Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

In connection with a loan, Bayonne provided Nuveen with an audit report authored by accounting firm, Withum and an opinion letter from Bayonne’s counsel, Lindabury. Soon after the transaction, Bayonne filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. 101. Nuveen claimed that the audit report and opinion letter concealed problems with Bayonne’s financial condition and that, had it known about these financial issues, it would not have entered into the transaction. The district court dismissed claims of fraud (Withum), negligent misrepresentation, and malpractice (Lindabury) based on Nuveen’s noncompliance with New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-26, which requires an affidavit of merit for certain actions against professionals. The Third Circuit remanded for reconsideration of diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the court accepted an argument that the action was “related to” Bayonne’s bankruptcy proceeding, establishing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1334(b), and again dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to jurisdiction and held that the AOM Statute can be applied by a federal court without conflicting with FRCP 8. If the AOM Statute applies, noncompliance requires dismissal. The court certified to the New Jersey Supreme Court questions relating to the “nature of the injury” and “cause of action” elements of the statute. View "Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown PC, et al" on Justia Law

The company, which issues preprinted travelers' checks, challenged 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25, amending New Jersey's unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 46:30B, to retroactively reduce the period after which travelers checks are presumed abandoned from 15 years to three years, after which the funds must be turned over to the state. The district court denied an injunction. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Commerce Clause. The law has a rational basis. It does not substantially impairment contractual relationships; while the company has the right to use and invest TC funds until the date the TC is cashed or sold, the duration of use is further subject to the lawful abandonment period set by unclaimed property laws. The company has no investment-backed expectation with respect to the longer period of investment.The law does not directly regulate sales in other states.

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses.

After refinancing her mortgage in 2006, plaintiff filed suit under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C 1601, claiming failure to properly notify her of her right to cancel the mortgage. The court instructed the jury that, because her signature was on the notice of right to cancel, something more than her testimony was needed to rebut the presumption that she received it. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. The Third Circuit vacated and remanding, stating that there is no basis in TILA or the Federal Rules of Evidence for the instruction and the error was not harmless. The signature does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery.

Defendant-lender reported to credit agencies that two of plaintiff's mortgage payments were received late. Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 and alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, negligence, negligent supervision, conversion, and fraud. The district court entered summary judgment for the lender. The Third Circuit affirmed. A private litigant seeking to recover against a furnisher of information under the FCRA must first make a complaint to a consumer reporting agency; plaintiff did not comply with the structural framework of the statute.

The district court granted a default judgment of foreclosure in favor of the mortgage company. Following a sale, at which the mortgage company was the successful bidder, the court granted a motion to set aside the sale because the mortgage company had failed to notify a junior lien holder of the sale, as required by state law, so that the junior lien remained in place. The court subsequently granted the junior lien holder's motion to vacate the set-aside order, reasoning that the notice issue involved an independent question of state law and was not properly before it. The Third Circuit vacated. The court's diversity jurisdiction extends to resolving issues that arise from an error committed during the pendency of its jurisdiction over a marshal's sale that it ordered. No overriding state policy or matter of substantial public concern, justifying abstention, was implicated in this case.