Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

In this action for wrongful foreclosure, the homeowner, Monica Sciarratta, alleged that as a result of a void assignment of her promissory note and deed of trust, the entity that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on her home had no interest in either the underlying debt or the subject property. In Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., (62 Cal.4th 919 (2016)), the California Supreme Court held that the homeowner has standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure. However, Yvanova did not address "any of the substantive elements of the wrongful foreclosure tort," and in particular did not address "prejudice . . . as an element of wrongful foreclosure." The issue this case presented was the question of "prejudice" left open in Yvanova: The Court of Appeal found that policy considerations that drove the standing analysis in Yvanova compelled a similar result in this case. "[A] homeowner who has been foreclosed on by one with no right to do so -by those facts alone- sustains prejudice or harm sufficient to constitute a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. When a non-debtholder forecloses, a homeowner is harmed by losing her home to an entity with no legal right to take it. Therefore under those circumstances, the void assignment is the proximate cause of actual injury and all that is required to be alleged to satisfy the element of prejudice or harm in a wrongful foreclosure cause of action." The opposite rule, urged by defendants in this case, would allow an entity to foreclose with impunity on homes that were worth less than the amount of the debt, even if there were no legal justification whatsoever for the foreclosure. "The potential consequences of wrongfully evicting homeowners are too severe to allow such a result." The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court erroneously sustained a demurrer to Sciarratta's first amended complaint without leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

A condominium board commenced a foreclosure action on a condominium unit to recover unpaid common charges owed by the previous unit owner. Two mortgages were consolidated into a single mortgage lien years before the condominium board filed its common charges lien. Plaintiff, the winning bidder in the foreclosure action, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring that the second mortgage was subordinate to the subsequently recorded common charges lien and was therefore extinguished by the condominium board’s successful action. Supreme Court declared that the consolidation agreement was the first mortgage of record and that Plaintiff purchased the unit subject to the consolidated mortgage. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the consolidated mortgage qualifies as the first mortgage of record under N.Y. Real Prop. Law 9-B. View "Plotch v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased certain property at a tax sale and then filed a petition to foreclose tax lien seeking to foreclose Bank’s right of redemption with respect to the property. Bank did not timely file an answer after its receipt of the petition. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for entry of default and final decree and a motion for decree pro confesso. Thereafter, Bank filed a motion to file a late answer and its response to the petition, which contained an offer to redeem. The trial justice granted Bank’s motion to file a late answer and Bank’s request for redemption. The court then entered judgment allowing Bank and redeem the property and setting forth the amount of redemption. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) Bank’s motion to file a late answer should have been denied because there was no good cause shown for Bank’s failure to comply with the deadline set out in the petition; and (2) accordingly, Bank was in default and should not have been permitted to redeem the property. View "Conley v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

In 2004, Brown obtained a $450,000 loan secured by a deed of trust recorded against her Oakland property, identifying Washington Mutual as the lender and beneficiary and CRC as the trustee. Washington Mutual failed in 2008. The FDIC was appointed its receiver and sold Chase many of the assets and liabilities (P&A Agreement). In 2011, CRC recorded a notice of default as trustee for Chase, claiming that Brown was in arrears by $60,984.42. Chase then assigned the deed of trust to Deutsche Bank; CRC remained as the trustee and recorded a notice of sale. In 2012, Brown filed the first of three lawsuits challenging the foreclosure. In 2013, CRC executed a third notice of sale. Two days later, Brown filed her third lawsuit, alleging that the assignment to Deutsche Bank was invalid and the foreclosure proceedings were initiated without authority. The trial court granted a request for judicial notice, which covered foreclosure-related documents, filings from the earlier lawsuits, and the P&A Agreement, then dismissed without leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. Brown‟s contention that Deutsche Bank and CRC lacked authority to enforce the deed of trust was contradicted by matters subject to judicial notice. View "Brown v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co." on Justia Law

