Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bank of America and related entities seeking to set aside and cancel, as null and void, the Bank’s mortgage interest in real property conveyed on the authority of an allegedly forged deed. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(5) as untimely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8). Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed as to the Bank, concluding that Plaintiff’s forgery-based claim against the Bank was subject to the six-year statute of limitations for fraud claims set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations in section 213(8) did not foreclose Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant because, under prior case law, a forged deed is void ab initio, and as such, any encumbrance upon real property based on a forged deed is null and void. View "Faison v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Superior Court granted Branch Banking and Trust Company's ("BB&T") motion for summary judgment on its foreclosure and breach of contract claims. In 2014, the Superior Court entered a final judgment order awarding damages to BB&T. The Eids failed to file a timely notice of appeal of thatorder. Instead, a little over two months after the entry of the final judgment order, the Eids filed a motion with the Superior Court under Rule 60(b) seeking vacatur of the final judgment order, contending that their counsel never received actual notice of the final judgment order. The Superior Court granted the Eids' motion to vacate. Then trial court entered a new final judgment order from which the Eids could file a timely notice of appeal. BB&T filed an appeal from the Superior Court's grant of the Rule 60(b) motion to vacate, and the Eids filed a cross-appeal of the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of BB&T. BB&T raises three issues on appeal: (1) that pursuant to Rule 77(d), the trial court lacked authority to grant the motion to vacate the final judgment order; (2) that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it applied a vague and undefined "interest of justice" standard to the motion to vacate; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to vacate because the Eids failed to establish that they were entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or (b)(6). On cross-appeal, the Eids also raised three issues: (1) that BB&T lacked standing to institute a foreclosure; (2) that the affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment was defective; and (3) that BB&T failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with BB&T that the trial court improperly granted the motion to vacate the final judgment, and reversed that decision. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Eid" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs asserted six causes of action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), Erika Knapstein, Bank of the West, and Jeff T. Courtney arising out of the foreclosure and subsequently sale of Plaintiffs’ residence. As a premise for all causes of action, Plaintiffs asserted that the assignment of their mortgage was defective. The district court dismissed Bank of the West and Courtney for failure to prosecute and granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, Fannie Mae, and Knapstein. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whether the assignment of the mortgage was properly executed was not a material issue in the causes of action addressed in this appeal because Plaintiffs could not show an injury arising from the assignment, and therefore, Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert any cause of action that dependent upon the validity of the assignment; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Courtney for failure to prosecute, but Bank of the West should have been dismissed from the action for lack of standing. View "Marcuzzo v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law

Salazar was born in Mexico in 1945. He speaks little English and cannot write English. His wife attended school through the second grade. She does not speak, read or write English. They operate a food truck. In 1992, they purchased commercial property on Brundage Lane in Bakersfield. Most of the businesses occupying the property were run by their children, who did not pay rent. They also had rent-paying tenants. In 2005, a deed of trust and assignment of rents was recorded, listing as collateral the Brundage Property and another parcel. The debt was a promissory note for $350,000. The proceeds bought the other property. Both purport to have been made by the Salazars, who claim that the signatures were forged (presumably by their son) and not made at their direction. Notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust were recorded in 2005. Their daughter, Marina, negotiated with the lender. When the son disappeared in 2009, Salazar started making payments. Marina signed her parents’ names to a forbearance agreement that identified the Salazars as “borrower” and released all claims. In 2012, the Salazars sought quiet title. The trial court granted summary judgment on the three-year limitations period, but did not address affirmative defenses, holding that the 2005 notices triggered the statute of limitations. The court of appeal reversed. Notices of default under a void deed of trust provided notice of a cloud on title, but did not dispute or disturb the possession of the property; the statute of limitations does not bar their action. View "Salazar v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Appellants borrowed money from Colonial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in their real property. The FDIC assigned Appellants’ loan to Branch Banking and Trust Company, Inc. (BB&T) after placing Colonial into receivership. After Appellants defaulted on their loan, BB&T instituted an action for a judicial foreclosure of the secured property. Two years later, Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which implements certain limitations on the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by an assignee creditor, became effective. After the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale, BB&T filed a motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants for the remaining balance of the loan. The district court awarded a deficiency judgment to BB&T, finding that section 40.459(1) did not apply to BB&T’s application for a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that section 40.459(1)(c) was preempted by the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to the extent that section 40.459(1)(c) limits deficiency judgments that may be obtained from loans transferred by the FDIC, as section 40.459(1)(c) conflicts with FIRREA’s purpose of facilitating the transfer of the assets of failed banks to other institutions. View "Munoz v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Respondent borrowed nearly $17 million from Appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The loan was secured by real property located in Texas. The Guarantors entered into a guaranty agreement to pay any debt remaining if Respondent defaulted. When Respondent defaulted, the Texas property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under Texas law. Appellant then sought a deficiency judgment against Respondent and the Guarantors under Nevada law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and the Guarantors, finding that Appellant’s nonjudicial foreclosure in Texas did not comply with the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which permits a creditor or deed-of-trust beneficiary to bring an action for a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale held pursuant to section 107.080, does not preclude a deficiency judgment in Nevada when the nonjudicial foreclosure sale upon property located in another state is conducted pursuant to that state’s laws instead of section 107.080. Remanded. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Windhaven & Tollway, LLC" on Justia Law

The complaint alleged that in May 2010, a notice of default was recorded against plaintiffs’ Pasadena residence. In August 2011, a notice of trustee sale was recorded. Plaintiffs retained Rex Law to negotiate a loan modification with Wells Fargo, which agreed to continue the trustee sale scheduled to October 17, 2011. On October 17, 2011, a paralegal from the Rex Law firm spoke with Wells Fargo representative Munoz, who stated that plaintiffs were “under active review for a modification and, therefore, there no longer was a trustee [sale] date scheduled.” In fact, a sale date of December 16, 2011 was scheduled. The house was sold at that sale. On December 10, 2011, the same paralegal spoke with Munoz and told her that plaintiffs’ tax returns were available. Munoz instructed him to submit the returns, but said nothing about the upcoming sale. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of promissory estoppel. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that no promise was made and that plaintiffs had no equity in the property and, therefore, no detrimental reliance. View "Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After voters in School District rejected a bond proposal to construct an addition to existing high school building, School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Bank, which agreed to finance the project. Appellants, residents and taxpayers in the school district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief contending that the agreement violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-10,105. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) under section 79-10,105, lease-purchase agreements may be used to make school improvements without the voters’ approval if the project is not funded by bonded debt; and (2) School District in this case did not fund the project through bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ claims were moot because, as of the time of this appeal, the addition had been completed, but the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (2) section 79-10,105 does not prohibit a school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement to finance a capital construction project if it has not created a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district, and because there was no evidence that this occurred in this case, School District did not violate section 79-10,105 by entering into the lease-purchase agreement with Bank. View "Nebuda v. Dodge County Sch. Dist. 0062" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bank filed a foreclosure action against Defendants for allegedly defaulting on a promissory note. The trial court granted Bank’s motion for summary judgment and issued a decree of foreclosure in Bank’s favor. Defendants appealed, asserting four assignments of error, none of which challenged the court’s conclusion that Bank had standing to bring the foreclosure suit. Rather than considering Defendants’ assignments of error, the court of appeals sua sponte considered the issue of standing and held that Bank lacked standing to bring this foreclosure action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bank had standing to file the foreclosure action against Defendants at the time that it filed the complaint in 2010. Remanded. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiffs purchased real estate from Charter West National Bank. Plaintiffs later filed suit, alleging that Charter West represented that the property would be free and clear of all liens but manipulated the language of the deed to reflect that the conveyance was subject to liens of record. Charter West moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the real estate purchase agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed an objection asserting that the arbitration clause was void because it failed to comply with Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was inapplicable because the transaction did not involve interstate commerce. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice based on a lack of evidence that the transaction affected interstate commerce as to trigger the provisions of the FAA. Charter West appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there was no final, appealable order entered by the district court capable of appellate review. View "Wilczewski v. Charter West Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law