Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

After voters in School District rejected a bond proposal to construct an addition to existing high school building, School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Bank, which agreed to finance the project. Appellants, residents and taxpayers in the school district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief contending that the agreement violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-10,105. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) under section 79-10,105, lease-purchase agreements may be used to make school improvements without the voters’ approval if the project is not funded by bonded debt; and (2) School District in this case did not fund the project through bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ claims were moot because, as of the time of this appeal, the addition had been completed, but the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (2) section 79-10,105 does not prohibit a school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement to finance a capital construction project if it has not created a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district, and because there was no evidence that this occurred in this case, School District did not violate section 79-10,105 by entering into the lease-purchase agreement with Bank. View "Nebuda v. Dodge County Sch. Dist. 0062" on Justia Law

First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Appellant Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank (LVFB) is a Pennsylvania chartered bank, and a subsidiary of Fulton Financial Corporation, which merged with Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. The merger made Fulton the parent company of Lebanon Valley National Bank, which merged with Farmers Bank as part of the transaction, thereby forming LVFB. Prior to the merger, both Farmers Bank and National Bank were "institutions" subject to the Shares Tax. For the 2002 tax year, LVFB filed a Bank Shares Tax return, which included National Bank's pre-merger value in its calculation of its six-year average share value, as required by the combination provision. However, in 2005, LVFB filed a petition with the Board of Appeals, seeking a refund of the portion of its 2002 tax payment attributable to National Bank’s pre-merger share value. It claimed disparate treatment because the combination provision was inapplicable when mergers involved out-of-state banks or banks less than six years old. The Commonwealth Court has held, under the plain language of the statute, the combination provision applied only to combinations of "institutions" (i.e., banks with Pennsylvania locations). The trial court held LVFB, as the survivor of the merger of two Pennsylvania banks, should have reported a taxable share value which averaged the combined share value of each constituent institution over the past six years and was, therefore, not entitled to a refund. However, the court ordered the Commonwealth "to provide meaningful retrospective relief" to cure LVFB’s non-uniform treatment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board of Finance and Revenue's classification of the merged LVFB and the 2002 tax assessment. After careful review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court's decision and reversed for further proceedings. View "Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed its 1999 Form 1120F (U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation), reporting total tax of $105,725,463, total payment of $188,256,721, including credit for taxes withheld at the source ($13,256,721), and a resulting overpayment of $82.5 million. Form 1120F does not itemize withholding credits, which were derived from Forms 8805 (Foreign Partner’s Information Statement of Section 1446 Withholding Tax) and 1042-S (Foreign Person’s U.S. Source Income Subject to Withholding) received from withholding agents. Deutsche Bank did not attach those forms . The IRS returned the filing, unprocessed, requesting documentation of the withholding credit. In its amended return, Deutsche Bank stated that it discovered an overstatement of the withholding credit by $11,240 and that the correct amount was $13,245,481. The IRS processed the resubmitted return without correcting the error and credited the overpayment to the 2000 tax year. Later, Deutsche Bank filed an amended 1999 return claiming an additional refund of $59 million based on a valuation adjustment. The IRS issued the refund and $5 million in overpayment interest for January 1, 2001 to November 14, 2002. The IRS denied its request for additional interest for March 15 to December 31, 2000. The Claims Court agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the return was not filed by the extended return filing due date in processible form to commence the accrual of overpayment interest. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit considered appeals by Illinois and Illinois counties and a Wisconsin county of district court holdings that those governmental bodies cannot levy a tax on sales of real property by Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation). Although both are now private corporations, the relevant statutes provide that they are “exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State … or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State … or local taxation to the same extent as other real property,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1452(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A transfer tax is not a tax on realty. After 2008 Fannie Mae owned an immense inventory of defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages and is under conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The states essentially requested the court to “pierce the veil,” in recognition of the fact that if the tax is paid, it will be paid from assets or income of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but their conservator is the United States, and the assets and income are those of entities charged with a federal duty. View "Milwaukee Cnty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ind. Code 6-1.1-24-3(b), which provides that a mortgagee annually request by certified mail a copy of notice that a parcel of real property is eligible for sale under the tax sale statutes. Here a bank, which held a mortgage on certain property, failed to submit a form affirmatively requesting from the county auditor to mail notice of a pending sale of the real property. Therefore, the bank was not notified that its mortgaged property was tax delinquent until after the property had been sold and the buyer requested a tax deed. The buyer filed a petition to direct the county auditor to issue a tax deed for the property, and the bank filed a response challenging the tax sale notice statutes as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court issued an order holding that the statute was unconstitutional and denying the buyer's petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 6-1.1-24-3(b) was constitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded. View "M & M Inv. Group, LLC v. Ahlemeyer Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the allocation of tax refunds pursuant to a Tax Sharing Agreement (TSA) between two members of a Consolidated Group, the parent corporation (the Holding Company), and one of its subsidiaries (the Bank), the principal operating entity for the Consolidated Group. At issue on appeal was whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in declaring the tax refunds an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that the relationship between the Holding Company and the Bank is not a debtor-creditor relationship; when the Holding Company received the tax refunds it held the funds intact - as if in escrow - for the benefit of the Bank and thus the remaining members of the Consolidated Group; the parties intended that the Holding Company would promptly forward the refunds to the Bank so that the Bank could, in turn, forward them on to the Group's members; and in the Bank's hands, the tax refunds occupied the same status as they did in the Holding Company's hands - they were tax refunds for distribution in accordance with the TSA. Accordingly, the court reversed the Bankruptcy Court's judgment and directed that court to vacate it decision declaring the tax refunds the property of the bankruptcy estate and to instruct the Holding Company to forward the funds held in escrow to the FDIC, as receiver, for distribution to the members of the Group in accordance with the TSA. View "Zucker, et al. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands obtained two tax judgments in the U.S. district court against the Millars for unpaid taxes. The Millards, who previously resided in the Commonwealth, relocated before the Commonwealth was able to obtain the judgments. The Commonwealth commenced proceedings as a judgment creditor asseking a turnover order against garnishees holding assets of the Millars. The Commonwealth named a Canadian bank (Bank) headquartered in Toronto, with a branch in New York, as a garnishee under the theory that the Millards maintained accounts in a foreign subsidiary of Bank. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a turnover order against Bank. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law, holding (1) for a court to issue a post-judgment turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) against a banking entity, the entity itself must have actual, not merely constructive, possession or custody of the assets sought; and (2) therefore, it is not enough that the banking entity's subsidiary might have possession or custody of a judgment debtor's assets. View "Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, as nominee for two lenders (collectively, Plaintiffs), held mortgages on Lot 456. For the property owner's failure to pay his water bill, the Pawtucket Water Supply Board (PWSB) auctioned the lot. PWSB issued a deed conveying the title in the property to Amy Realty. Amy Realty subsequently discovered that the property PWSB had intended to auction had been mistakenly listed as Lot 486 on the tax sale notices and deed. Amy Realty then obtained a corrective deed from the PWSB conveying title to Lot 456. Amy Realty subsequently filed a petition to foreclose on Plaintiffs' rights of redemption in Lot 456. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to vacate the final decree of disclosure, alleging that the corrective deed changing the lot number from 486 to 456 was invalid and this infirmity rendered the foreclosure decree void. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the corrective deed obtained in this case was null and void because it was not recorded within sixty days of the tax sale; and (2) the final foreclosure decree may be vacated because the tax sale was invalid. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. DePina" on Justia Law