Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Todd alleges that in 2012 he received a recorded telephone message from Collecto asking him to call and help the company locate his mother, Terry. He called; a Collecto representative told him that Terry owed AT&T money for cell phone service. Todd stated that he is not Terry, but the representative continued to discuss the alleged debt without asking how to reach Terry or asking Todd to pay the bill. Todd claimed that this interaction harmed him emotionally and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692b, which permits a debt collector to call a third party for help in locating a “consumer” but prohibits revealing the existence of the consumer’s debt to the third party. Section 1692f prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court concluded that Todd lacked standing under the Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Todd lacked standing under 1692b and failed to state a claim under 1692f. View "Todd v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

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The defendants, affiliated companies, owned ATMs in Indianapolis bars that were popular with college students. Plaintiffs filed a purported class action, based on violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693b(d)(3). At the time, the Act required a sticker notice on the ATM and an onscreen notification during transactions. Defendants provided onscreen notice but not, according to the complaint, a sticker. The Act has been amended to remove the sticker notice requirement. The district court decertified the class. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the district judge did not provide adequate explanation. While the compensatory function of the class action has no significance in this case, the damages sought by the class, and, more importantly, the attorney’s fee that the court will award if the class prevails, will likely make the suit a wake‐up call and have a deterrent effect on future violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. View "Hughes v. Kore of IN Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

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Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

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Before its 2007 bankruptcy, Sentinel was an investment manager. Its customers were not typical investors; most were futures commission merchants (FCMs), which operate in the commodity industry like to the securities industry’s broker‐dealers. Through Sentinel, FCMs’ client money could, in compliance with industry regulations, earn a decent return while maintaining the liquidity FCMs need. To accept capital from FCM customers, Sentinel had to register as an FCM, but it did not solicit or accept orders for futures contracts; it received a no‐action letter from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) exempting it from certain requirements applicable to FCMs. Sentinel represented that it would maintain customer funds in segregated accounts as required under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1. In reality, Sentinel pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in customer assets to secure an overnight loan at the Bank of New York. Sentinel’s bankruptcy trustee claimed fraudulent transfer, equitable subordination, and illegal contract, in an effort to dislodge the Bank’s secured position. The district court rejected all of the claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting a finding that Sentinel’s failure to keep client funds properly segregated was insufficient to show actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. View "In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

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Rosen, as owner of Kully Construction, submitted a development plan to the city of East St. Louis for a $5,624,050 affordable housing project to be constructed with a combination of private and public funds: $800,000 in federal grant funds, $1,124,810 in Tax Increment Financing (TIF), and $3,699,240 from Rosen and Kully. Rosen constructed elaborate lies about his credentials and history. After obtaining a contract for 32 units, Rosen learned that the project was under-funded by about $2.7 million dollars. To conceal the problem, Rosen misrepresented to the city that he could build 56 units without increasing construction costs, then substituted less-expensive prefab modular housing units in place of the promised new construction; he nonetheless submitted an itemized list of materials and expenses related to construction. He also submitted falsified tax returns to obtain financing and falsified statements that he had obtained financing. After the scheme was discovered, Rosen pleaded guilty to seven counts of wire fraud, and based on the court’s calculation of the loss amount and determination that Rosen was an organizer or leader of criminal activity, was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Rosen" on Justia Law

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Greenblatt, the “bad boy of Chicago arbitrage” became involved in litigation concerning use of his “web of corporations,” including Loop Corporation and Banco. In 2000, Banco extended a $9.9 million line of credit in exchange for a blanket lien over Loop’s assets. Loop defaulted; nevertheless, Banco expanded the line of credit by several million dollars in 2002 and continued lending Loop money until 2004. Banco lost senior creditor status when the district court voided the lien in an earlier case. In 2001 Loop purchased millions of shares of EZ Links stock from Golf Venture, giving a promissory note. Loop defaulted; Golf Venture won a judgment of $1.2 million. Also in 2001, a failed margin transaction left Loop indebted to its brokerage firm, Wachovia, in the amount of $1,885,751. Wachovia took Loop to arbitration and won a $2,349,000 award in 2005. Wachovia is still trying to collect. Loop had transferred almost all of its valuable assets to another Greenblatt company, leaving only the EZ Links stock, in possession of Banco, and Banco claimed to have creditor priority over Wachovia. The district vourt pierced Loop’s corporate veil, allowing Wachovia to reach Greenblatt’s assets, and voiding Banco’s lien, and ordered the sale of Loop’s only asset, EZ Links stock. Banco attempted to contest the d decisions. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Banco’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp." on Justia Law

