Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Construction Manager subcontracted with Subcontractor to do work on a construction project. After the project was substantially complete, Subcontractor recorded a mechanic’s lien for unpaid work on the project. Subcontractor then filed a complaint against Construction Manager as the general contractor of the project, the owner of the property (Landowner), and the bank that financed the project (Bank) to enforce its mechanic’s lien. Construction Manager did not enter an appearance in the case. The circuit court subsequently granted an application filed by Landowner and Bank and released the real estate that had been subject to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien. Bank filed a motion to dismiss the mechanic’s lien claim on the basis that Subcontractor failed to timely serve Construction Manager, who it alleged to be a necessary party to the mechanic’s lien enforcement action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the mechanic’s lien claim with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Construction Manager, as the general contractor, was not a necessary party to Subcontractor’s mechanic’s lien enforcement action. Remanded. View "Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC" on Justia Law

The Bank commenced this adversary proceeding in Restivo's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, seeking a judgment declaring that the security interest it acquired on January 4, 2005, had priority over the IRS's tax lien filed on January 10, 2005, regardless of the fact that it did not record its security interest until after the IRS had filed notice of its tax lien. The district court granted the Bank priority. The court rejected the district court's holding that Md. Code. Ann., Real Prop. 3-201 gives the Bank retroactive priority over the IRS, concluding that 26 U.S.C. 6323(h)(1)(A)'s use of the present perfect tense precludes giving effect to the Maryland statute's relation-back provision. However, the court affirmed the judgment based on the ground that under Maryland common law, the Bank acquired an equitable security interest in the two parcels of real property on January 4, regardless of recordation, because its interest became protected against a subsequent lien arising out of an unsecured obligation on that date and that therefore its security interest had priority over the IRS's tax lien under sections 6323(a) and 6323(h)(1). View "Susquehanna Bank v. United States/Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the sale of dairy cattle that were subject to Appellant Farmers National Bank’s (FNB) perfected security interest and Respondent J&M Cattle Company’s (J&M) agister’s lien. The net sale proceeds received from the sale of the dairy cattle were insufficient to satisfy both FNB’s perfected security interest and J&M’s agister’s lien. J&M filed an action for declaratory relief to resolve FNB’s and J&M’s competing interests. Although FNB’s perfected security interest had a priority date that predates J&M’s lien, the district court determined that J&M’s lien had priority over FNB’s perfected security interest. The district court entered a final judgment in favor of J&M, and FNB appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "J&M Cattle Co v. Farmers National Bank" on Justia Law

The Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action to collect a loan secured by two parcels of real estate which had been made to a husband and wife. After the husband died, the loan went into default. The Bank and wife agreed to a private sale of one of the parcels that was her separate property and Bank filed the foreclosure action on the remaining parcel to obtain a deficiency judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary adjudication of its judicial foreclosure cause of action and determined that the Bank was entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment against the representatives of the husband's estate (appellants). The court concluded that, because the Bank failed to show the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 726 for creditors seeking deficiency judgments by disposing of the property at issue outside of judicial foreclosure and without appellants' consent or waiver, the Bank has waived any right to a deficiency against them. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "First CA Bank v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the named Defendant in this action, and others formed a limited liability company (the LLC) to purchase and redevelop certain property. After the LLC acquired the property, Plaintiff guaranteed the payment of two loans from a Bank. In the meantime, Plaintiff, Defendant, and others entered into backstop guarantee agreements that provided protection to Plaintiff in the event he was required to honor his personal guarantees to the Bank. The Bank later commenced foreclosure proceedings against the LLC and Plaintiff as guarantor. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the Bank sought a deficiency judgment against the Plaintiff. The Bank and Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action against Defendants to enforce the backstop guarantee agreements. The trial court concluded that the backstop guarantee agreements were unenforceable. The Appellate Court reversed. Defendant appealed, claiming that Plaintiff’s tax treatment of the debt that Defendant guaranteed effectively divested Plaintiff of his interest in the debt, and therefore, Plaintiff had no standing to enforce the backstop guarantee agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had standing to enforce the agreement. View "One Country, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a borrower may rescind a loan that has not been consummated pursuant to the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Prior to closing on a home refinancing loan, Respondent submitted to the lender a notice of rescission of the loan. Thereafter, Respondent signed a note and deed of trust consistent with the negotiated terms of the loan. The loan proceeds were distributed as previously agreed to by the parties, and Respondent made payments on the note for approximately two years. Respondent subsequently defaulted on the loan, and the home was sold at a foreclosure public auction. Respondent filed exceptions to the foreclosure sale, arguing that he had rescinded the loan. The circuit court overruled the exceptions and ratified the sale. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the rescission notice was timely because there was no language in 15 U.S.C. 1635 or TILA’s implementing regulation prohibiting a borrower from rescinding a loan prior to consummation of the transaction, and therefore, such an action was supported by statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under TILA, a loan may not be rescinded before it is consummated. View "Burson v. Capps" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel after losing their home in a foreclosure sale which they understood from a phone conversation with the bank would be postponed to a date 10 days after the actual sale date. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding detrimental reliance or injury under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. They did not relinquish any legal right to stay the bank’s foreclosure View "Jones v. Wachovia Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant borrowed $143,065 in two separate loans from a Corporation. The Corporation assigned its interest in the notes to a Bank, which assigned the second loan (loan two) to Plaintiff, a municipality. Defendant had fully paid off the first loan (loan one), but determining that Defendant had defaulted on his payment obligations as to loan two, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant to foreclose on the property. Defendant counterclaimed, arguing, among other things, that he made an overpayment on loan two. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was liable to Defendant for the total amount Defendant claimed to have overpaid on loan two to Plaintiff and all other prior holders of the note. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that, in the absence of an express contract provision, “an assignee generally does not assume the original responsibilities of the assignor." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly determined that Plaintiff, “as the most recent assignee and current holder of Defendant’s note, could not be held liable to repay Defendant for sums that were overpaid on the note before it was assigned to Plaintiff.” View "Hartford v. McKeever" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Supreme Court held that Seattle Savings Bank had the right to foreclose on certain property that Defendant inherited from his mother. In 2007, the Bank executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Because Defendant refused to vacate the property, Fannie Mae filed a trespass and ejectment complaint. Defendant, in turn, argued that Fannie Mae was not entitled to possession of the property. The trial court awarded Fannie Mae possession of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Fannie Mae had the right to possess the property. View "Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Malinou" on Justia Law

A mortgage deed designated Desmond Leone as the mortgagor of his home and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee, acting as nominee for the lender, Equity One, Inc. MERS later assigned its interest in the mortgage to Assets Recovery Center Investments, LLC (ARC). When Leone failed to make timely payments to the lender, ARC, which Equity One had authorized to act on its behalf, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Leone subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to ARC was invalid and also sought to quiet title to the property. A hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants - MERS, Equity One, and ARC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly found that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the matter was ripe for summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Leone v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys." on Justia Law