Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

In this foreclosure proceeding, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's order granting Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment on its complaint to foreclose a mortgage, holding that Deutsche Bank did not establish that it had standing to foreclose.In 2006, Blaine Yata executed a note and mortgage to New Century Mortgage Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC4 (Deutsche Bank). When Yata defaulted on the note, Deutsche Bank brought a complaint to foreclose on the mortgage. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Deutsche Bank. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding (1) the ICA misapplied U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Verhagen, 489 P.3d at 419 (2021) in determining that Deutsche Bank's documents were admissible; and (2) even if the documents were admissible, they would not establish that Deutsche Bank had possession of the note when it filed the complaint. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Yata" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the admissibility and evidentiary weight of documents and declarations in a foreclosure proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment and order of the circuit court granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and for interlocutory decree of foreclosure, holding that promissory notes are not hearsay.Plaintiff, U.S. Bank, brought this foreclosure action. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, but the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded the case. At issue on remand was whether U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note when it filed its complaint. The circuit court concluded that U.S. Bank possessed the promissory note at the time it brought suit. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment, concluding that U.S. Bank lacked standing because it had not established it possessed the promissory note at the time it filed the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) promissory notes are not hearsay; (2) copies of promissory notes are not self-authenticating under Haw. R. Evid. 902(9); (3) under the incorporated records doctrine, business records may be admissible even absent testimony concerning the business practices or records of their creator; and (4) U.S. Bank was entitled to summary judgment. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Verhagen" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's grant of summary judgment for Nationstar Mortgage, LLC but corrected the ICA's reasoning, holding that the ICA erred in holding that Nationstar's business records were trustworthy under the business records exception to hearsay and that Daniel Kaleoaloha Kanahele's affirmative defenses should have been addressed by the circuit court.After Kanahele defaulted on a loan, Nationstar initiated this foreclosure action. The circuit court issued final judgment in favor of Nationstar. Although the ICA vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, Kanahele asked the Supreme Court to review additional issues he argued were either incorrectly resolved or left unresolved by the ICA. The Supreme Court held that the ICA erred with respect to two issues and that Kanahele would be prejudiced on remand absent the Court's further review. Specifically, the Court held (1) in light of Nationstar's failure adequately to explain material discrepancies in its business records and its presentation of contradictory declarations regarding which of several versions of Kanahele's note was the original, the ICA should have vacated the circuit court's order on this ground as well; and (2) the ICA should have clarified whether Nationstar was subject to Kanahele's affirmative defenses. View "Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Kanahele" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a certificate of title was entered when a deed was accepted by the Office of the Assistant Registrar of the Land Court and stamped with a new certificate of title number.Plaintiff-mortgagor brought this action against Defendant-purchaser arguing that the non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain property was not lawfully conducted. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff’s arguments to invalidate the foreclosure sale were untimely because they were not raised before the issuance of a new certificate of title. Plaintiff argued in response that a new certificate of title had not been issued, and therefore, Plaintiff was not prevented from challenging the non-judicial foreclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that the issuance of a new certificate of title number was sufficient to provide Defendant with statutory protection. The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) assignment of a new certificate of title number is not the statutory equivalent of an entry of a certificate of title, and therefore, the evidence in this case did not establish that a certificate of title had been entered; (2) accordingly, Plaintiff was not barred from bringing this action; and (3) an issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a certificate of title was entered when a deed was accepted by the Office of the Assistant Registrar of the Land Court and stamped with a new certificate of title number.Plaintiff-mortgagor brought this action against Defendant-purchaser arguing that the non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain property was not lawfully conducted. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff’s arguments to invalidate the foreclosure sale were untimely because they were not raised before the issuance of a new certificate of title. Plaintiff argued in response that a new certificate of title had not been issued, and therefore, Plaintiff was not prevented from challenging the non-judicial foreclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that the issuance of a new certificate of title number was sufficient to provide Defendant with statutory protection. The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) assignment of a new certificate of title number is not the statutory equivalent of an entry of a certificate of title, and therefore, the evidence in this case did not establish that a certificate of title had been entered; (2) accordingly, Plaintiff was not barred from bringing this action; and (3) an issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the intermediate court of appeals’ (ICA) judgment denying without prejudice Philip Kozma’s request for attorneys’ fees related to his appeal but vacated the portion of the ICA’s judgment denying costs. The appeal was related to a foreclosure action brought by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. The circuit court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure. On appeal, the ICA vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Upon Kozma’s request seeking attorney’s fees and costs related to his appeal, the ICA determined that Kozma was not a “prevailing party’ at this point in the proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) the ICA did not err in denying Kozma’s request for attorney’s fees because there was no “prevailing party” entitled to such fees under Haw. Rev. Sat. 607-14; but (2) the ICA incorrectly concluded that Kozma was not entitled to costs pursuant to Haw. R. App. P. 39. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Kozma" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a judicial decree of foreclosure granted in favor of U.S. Bank N.A. (Plaintiff) and against Joseph and Chanelle Meneses (Defendants). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that the circuit court properly granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s order granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure, holding (1) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC had the authority to sign a second assignment of mortgage to Plaintiff; and (2) in the judicial foreclosure context, a third party unrelated to a mortgage securitization pooling and servicing agreement lacks standing to enforce an alleged violation of its terms unless the violation renders the mortgage assignment void, rather than voidable. View "U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mattos" on Justia Law

Bank of America, N.A. filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on Homeowner’s property. Homeowner asserted numerous defenses, including that the Bank was not the lawful holder of the note and mortgage and therefore was not entitled to foreclosure. Homeowner also asserted four counterclaims. The circuit court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss Homeowner’s counterclaims. Thereafter, the court granted Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the Bank was the “current holder” of the note and mortgage and was therefore entitled to foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the property. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and vacated the circuit court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to Bank of America, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) the ICA erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction over the circuit court’s order granting the Bank’s motion to dismiss Homeowner’s counterclaims. Because the ICA did not reach the merits of Homeowner’s appeal with respect to the dismissal of her counterclaims, the case must be remanded to address the merits of Homeowner’s appeal of the dismissal of her counterclaims. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a non-judicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I, which was repealed by the legislature by Act 182. Russell Hungate, the property owner, filed a complaint and first amended complaint alleging that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) and David B. Rosen and his law office (collectively, Rosen), the attorney hired by Deutsche Bank to conduct the foreclosure of Hungate’s property, violated statutory, contractual, and common law duties and committed unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The circuit court granted Rosen’s motion to dismiss and then granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing the majority to Hungate’s claims alleging Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I violations against Deutsche Bank; (2) Duetsche Bank must use reasonable means to obtain the best price for a foreclosed property; and (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing Hungate’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim against Deutsche Bank, but property dismissed Hungate’s claim against Rosen. View "Hungate v. Rosen" on Justia Law