Abbey Springs Condominium Association, Inc. and Abbey Springs, Inc. (collectively, Abbey Springs) have a policy forbidding both current and subsequent unit owners from utilizing recreational facilities until unpaid condominium assessments are paid in full. Following a foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale of the property to Walworth State Bank, the Bank paid the former owner’s outstanding assessment under protest. The Bank filed suit against Abbey Springs, asserting that the policy violates Wisconsin law by impermissibly reviving a lien on the condominium units that was eliminated by the foreclosure action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium policy effectively revived the lien against the property that the foreclosure judgment entered against Abbey Springs and the former unit owners had extinguished, and therefore, the policy violates well-established foreclosure law and the foreclosure judgment entered in the underlying foreclosure action. Remanded. View "Walworth State Bank v. Abbey Springs Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Hawley McIntosh purchased a home located within a common-interest community. McIntosh’s first mortgage lender subsequently foreclosed on McIntosh’s home. Scott Ludwig purchased the property and subsequently transferred the property by quitclaim deed to Ikon Holdings, LLC. Ikon acknowledged that it acquired the property subject to the homeowner association’s (Horizons) superpriority lien but disagreed that the lien included nine months, rather than six months, of unpaid assessments or the collection fees and foreclosure costs Horizon was seeking to recoup. Thereafter, Ikon filed the underlying declaratory relief action. The district court granted partial declaratory relief, concluding that Horizons’ covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limited its superpriority lien to an amount equal to six months of assessments, which did not offend Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2)’s superpriority provision providing for nine months of assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a superpriority lien for common expense assessments pursuant to section 116.3116(2) does not include collection fees and foreclosure costs incurred by an HOA; and (2) an HOA’s CC&Rs that purport to create a superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs over six months preceding foreclosure are superseded by the terms of the superpriority lien created by section 116.3116(2). View "Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Charles and Donna Nickerson appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of PHH Mortgage and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. The suit involved an action for judicial foreclosure of a loan by PHH Mortgage against the Nickersons, and third-party claims against J.P. Morgan Chase by the Nickersons. The Nickersons argued they were entitled to relief based on: mistakes by the court; surprise due to the actions and withdrawal of their former counsel; excusable neglect due to their reliance on their former counsel; new evidence showing PHH did not have standing to pursue foreclosure; fraud regarding PHH’s chain of title, the amount of default, and coercion of the Nickersons at closing; and misconduct of the opposing parties regarding the depositions of the Nickersons and the submission of a fraudulent affidavit. The district court denied the Nickersons’ motions, concluding that the Nickersons failed to present admissible evidence to support their claims. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of PHH Mortgage, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson" on Justia Law

The Danielses obtained a $650,000 adjustable rate loan secured by a deed of trust on their Santa Cruz residence. When their interest rate adjusted upward, they spent years in unsuccessful attempts to obtain a loan modification from their then-loan servicer, Bank of America (BofA). In the process, they fell behind on their loan payments, allegedly at the behest of BofA. They sued BofA and several other entities to prevent a non-judicial foreclosure sale of their home and to collect monetary damages. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding that: when a lender acquires by assignment a loan being administered by a loan servicer, the lender may be liable to the borrower for misrepresentations made by the loan servicer, as the lender‟s agent, after that assignment; and, a loan servicer may owe a duty of care to a borrower through application of the “Biakanja” factors, even though its involvement in the loan does not exceed its conventional role. View "Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

This was a case involving a dispute over a mistakenly released deed of trust, which secured a 2004 residential mortgage between Ralph Sheets and the lender, Bank of America, N.A., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide); the servicer of the loan; and the trustee who executed the mistaken release (companies collectively referred to as “Bank of America”). Sheets borrowed $65,250 from Countrywide. He executed a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust to his home in New Meadows. Between December of 2004 and April of 2009, Sheets timely paid the amounts due on the note. In 2008, Countrywide sent Sheets a letter telling Sheets that he “may” qualify for a lower interest rate on a refinancing loan and estimating he had $88,056 equity in the home. Around this time, Bank of America acquired and merged with Countrywide. In the late spring of 2009, Sheets applied for a new loan (the 2009 Refinancing). Closing on the new loan was scheduled for October 27. Sheets testified that the title company agent at the closing would not let him execute the documents because they were “bad” and incomplete. Thus, the 2009 Refinancing did not close. Sheets arrived home and found proposed closing documents, but he did not sign the documents because he did not agree with the terms contained therein. The trustee of the deed of trust, ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust), erroneously recorded a full reconveyance of the deed of trust securing Sheets’ original note. How the erroneous reconveyance came to be recorded was not clear. Bank of America claimed that it caused the reconveyance to be recorded because it mistakenly proceeded as if the 2009 Refinancing had closed. On March 29, 2010, Bank of America sent Sheets a letter asking Sheets to stipulate to rescinding the reconveyance. The next day, Bank of America filed a complaint against Sheets seeking reinstatement of the deed of trust. On May 25, 2010, Bank of America sent Sheets a notice of its intent to commence foreclosure proceedings. Sheets filed an answer, counterclaim, demand for jury trial, and third party complaint against the third-party defendants in this action. He brought counterclaims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) specific performance; (3) violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act; (5) slander of credit; and (6) violation of Idaho Code section 45-1502. In 2012, Bank of America filed two motions for summary judgment, seeking reinstatement of the deed of trust and dismissal of Sheets’ counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment reinstating the deed of trust and dismissing Sheets’ counterclaims. Finding no error in the grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sheets v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Green Tree to prevent it from foreclosing on plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs alleged that Green Tree lacked authority to foreclose. The district court granted Green Tree's motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs' lack of standing to challenge the assignment between creditors and concluded that plaintiffs' notice claim failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The court concluded that plaintiffs' invalid assignment claim is nearly identical to the claim in Quale v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, where the court determined the homeowners did not have standing to raise such a claim because they “were not injured by the assignment” and any harm to the homeowners was not fairly traceable to the allegedly invalid assignment. The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their amended complaint where plaintiffs failed to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law