Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
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Appellant opened three business accounts at Respondent Wells Fargo Bank. Respondent later unilaterally closed the three accounts, stating that the reason for the closure was because Appellant had been involved in a criminal activity. Appellant filed a complaint alleging defamation, false light, and declaratory relief. Appellant then filed a motion to compel Respondent to produce documents regarding the closure of her accounts, as well as the risk assessment processes and analysis for closing these accounts. The discovery commissioner decided that Respondent was not required to provide the requested records under the Bank Secrecy Act. The district court affirmed the commissioner’s report and recommendations but ordered Respondent to provide a privilege log concerning the subject matter at issue. After Respondent submitted a privilege log, the discovery commissioner recommended that the documents be deemed confidential. The district court affirmed and adopted the report and recommendations. Appellant’s cause of action for declaratory relief was ultimately dismissed by the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery commissioner and the district court did not err in concluding that the documents at issue were protected by the Suspicious Activity Report privilege under the Bank Secrecy Act. View "Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

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When Respondent defaulted on a commercial guaranty agreement with Bank, Bank sued Respondent. Bank’s complaint sought from Respondent the deficiency allowed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.495(4). On June 18, 2013 Bank proceeded to foreclosure sale. Bank acquired the property at foreclosure. On January 16, 2014, Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a deficiency judgment against Respondent. Respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Bank let more than six months elapse between the date of the foreclosure sale and the date it filed its motion for summary judgment, Bank forfeited its right to obtain a deficiency judgment by operation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455. Bank responded that its pre-foreclosure complaint satisfied all applicable requirements in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and against Bank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bank’s complaint against Respondent for the deficiency allowed by section 40.495(4) satisfied the requirements of Chapter 40. View "Bank of Nevada v. Petersen" on Justia Law

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Catherine Rodriguez defaulted on her loan and elected for foreclosure mediation. At a third, unsuccessful mediation between Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, as the agent of the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), and Rodriguez, Nationstar presented an uncertified, inaccurate copy of the promissory note. Thereafter, BONY filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure. Upon learning that the note presented at the third mediation was inaccurate, Rodriguez filed a petition for judicial review of the mediation against Nationstar and BONY (collectively, Nationstar). The district court excused the untimeliness of the petition based on good cause and found that the note’s certification was false and that Nationstar knew of the falsity. The court sanctioned Nationstar $100,000. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review because the filing of such a petition is not permitted beyond the thirty-day time period provided in Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Rule 21(2), even when a party discovers fraud months after the mediation. View "Nationstar Mortgage v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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After the Borrower defaulted on a loan, the Guarantor (the petitioner) allegedly breached the guaranty. Omni (the real party in interest) filed a complaint against the Guarantor for the alleged default on the guaranty. At issue on appeal is whether a creditor's amended complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against petitioner may relate back to a timely complaint against a different party pursuant to NRCP 15(c), so as to satisfy NRS 40.455(1)'s six-month deadline for an application for a deficiency judgment against petitioner. The court concluded that the district court erred in permitting the real party in interest's amended complaint to relate back to the timely original complaint pursuant to NRCP 15(c), so as to satisfy the six-month deadline for an application for a deficiency judgment against petitioner, as required by NRS 40.455(1); the timely complaint against the borrowers does not constitute a valid application for deficiency judgment against the unnamed petitioner; and petitioner did not waive his right to object under NRS 40.455(1). Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment in the guaranty action and motion to dismiss in the borrower action, and the court granted the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Badger v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

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Hawley McIntosh purchased a home located within a common-interest community. McIntosh’s first mortgage lender subsequently foreclosed on McIntosh’s home. Scott Ludwig purchased the property and subsequently transferred the property by quitclaim deed to Ikon Holdings, LLC. Ikon acknowledged that it acquired the property subject to the homeowner association’s (Horizons) superpriority lien but disagreed that the lien included nine months, rather than six months, of unpaid assessments or the collection fees and foreclosure costs Horizon was seeking to recoup. Thereafter, Ikon filed the underlying declaratory relief action. The district court granted partial declaratory relief, concluding that Horizons’ covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limited its superpriority lien to an amount equal to six months of assessments, which did not offend Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2)’s superpriority provision providing for nine months of assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a superpriority lien for common expense assessments pursuant to section 116.3116(2) does not include collection fees and foreclosure costs incurred by an HOA; and (2) an HOA’s CC&Rs that purport to create a superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs over six months preceding foreclosure are superseded by the terms of the superpriority lien created by section 116.3116(2). View "Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law