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Bank of America lost approximately $34 million when the Knight companies went bankrupt. BOA sued, claiming that Knight’s directors and managers looted the firm and that its accountants failed to detect the embezzlement. The district court dismissed. The accountants invoked the protection of Illinois law, 225 ILCS 450/30.1, which provides that an accountant is liable only to its clients unless the accountant itself committed fraud (not alleged in this case) or “was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action” The court found that BOA did not plausibly allege that the accountants knew that Knight’s “primary intent” was to benefit the Bank in alleging that the accountants knew that Knight would furnish copies of the financial statements to lenders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting BOA’s choice not to pursue its claims in the bankruptcy process. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Knight" on Justia Law

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abiu worked as a bank teller, 2003-2007. He searched account records for account holders with balances exceeding $100,000, then stole their information and, along with codefendants, compromised that information to divert money into fraudulently opened bank accounts. Postal inspectors lawfully searched his home and seized notes containing names, Social Security numbers, and account information of 86 customers, and an unspecified number of fake driver’s licenses and Social Security cards bearing the names of some of those customers, but only 17 customers suffered a loss. The losses were reimbursed by the banks. Rabiu pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1344, 1029(a)(2), 1028A(a)(1), admitting participation in the scheme, but insisting that some of the names and identifying information on the phony driver’s licenses and Social Security cards were fictitious and not from customers. The government successfully sought a four-level upward sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) based on 50 or more victims. The government cited a definition of “victim,” which, for offenses involving identity theft, was broadened in 2009, after Rabiu’s arrest, to include “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the court overstated the number of victims, it was clear that the judge would have imposed the same sentence even had he accepted Rabiu’s calculation; the error was harmless. View "United States v. Rabiu" on Justia Law

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Green sued under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1606, claiming that U.S. Cash Advance misstated her loan’s annual percentage rate. The lender requested arbitration under the loan agreement, which referred to “binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.” The agreement was signed in 2012; the Forum has not accepted new consumer cases for arbitration since 2009, when it settled a suit alleging bias in merchants’ favor. The lender asked the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. 5. The judge declined, stating that identification of the Forum as arbitrator was “integral.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the agreement calls for use of the Forum’s Code of Procedure, not for the Forum itself to conduct proceedings. The court noted that the lender will have to “live with” the judge’s broad discretion in choosing an arbitrator, who might be familiar with practices in the payday loan industry or open to use of claimant classes in arbitrations, perhaps on a theory “that a consumer who would not voluntarily waive her rights under the Truth in Lending Act probably should not be deemed to have implicitly waived her right to the only procedure that could effectively enforce those rights.” View "Green v. U.S. Cash Advance IL, LLC" on Justia Law

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An Illinois judgment creditor may, without court action, require a third party to freeze property of a judgment debtor until a court determines whether the creditor has a valid claim, by serving the third party with a citation to discover assets. If the third party releases the property without court order, the third party may be liable to the creditor for property that was released. Mendez was awarded $387,931 in damages for unlawful abuse suffered at the hands of her employer. She served more than 50 citations to discover assets on the employer and banks where she believed the defendants had deposited assets. She successfully fought the employer’s fraudulent attempt to declare bankruptcy. She has recovered only $99,519.97. Mendez served Republic Bank a citation, requiring the bank to freeze accounts held under the names of 22 entities that Mendez believed contained assets belonging to her former employers. Republic Bank froze all of the listed accounts. Interveners, who owned only a subset of the accounts frozen, obtained a court order that the bank claims unambiguously required it to unfreeze all accounts, except two that were specifically mentioned as remaining frozen. The Seventh Circuit held that Republic Bank is not liable because the most reasonable reading of the order unfroze the accounts in question. View "Mendez v. Republic Bank" on Justia Law