Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

This is an adversary proceeding arising out of the bankruptcy of debtor (Derivium). Plaintiff (Grayson), assignee of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to grant summary judgment for defendants (Wachovia). The court concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Customer Transfers claim; summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Cash Transfers claim; the bankruptcy court's determinations that the stockbroker defense applied to commissions; and the bankruptcy court's ruling that in pari delicto barred Grayson's tort claims against Wachovia. View "Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant purchased nonrecourse notes (Notes) in the amount of two million dollars, issued by the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust Fund (PRCTF). The Notes were not registered under the Securities Act based on an exemption from registration. The Notes later went into default, and Appellant sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), trustee of the Notes, and Wilmington Trust Company (WTC), indenture trustee of the securities that the PRCTF purchased with Note proceeds. Appellant brought suit in federal district court, premising his assertion of subject matter jurisdiction on the Edge Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA). The district court dismissed the amended complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's suit did not arise under federal law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to file a delayed amended complaint asserting a new theory of liability because Appellant proffered no good reason for the delay. View "Nikitine v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

Appellants purchased nonrecourse notes (Notes) in the amount of two million dollars, issued by the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust Fund (PRCTF). The Notes were not registered under the Securities Act based on an exemption from registration. The Notes later went into default, and Appellants sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), trustee of the Notes, and Wilmington Trust Company (WTC), indenture trustee of the securities that the PRCTF purchased with Note proceeds. Appellants brought their suit in federal district court, premising their assertion of subject matter jurisdiction on the Edge Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA). The district court dismissed the amended complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellants' suit did not arise under federal law. View "Calderon-Serra v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for remand to state courts. This is an interlocutory appeal of a question certified by the district court, calling for interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632. Whether the district court's denial of remand was proper turns on whether the dispute falls within section 632. The court concluded that the dispute did not fall within section 632's grant of jurisdiction so that removal from state to federal court was not authorized by the statute. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying remand. View "AIG v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Developers purchased forty acres with the intent to develop it. Appellants secured a mortgage on the property with a bank. Later Developers formed a municipal property owners' district (the District). Law Firm was retained by the District as legal counsel for the proposed issuance of improvement bonds to finance public improvements in the development. At issue in this case were certain bonds issued by the District that were sold to several banks (Appellants). Developer defaulted on payment of the capital improvement use fees on the bonds and subsequently defaulted on the original mortgage, and the property was sold. Appellants sued Law Firm, alleging that Law Firm had a duty to inform Appellants of the mortgage on the real property and that it failed to inform them. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Law Firm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found Law Firm was not liable under the Arkansas Security Act; (2) erred in granting judgment on the issue of attorney malpractice; and (3) correctly found Law Firm had no duty to Appellants under contract, negligence, or breach of a fiduciary duty. View "First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A." on Justia Law

MBIA sued as the third party beneficiary of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs) of a failed bank. It alleged that the FDIC as conservator of the successor bank had "approved," the PSAs and then breached its "Put Back" obligations under those agreements, resulting in investor claims of MBIA-issued insurance policies. At issue was whether payments made by MBIA to investors in mortgage securitizations of a failed bank constituted "administrative expenses" entitled to priority under the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)(A). The court held that the district court properly rejected MBIA's broad interpretation of "approved" in section 1821(d)(20) and dismissed MBIA's damage claims in counts I-V and VIII as prudentially moot in light of the FDIC's No Value Determination; the district court did not err in dismissing counts VI-VII for failure to state a claim; and the court rejected MBIA's alternative theory of recovery, claiming that FDIC Corporate was obligated under 12 U.S.C. 1821(m)(13) to fund the failed bank's losses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "MBIA Ins. Corp. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Argentina appealed from permanent injunctions entered by the district court designed to remedy Argentina's failure to pay bondholders after a default in 2001 on its sovereign debt. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoined Argentina from making payments on debt issued pursuant to its 2005 and 2010 restructurings without making comparable payments on the defaulted debt. The court held that an equal treatment provision in the bonds barred Argentina from discriminating against plaintiffs' bonds in favor of bonds issued in connection with the restructurings and that Argentina violated that provision by ranking its payment obligations on the defaulted debt below its obligations to the holders of its restructured debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court; found no abuse of discretion in the injunctive relief; and concluded that the injunction did not violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. However, given the need for clarity as to how the injunctions were to function, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

Knight was owner and CEO of Knight Industries, which owned other companies. Bank had provided credit ($34 million) to the companies, which, in 2009, filed bankruptcy petitions. Chatz was appointed trustee and was authorized to retain the Freeborn law firm. Chatz and the Bank alleged that Knight had made fraudulent transfers, had breached duties of good faith and fair dealing and duties to creditors, had misappropriated corporate opportunities, had committed conversion, and had violated securities laws, and demanded $27 million for the companies and $34 million for the Bank. In 2010 Knight filed a chapter 7 petition, listing the claims, value “unknown.” Chatz, appointed as trustee, requested representation by the Freeborn law firm, without disclosing intent to pursue the claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court approved. Later, the Bank and Chatz asked to assign the companies’ claims to the Bank. Knight objected, arguing that approval of the law firm conflicted with the companies having viable claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court overruled Knight’s objection. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Failure to disclose intent to pursue the claims did not harm Knight, and other remedies are available. It would be inequitable to permit Knight to reap huge benefits from harmless omission.View "Knight v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Former Fifth Third employees participated in a defined contribution retirement plan with Fifth Third as trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions and direct the Plan to purchase investments for their individual accounts from preselected options. The options included Fifth Third Stock, two collective funds, or 17 mutual funds. Fifth Third makes matching contributions for eligible participants that are initially invested in the Fifth Third Stock Fund but may be moved later to other investment options. Significant Plan assets were invested in Fifth Third Stock. Plan fiduciaries incorporated by reference Fifth Third’s SEC filings into the Summary Plan Description. Plaintiffs allege that Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender, its loan portfolio became increasingly at-risk, and it either failed to disclose or provided misleading disclosures. The price of the stock declined 74 percent. The district court dismissed a complaint under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, based on a presumption that the decision to remain invested in employer securities was reasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleged a claim of breach of fiduciary duty and causal connection regarding failure to divest the Plan of Fifth Third Stock and remove that stock as an investment option. View "Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp" on Justia Law