Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the fallout from the failure of the Fountainebleau development in Las Vegas, Nevada and involved the contract dispute between the Term Lenders, the Revolving Lenders, and the Borrowers. The district court dismissed the Term Lenders' claims against the Revolving Lenders, finding that the Term Lenders lacked standing to sue. The district court also denied the Borrowers' motion for summary judgment against the Revolving Lenders, rejecting the Borrowers' argument that the Revolving Lenders had breached the contract as a matter of law and alternatively finding there were material issues of fact about whether the Revolving Lenders breached the contract. The court held that the Term Lenders lacked standing to enforce section 2.1(c) of the Credit Agreement promise and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The court could not conclude as a matter of law that the Revolving Lenders broke their promise to fund the Borrowers under section 2 of the Credit Agreement and affirmed the district court's denial of the Borrowers' request for turnover of the loan proceeds and specific performance. View "Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., et al v. Bank of America, NA, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from a land development project dispute where the Retreat took out a short-term purchase loan from a Georgia bank to finance the acquisition of the land. At issue was the district court's interpretation of an exclusion in a title insurance policy issued by First American to the bank and the district court's decision that First American was entitled to summary judgment based on that exclusion. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted the terms of the title insurance contract; the district court's conclusion that the affidavit at issue would be admissible at trial was not an abuse of discretion; and the evidence demonstrated that the bank was fully aware of the Retreat property's lack of dedicated access when it extended the purchase loan and took out the insurance policy from First American. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and because First American was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Cynergy, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from WaMu's lease agreement with Interface, the lessor. WaMu subsequently closed as a "failed bank" and entered into receivership under the direction of the FDIC. The FDIC then entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement) with JPMorgan, which set forth the terms and conditions of the transfer of WaMu's assets and liabilities to JPMorgan. Interface filed a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan. On appeal, Interface challenged two district court orders that granted JPMorgan's motion for summary judgment, denied Interface's motion for summary judgment, and granted the FDIC's, the intervenor, request for declaratory relief. The court concluded that Interface was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement executed between FDIC and JPMorgan, and, as a result, Interface lacked standing to enforce its interpretation of that agreement. The court also concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award declaratory relief to the FDIC. Consequently, the court vacated and remanded the judgment. View "Interface Kanner, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

Beneva and Iberiabank became parties to the sublease at issue through a series of assignments. At issue was whether the sublease transferred by the FDIC to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank was enforceable despite a clause purporting to terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank. Because the court found that the FDIC acted within its power to enforce contracts under 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(13)(A) and that the termination clause was unenforceable against Iberiabank as the FDIC's transferee, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberiabank. View "Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved an allegedly fraudulent payment order that resulted in the bank's transfer of $329,500 from plaintiff's account to someone in the Dominican Republic. Plaintiff sued the bank to recover the money and, in response, the bank asserted, inter alia, an affirmative defense premised upon Fla. Stat. 670.202(2), which relieved a bank of liability for fraudulent payment orders in certain situations. The court held that the parties' agreed-upon security procedure did not satisfy section 670.021 and consequently section 670.202(2) did not apply. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank. View "Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A." on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals, the court must decide issues about the enforceability of German bonds issued during the period between World War I and World War II. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1302-1311, over the complaint against Germany filed by Sovereign Bonds regarding its Agra bonds issued in the territory that later became East Germany; all the bonds were subject to the 1953 Validation Treaty and must be validated before they could be enforced in American courts; the complaint filed by World Holdings to enforce its validated bonds was untimely; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied discovery to Sovereign Bonds on the issue of validation. View "World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany" on Justia Law

Leon County appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the FHFA, it's acting director, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Leon County argued that by directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks to refrain from purchasing mortgages encumbered with certain first-priority lien obligations, some of which were held by Leon County, the FHFA engaged in rulemaking without providing notice and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 12 U.S.C. 4526(b). The court agreed with the district court that, under the specific facts in this case, the FHFA's directive not to purchase Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) encumbered mortgages was within the FHFA's broad powers as conservator. Accordingly, because 12 U.S.C. 4617(f) provided that "no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or receiver," the district court held that section 4617(f) barred Leon County's claims. View "Leon County Florida, et al v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these five separate putative class actions alleged that Wells Fargo and Wachovia Bank unlawfully charged them overdraft fees for their checking accounts, which were governed by agreements that provided for arbitration of disputes on an individual basis. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued that it did not waive its right to compel arbitration because it would have been futile to move to compel arbitration before the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The court concluded that Concepcion established no new law. Because the court concluded that it would have been futile for Wells Fargo to argue that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted any state laws that purported to make the classwide arbitration provisions unenforceable, the court affirmed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. View "Garcia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This case involved unanswered questions of Georgia law that are central to this appeal. Because these questions are determinative of the case and there are no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court respectfully certified the following questions for resolution: (1) Whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33, such that a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser would have constructive notice when the deed incorporates the covenants, terms, and provisions of a rider that contains the attestations required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33 and said rider was filed, recorded, and indexed with the security deed; and (2) If the answer to question one was in the negative, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. View "Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A bank customer sued her bank to recover for unauthorized withdrawals from her checking account, made using her check card and personal identification number (PIN). Federal law requires a bank to investigate such disputed transactions, to notify the customer if it has verified the transactions as authorized, and to recredit the account if the withdrawals were unauthorized; failure to do so renders the bank liable to the customer for up to treble damages. The bank investigated the withdrawals at issue in this case, found that they were the product of a scheme to defraud the bank, and denied liability for the withdrawals. The customer, represented by counsel, brought suit. By the time the case was tried to the district court, the customer was pro se. After a two-day bench trial, the District Court rejected the customer's EFTA claims and entered judgment for the bank. Specifically, the District Court found that the transactions were authorized because they were part of a scheme to defraud the bank. The customer appealed pro se. Although the briefs were "inartfully" drawn, she challenged the District Court's finding as clearly erroneous. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error and therefore affirmed. View "Merisier v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law