Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
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Markisha Lattimore obtained a judgment exceeding $20 million against Kim Brothers Kickin’ Kids, LLC. Instead of collecting directly from Kickin’ Kids, Lattimore initiated garnishment actions against twelve financial services companies, including RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.), Inc. (Global), using a garnishment summons form for financial institutions. Global, a registered investment advisor, did not respond to the summons, leading Lattimore to move for a garnishment default judgment for the full amount. Global claimed it did not receive the motion and did not respond. The State Court of Fulton County entered a default judgment against Global.The State Court of Fulton County denied Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The court ruled that Global was a financial institution, that Lattimore used the correct summons form, and that Global waived any defect in the form used. Global argued that it was not a financial institution as defined by the statute and that the incorrect summons form invalidated the garnishment action, thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction. The court also ruled that Global could not challenge the constitutionality of the default judgment in its motion to set aside.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Global, as a registered investment advisor, did not meet the statutory definition of a financial institution. Therefore, Lattimore used the wrong summons form, rendering the garnishment invalid and failing to obtain personal jurisdiction over Global. The court concluded that the State Court of Fulton County abused its discretion in denying Global’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The judgment was reversed. View "RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT (U.S.) INC. v. LATTIMORE" on Justia Law

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In this case, the appellant, Savanna Jennings, was convicted of malice murder and related charges in relation to the shooting death of her grandfather, Otha Perrin Sr. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, Jennings argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other-acts evidence, admitting certain business records, and that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Jennings' financial activities pertaining to her grandfather's bank account, as it formed part of the financial motive for the crime. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Facebook messages between Jennings and another individual, which were arguably hearsay but did not likely affect the outcome of the trial.In terms of ineffective counsel, the court found that Jennings' lawyer did preserve her objections to the admission of the bank records. As for the failure to preserve an objection to the Facebook records and to timely disclose an expert witness, the court concluded that Jennings failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that these actions affected the outcome of her trial. Therefore, the court affirmed Jennings' convictions. View "JENNINGS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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This case came to the Georgia Supreme Court by way of three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. As the receiver of the Buckhead Community Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sued nine former directors and officers of the Bank in federal district court, alleging that the former directors and officers were negligent and grossly negligent under Georgia law for their approval of ten commercial real-estate loans. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that some of the former directors and officers were negligent in approving four of ten loans at issue, and awarded the FDIC $4,986,993 in damages. The district court entered a final judgment in that amount and held the former directors and officers jointly and severally liable. They timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on apportionment, which, they say, was required by OCGA 51-12-33 because purely pecuniary harms (such as the losses at issue here) were included within “injury to person or property” under Georgia’s apportionment statute. Concluding that these arguments required answers to questions of law that “have not been squarely answered by the Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals,” the Eleventh Circuit certified questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Court concluded OCGA 51-12-33 did apply to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers, but did not abrogate Georgia’s common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert insofar as a claim of concerted action invokes the narrow and traditional common-law doctrine of concerted action based on a legal theory of mutual agency and thus imputed fault. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Loudermilk" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Georgia Trust Bank secured a judgment against Virgil Lovell for $1.2 million. The next year, Georgia Trust failed, and its assets went into receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which later sold the judgment to Community & Southern Bank. When CSB was unable to collect the full amount of the judgment, it discovered a number of recent transactions in which Lovell and his companies had conveyed their respective interests in properties that, CSB believed, otherwise would have been available to satisfy the judgment. In 2015, CSB filed a lawsuit against Lovell, his wife, and several of his companies, asserting claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) to set aside those conveyances as fraudulent transfers. The trial court dismissed some of those claims on the ground that they did not state claims upon which relief might properly be granted. After reviewing the transfers, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found that trial court erred when it dismissed a claim under the UFTA against Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land, LLC, relating to property in Habersham County: the trial court rested its dismissal of the claim upon the time bar of former OCGA 18-2-79 (1), and did not consider the other grounds asserted by Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land for dismissing the claim. The trial court reasoned that former Section 18-2-79 (1) was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitation, and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) did not, it concluded, preempt statutes of repose. CSB contended that this conclusion was in error, and with that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court reversed the trial court on this point, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell" on Justia Law

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The Community Bank loaned money to several entities (“the Borrowers”) over the course of several years. The Borrowers executed five promissory notes, granting the bank a security interest in real estate located in three different counties. To further secure the loans, the Guarantors signed commercial guaranties (“the Guaranties”) in which they guaranteed full payment of the notes. In 2011, RES-GA foreclosed on and bought the properties that were serving as collateral. It then filed confirmation actions in the three counties in which the secured properties were located. In each instance, the court entered an order refusing to confirm the sale, finding that RES-GA had failed to prove that it obtained the fair market value of the property in question, and refusing to allow a resale. RES-GA appealed two of those orders, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed in each case. Last year, the Supreme Court held that compliance with OCGA 44-14-161, Georgia’s confirmation statute, “is a condition precedent to the lender’s ability to pursue a guarantor for a deficiency after foreclosure has been conducted, but a guarantor retains the contractual ability to waive the condition precedent requirement.” The Court granted certiorari in this case to consider additional questions regarding creditors’ ability to pursue deficiency actions against guarantors. The Court concluded that Jim York and John Drillot (“the Guarantors”) waived any defense based on the failure of creditor RES-GA LJY, LLC (“RES-GA”) to confirm the relevant foreclosure sales, and thus affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that upheld deficiency judgments against them. View "York v. RES-GA LJY, LLC" on Justia Law

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A mandatory arbitration clause is contained in each deposit agreement for customers of appellee SunTrust Bank. The clause permits an individual depositor to reject the agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a certain deadline. SunTrust claimed it drafted the arbitration clause in such a way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserted that even if, as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the rejection of arbitration deadline operated to give notice of the individual plaintiff’s rejection of arbitration, the complaint could not be brought as a class action because the filing of a class action could not serve to reject the arbitration clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice. Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging the bank’s overdraft fee constitutes the charging of usurious interest. At the time Bickerstaff opened his account (thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust’s deposit agreement), that agreement included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust’s deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law, and after Bickerstaff’s complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements. SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint, was filed prior to the amendment’s deadline for giving SunTrust written notice of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff’s complaint was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors, by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24, 2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line, and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement. SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff’s attorney substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, holding in essence, that the contractual language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the filing of his class action complaint. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the terms of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust’s deposit agreement did not prevent Bickerstaff’s class action complaint from tolling the contractual limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of OCGA 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint was not defeated on this ground. View "Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Cindy and David Ames executed a security deed to their residential property in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (WaMu). WaMu’s receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), later assigned the deed to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A (Chase). When Chase initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale on the property, the Ameses filed lawsuits in state court and then in federal court, alleging among other things that the assignment of the security deed to Chase was invalid. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Georgia Court of Appeals erred in concluding in the state lawsuit, the Ameses lacked standing to bring such a challenge to the assignment, a conclusion based on that court’s previous decisions in "Montgomery v. Bank of America," (740 SE2d 434 (2013)), and "Jurden v. HSBC Mortgage Corp.," (765 SE2d 440 (2014)). The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the appellate court's decision. Alternatively, the assignment issue raised by the Ameses was precluded because it had already been resolved against them in their federal lawsuit by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law