Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this consolidated interlocutory appeal were defaulted mortgagors of Rhode Island real estate. Defendants were the corresponding mortgagees, Plaintiffs' agents or assignees, who allegedly held Rhode Island mortgagees' legal titles and asserted the right to foreclosure for default on mortgage terms. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the ostensible assignments of their mortgagees' legal titles were invalid, leaving the assignees without the right to foreclose. The district court imposed a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction against foreclosure and possessory proceedings and appointed a special master to mediate the claims. Defendants appealed and filed a mandamus petition, claiming that the district court erred in failing to provide notice and hearing before issuing the stay and in failing to set limits of time and cost when referring the mortgagors' cases to the special master. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to hold a prompt hearing with reasonable notice on the question of whether the injunction should be continued and to establish specific limits of time and expense if the reference for mediation was to remain in effect. View "In re Mortgage Foreclosure Cases" on Justia Law

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant purchased nonrecourse notes (Notes) in the amount of two million dollars, issued by the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust Fund (PRCTF). The Notes were not registered under the Securities Act based on an exemption from registration. The Notes later went into default, and Appellant sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), trustee of the Notes, and Wilmington Trust Company (WTC), indenture trustee of the securities that the PRCTF purchased with Note proceeds. Appellant brought suit in federal district court, premising his assertion of subject matter jurisdiction on the Edge Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA). The district court dismissed the amended complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's suit did not arise under federal law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to file a delayed amended complaint asserting a new theory of liability because Appellant proffered no good reason for the delay. View "Nikitine v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

Appellants purchased nonrecourse notes (Notes) in the amount of two million dollars, issued by the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust Fund (PRCTF). The Notes were not registered under the Securities Act based on an exemption from registration. The Notes later went into default, and Appellants sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), trustee of the Notes, and Wilmington Trust Company (WTC), indenture trustee of the securities that the PRCTF purchased with Note proceeds. Appellants brought their suit in federal district court, premising their assertion of subject matter jurisdiction on the Edge Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA). The district court dismissed the amended complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellants' suit did not arise under federal law. View "Calderon-Serra v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

Former employees (Plaintiffs) of a failed bank taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), a bank that subsequently acquired the failed bank's deposits and certain assets on claims for severance pay. The FDIC intervened, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims because Plaintiffs either failed to file administrative claims with the FDIC or failed to challenge in federal court the FDIC's disallowance of their administrative claims. BPPR moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for any severance claims for at least three different merits-based reasons. The district court granted summary judgment for BPPR and did not address the question of whether it had jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated entry of summary judgment for Defendants and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Plaintiffs' failures to comply with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act administrative claims process triggered the statutory bar, and Plaintiffs could not avoid the jurisdictional bar by failing to name the FDIC as a defendant. View "Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Defendant bought a custom-made yacht with the help of a loan from Barclays Bank. When Defendant stopped making payments on the loan, Barclays repossessed the yacht and sold it pursuant to the Florida UCC. Barclays got less than what Defendant owed on the yacht, and therefore, Barclays sued Defendant for the deficiency. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Barclays was barred from recovering the deficiency because, in violation of the mortgage's terms, it did not provide Defendant with proper notice of the sale. The district court denied Defendant's motion and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Barclays. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the notice Barclays provided to Defendant was sufficient. View "Barclays Bank PLC v. Poynter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her single-family home in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's promissory note was delivered to one party (the lender) and then transferred. The mortgage itself was granted to a different entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and later assigned to the foreclosing entity (Aurora). Three days before the rescheduled foreclosure, Plaintiff sued in state court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. Aurora removed the case to the federal district court. At issue before the court was how MERS's involvement in the chain of title impacted Aurora's authority to foreclose. The district court resolved this question in favor of Aurora, which then foreclosed on Plaintiff property. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure here was not unlawful, as (1) in the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had standing to contest the validity of the mortgage assignment made by MERS to Aurora; but (2) the MERS framework is faithful to the tenants of mortgage law in Massachusetts and was therefore not unlawful. View "Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against two entities she claimed illegally foreclosed her home once she defaulted on her mortgage payments. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court then addressed Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated plausible claims for relief, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in deciding that it would be futile to allow an amendment to the complaint. View "Juarez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to surrender their home. When Plaintiffs' mortgage lenders (collectively, Beneficial) refused to foreclose or otherwise take title to the residence, Plaintiffs demanded that the mortgage lien be released. After Beneficial also refused to release the mortgage lien, Plaintiffs began an adversary proceeding claiming a discharge injunction violation. The bankruptcy court found Beneficial did not violate the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that because the facts of this case so closely mirrored those in Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the same result should follow. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions were correct and that the court did not err in its judgment. View "Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc." on Justia Law