Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Dean and Stacey Norcutt bought a home for cash and satisfied the existing first mortgage held by Zions National Bank. They later discovered the home was also subject to a judgment lien obtained by Sourcecorp, Inc. that far exceeded the property's value. Sourcecorp subsequently initiated a sheriff's sale to foreclose on its judgment lien, and the Norcutts sued to enjoin the sale. The trial court granted relief to the Norcutts, and the court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for Sourcecorp. The Court of appeals reversed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the position of Zions Bank in priority over Sourcecorp. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the mortgage lien's priority for the amount they paid to satisfy the mortgage. Remanded. View "Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the denial of declaratory and injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled low-income residents by HUD. The complex was funded by Section 811 of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (Section 811), 42 U.S.C. 8013. Following the district court's grant of summary judgment and denial of injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale, HUD resumed foreclosure proceedings. HUD subsequently sold the property to a third party not before the court. Consequently, the court could not grant NBC effective relief and dismissed the appeal as moot. View "NBC-USA Housing, Inc, et al. v. Donovan, et al." on Justia Law

Judith Kehl and Port of Call, LLC filed a motion to modify an order of prejudgment attachment and attachment on trustee process that had been entered in favor of Centrix Bank and Trust, following a contested hearing, ten months earlier. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits, concluding that the final judgment rule barred the appeal because (1) Appellants' motion raised arguments that should have, and could have, been raised before the attachment order was issued and on direct appeal from that order, and therefore, Appellants waived any rights by failing to challenge the attachment order through proper procedural avenues; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied in this case. View "Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl" on Justia Law

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13. View "Kekauoha-Alisa, et al. v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., et al." on Justia Law

Respondents the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Banking Department and the New Hampshire Banking Department (collectively, the Department), appealed an order of the Superior Court that permanently enjoined the Department from pursuing an administrative proceeding against Petitioner Jeffrey Frost on the ground that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners Frost, Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC, and Frost Family, LLC, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. Frost is a member and designated manager of Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), and a member of Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family). Chretien and Frost Family (collectively, the LLCs) are New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. The underlying dispute arose as the result of two seller-financed real estate transactions, one conducted by Frost Family and the other by Chretien. After both instances of seller-financing, Petitioner submitted a loan originator license application to the Department. At the time the administrative proceedings were initiated, the Department notified Petitioner that he could request a hearing with the Department. Petitioner did not file such a request. Instead, all Petitioners initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in superior court, which included a request for a temporary restraining order. The petitioners contended that Respondents lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Frost and violated the State Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws by seeking to impose a $25,000 fine for each alleged violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that "[w]hile the [Department] may have jurisdiction over Frost because he is now a loan originator, it [could] take no action against him based on the September 2008 or the March 2009 transactions." Further, the trial court concluded that since the Department "may not impose any penalties on Frost," it did not need to consider the issue of the retrospective nature of the sanctions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Frost v. New Hampshire Banking Dept. " on Justia Law

In 2006 debtors sublet land from lessees on a 30-year recorded lease and purchased a three-story cottage on the land by bill of sale. The lease refers to removal of the structure upon termination of the lease and requires approval by the lessor of any liens or mortgages. The landowner consented to a mortgage on the cottage and leasehold. Two years later, debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition and listed the cottage as real property, with a secured claim of $235,000. The Trustee sought to avoid security interests held by the bank and landowner, arguing that the cottage was a chattel so that a lien could only be perfected by filing a financing statement with the Ohio Secretary of State. The bankruptcy court ruled that the mortgage was valid, concluding that the cottage was a fixture. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To avoid the security interest (11 U.S.C. 544) the trustee had to show that the cottage was chattel. The cottage is highly integrated with the land and unlikely to be moved or dismantled; there was no proof that the parties intended that it be chattel. Security interests in both the cottage and leasehold were properly secured. View "In re: Szerwinski" on Justia Law

Because Property Owner failed to pay real estate taxes on his property, the Town held a tax sale of Property Owner's property. Buyer purchased the property after Property Owner defaulted on the action. The superior court subsequently granted Buyer's petition to foreclose Property Owner's right of redemption to the property. Subsequently, a judgment was entered declaring the prior tax sale void and vesting the property back to Property Owner. Property Owner then executed a warranty deed conveying the property to his Sister. Concurrently, a stipulation was entered as an order of the superior court vesting title in the property to Buyer. Thereafter, Property Owner and Sister filed the instant action, seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the stipulation order. The superior court determined that Buyer was the proper record title holder of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a superior court judgment cannot "re-vest" title to property back to a prior owner once that owner has been defaulted in a petition to foreclose his right of redemption and a final decree has been entered. View "Medeiros v. Bankers Trust Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellants David and Mary Eldridge executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. In both the Note and the Mortgage, "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." was explicitly designated as the lender and payee, or entity to whom payment under the Note and Mortgage was due. Appellants voluntarily filed bankruptcy in 2009. In their amended statement of intentions, Appellants agreed to reaffirm the outstanding balance on the Note. Shortly thereafter, the Note went into default. Appellee Chase Home Finance Milwaukee initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2010, claiming to be the present holder of the Note and Mortgage. Chase Home Finance Milwaukee claimed to have acquired the Note and Mortgage by assignment from J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in their motion for summary judgment filed several months later. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank, finding the Bank was the undisputed owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the Bank and Appellants' counterclaims were dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued the trial court erred ruling in favor of the Bank. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record to support the Bank's contention that it was the holder of the Note. Therefore, the Court reversed the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remanded the case back for further proceedings. View "J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A. v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

In 2004, Appellants Cin Kham and Ngul Liam Cing executed an adjustable rate note in favor of Encore Credit Corporation. Contemporaneously, Appellants executed a mortgage to secure the note. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as the mortgagee and further stated "MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." Encore was identified as the Lender in this mortgage. In 2008 Appellants defaulted on the note. Appellee CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1, by the Bank of New York Mellon (on behalf of CPT Asset Backed Certificates Series 2004-EC1) filed a foreclosure petition. Appellants failed to answer the petition and a default judgment was entered against them. A hearing to confirm the sale was set, and at that time, Appellants filed a Petition and Motion to Vacate challenging Appellee's standing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court denied Appellants' petition to vacate judgment but granted leave to file a writ of prohibition. Appellants alleged Appellee lacked standing to commence this foreclosure action. Appellants further alleged the mortgage was a nullity because MERS could not be a mortgagee in Oklahoma and therefore the note was unsecured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that though Appellee claimed to be the holder of the note and mortgage, the note in the record contained no indorsements. And because there was no indorsement on the note in the record, Appellee could not be a holder as defined by the statute: "[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law. Therefore, [the Court found] that the trial court abused its discretion when granting the default judgment." Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Kham" on Justia Law

In a petition filed in 2010, Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of America, NA claimed to be the present holder of the note initiated a foreclosure action against Defendants Momodu Kabba and his wife. Bank of America claimed to hold the note and mortgage as Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee under the Trust agreement for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Series 2004-BNC2. A review of the note showed a blank indorsement. This blank indorsement was filed with the lower court for the first time in the motion for summary judgment. The blank indorsement was not mentioned or referenced in the original petition. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Bank of America. Defendants appealed the judgment asserting Bank of America failed to demonstrate standing. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment: "[i]t is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and to have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. . . . [the Bank] only presented evidence of an indorsed-in-blank note and an 'Assignment of Mortgage'" With nothing more, the Court concluded the Bank did not meet its burden of proving it was entitled to foreclose on Defendants' property. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Kabba" on Justia Law