevents a servicer from initiating foreclosure while a facially complete loan-modification application is pending, 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(f)(2); failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining documents and information necessary to complete her application, section 1024.41(b)(1); and failed to provide adequate notice of the information needed to complete its review (1024.41(b)(2)). The district court granted Caliber summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the “reasonable diligence” claim. Hurst identified communications where Caliber employees provided conflicting information and had trouble identifying deficiencies. View "Hurst v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part the Housing Court judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as trustee of the Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E, Mortgage Backed Certificate, Series 2005-E (HSBC), in this summary process action, holding that one of Defendants' counterclaims was not barred.Defendants purchased their home with proceeds from two loans secured by a mortgage on the property. The primary loan was at issue on appeal. After Defendants defaulted on their monthly payments HSBC, the assignee of the home mortgage loan, held a foreclosure sale and sold Defendants' home to the highest bidder. When Defendants refused to vacate the property HSBC initiated the present summary process action. Defendants brought counterclaims under section 15(b)(2) of the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (PHLPA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were entitled to assert a counterclaim under PHLPA to limited monetary damages; and (2) Defendants' counterclaim under chapter 93A was barred. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris" on Justia Law

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Defendant and her then-husband bought a condo for $525,000 with the intention of making it their primary residence. To finance the purchase, the couple took out a mortgage with the Plaintiff bank. Defendant did not sign the note but consented to her husband doing so. The mortgage contained a "future advances" clause, which granted Plaintiff a security interest in the Mortgage covering future funds Defendant's husband might borrow.Four years later, Defendant's husband borrowed additional funds from Plaintiff to keep his business afloat. Defendant did not sign the note. A few months later, Defendant's husband filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the condo was sold for $650,000, approximately $250,000 of which was deposited in escrow. The couple divorced and Defendant moved out of the state.In Defendant's husband's bankruptcy case, the court held a portion of the escrowed sale proceeds must pay down his business notes pursuant to the mortgage’s future advances clause and that he could not claim a homestead exemption. Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on its claims that Defendant's proceeds were also subject to the future advances clause and that Plaintiff could apply those proceeds to Defendant's husband's business note.Defendant appealed on several grounds, including unconscionability, contract formation, and public policy, all of which the court rejected, affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment to Plaintiff. View "Sanborn Savings Bank v. Connie Freed" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Select Portfolio Servicing ("Portfolio"), a mortgage servicer, under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"). Plaintiff claimed that several mortgage statements sent by Portfolio misstated a number of items, including the principal due, and that by sending these incorrect statements, Portfolio violated the FDCPA and FCCPA. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, finding the mortgage statements were not "communications" under either statute.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that monthly mortgage statements may constitute "communications" under the FDCPA and FCCPA if they "contain debt-collection language that is not required by the TILA or its regulations" and the context suggests that the statements are an attempt to collect or induce payment on a debt. View "Constance Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2008, Morris defaulted on her home mortgage. After negotiating a loan modification, she again defaulted in 2009. Morris and her husband, Mazhari, then filed two bankruptcy proceedings. Mazhari died while the second bankruptcy was pending. Morris unsuccessfully tried to obtain another loan modification. Following the 2016 lifting of the automatic stay in her third bankruptcy, Morris’s home was sold at public auction to Chase, the deed of trust beneficiary and successor to the original lender. Morris claims that the trustee’s sale occurred without notice to her because Chase and then Rushmore, the loan servicer, pursued foreclosure secretly while giving her false assurances that loan modification terms were forthcoming and shuttling her between uninformed representatives who gave her inconsistent information about her modification request.Morris sought post-foreclosure relief, including damages, an order setting aside the trustee’s sale, and a declaration quieting title under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR) (Civ. Code 2923.6, 2923.7) and other theories. In 2018, the trial court dismissed all claims. After another delay occasioned by another bankruptcy, Morris appealed. The court of appeal reversed in part, with respect to claims alleging failure to appoint a single point of contact (HBOR 2923.7), dual tracking (2923.6), and failure to mail upon request a notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale 2924b). The court otherwise affirmed. View "Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank of the West in state court, seeking to set aside the trustee's sale of his property. After the claim was dismissed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding U.S. Bank as a defendant. The case was removed to federal district court where it was ultimately dismissed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal orders, concluding that the federal law violations as alleged in the second amended complaint all occurred prior to the institution and maintenance of any foreclosure activity. Therefore, they were not defects in the trustee's sale under Nebraska law. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint where the motion was procedurally defaulted and granting leave would be futile. View "Anderson v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law