Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Defendant worked as an assistant branch manager and pled guilty to embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. 656 after stealing more than $40,000 from the bank by manipulating the electronic security system. He was arrested in the Dominican Republic. The district court imposed a two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust (U.S.S.G. 3B1.3) and imposed a sentence of six months in prison, followed by two years of supervision with six months of home confinement. The Seventh Circuit rejected challenges to the sentence. View "United States v. Wasilewski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had a Home Depot credit card issued by Citibank. In 2005, Krahenbuhl, who also had a Citibank-Home Depot credit card, contracted with plaintiffs to build a log cabin for speculative resale. A log cabin package was purchased over the phone from Home Depot for $9,761.64 and charged to Krahenbuhl’s account. The materials were approved by, delivered to, and signed for by plaintiffs, who eventually built and sold the log cabin. The relationship between Krahenbuhl and plaintiffs deteriorated, and Krahenbuhl disputed the charge. Citibank transferred the charge from Krahenbuhl’s credit card to plaintiffs’ card. Krahenbuhl and plaintiffs reached a settlement through mediation, which plaintiffs thought included payment of the credit card charge. About one year later, they claim, they became aware that the $9,761.64 charge had been transferred to their account. Neither Citibank nor Home Depot would remove the charge; accrued interest has resulted in a total sum of approximately $21,000. Plaintiffs sued under the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Stat. 427.104(1)(j). Citibank was dismissed and the district court granted Home Depot summary judgment, finding that Home Depot had not acted either directly or indirectly in an attempt to collect a debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Home Federal agreed to lend up to $95.5 million to finance construction of a new ethanol production plant. When the developer of the plant ran into serious trouble finishing the project, the bank did not disburse the final $8 million. The developer defaulted on the debt and fired its general contractor, which then filed a mechanic’s lien on the property to recover $6 million allegedly owed it. When the bank sought to foreclose on its mortgage, the general contractor counterclaimed, asserting that its lien had priority over, or at least parity with, the bank’s mortgage. The bank tendered its defense to the title insurer under a policy that required the insurer to defend the bank against a “claim . . . alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured against by this policy.” The policy contained an exclusion from coverage for claims “created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to” by the insured. The district court ruled in favor of the title insurer. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The undisputed facts show that the title insurer breached its duty to defend the bank on the contractor’s claim that its mechanic’s lien had priority over or parity with the mortgage. View "Home Fed. Savings Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Knight was owner and CEO of Knight Industries, which owned other companies. Bank had provided credit ($34 million) to the companies, which, in 2009, filed bankruptcy petitions. Chatz was appointed trustee and was authorized to retain the Freeborn law firm. Chatz and the Bank alleged that Knight had made fraudulent transfers, had breached duties of good faith and fair dealing and duties to creditors, had misappropriated corporate opportunities, had committed conversion, and had violated securities laws, and demanded $27 million for the companies and $34 million for the Bank. In 2010 Knight filed a chapter 7 petition, listing the claims, value “unknown.” Chatz, appointed as trustee, requested representation by the Freeborn law firm, without disclosing intent to pursue the claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court approved. Later, the Bank and Chatz asked to assign the companies’ claims to the Bank. Knight objected, arguing that approval of the law firm conflicted with the companies having viable claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court overruled Knight’s objection. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Failure to disclose intent to pursue the claims did not harm Knight, and other remedies are available. It would be inequitable to permit Knight to reap huge benefits from harmless omission.View "Knight v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Javell, the owner of a mortgage brokerage, and Arroyo, Javell’s employee and loan processor, were convicted of two counts of mortgage-based wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) based on their actions in procuring a fraudulent mortgage during an FBI sting operation. Javell was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Javell argued the district court violated Bruton, and Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the post-arrest statements made by Arroyo and by failing to properly instruct the jury about the rules of non-imputation. According to Javell, Arroyo’s post-arrest statements directly implicated Javell and had the jury not heard those statements, Javell would not have been convicted. Noting a “plethora” of other evidence, including recordings, the court rejected the argument. View "United States v. Javell" on Justia Law

The target witness learned in 2009 that the IRS had opened a file on him, and that an IRS special agent and DOJ tax division prosecutor were assigned to investigate whether he used secret offshore bank accounts to evade income taxes. Two years later, a grand jury issued a subpoena requiring that he produce all records required to be maintained pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 1010.420 relating to foreign financial accounts that he had a financial interest in, or signature authority over. The requested records are required under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Government argued that the Required Records Doctrine overrides the Fifth Amendment privilege. The district court quashed the subpoena, concluding that the required records doctrine did not apply because the act of producing the required records was testimonial and would compel the witness to incriminate himself. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the Doctrine applicable. View "In re: February 2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that defendant banks participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.1350, and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they alleged: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. Plaintiffs sought certification as a class action and asked that each bank be held jointly and severally responsible for damages of approximately $75 billion. This case and a parallel case against the Hungarian national railway have produced nine appeals and mandamus petitions. The district court declined to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, noting that such a decision would ordinarily not be reviewable, stated that: “This is the rare case, however, in which it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of mandamus to confine the district court to the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction” The court cited the extraordinary scale of the litigation, the inherent involvement with U.S. foreign policy, and the “crystal clarity” of the lack of foundation for exercising general personal jurisdiction over the banks. View "Abelesz v. OTP Bank" on Justia Law

EAR, a seller of manufacturing equipment, defrauded creditors by financing non-existent or grossly overvalued equipment and pledging equipment multiple times to different creditors. After the fraud was discovered, EAR filed for bankruptcy. As Chief Restructuring Officer, Brandt abandoned and auctioned some assets. Five equipment leases granted a secured interest in EAR’s equipment; by amendment, EAR agreed to pay down the leases ($4.6 million) and give Republic a blanket security interest in all its assets. Republic would forebear on its claims against EAR. The amendment had a typographical error, giving Republic a security interest in Republic’s own assets. Republic filed UCC financing statements claiming a blanket lien on EAR’s assets. After the auction, Republic claimed the largest share of the proceeds. The matter is being separately litigated. First Premier, EAR’s largest creditor, is concerned that Republic, is working with Brandt to enlarge Republic’s secured interests. After the auction, EAR filed an action against its auditors for accounting malpractice, then sought to avoid the $4.6 million transfer to Republic. The bankruptcy court approved a settlement to end the EAR-Republic adversary action, continue the other suit, divvy proceeds from those suits, and retroactively modify the Republic lien to correct the typo. First Premier objected. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First Premier was not prejudiced by the settlement. View "First Premier Capital, LLC v. Republic Bank of Chicago" on Justia Law

The collapse of investment manager Sentinel in 2007 left its customers in a lurch. Instead of maintaining customer assets in segregated accounts as required by the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1, Sentinel pledged customer assets to secure an overnight loan at the Bank of New York, giving the bank in a secured position on Sentinel’s $312 million loan. After filing for bankruptcy, Sentinel’s liquidation trustee brought attempted to dislodge the bank’s secured position. After extensive proceedings, the district court rejected the claims. Acknowledging concerns about the bank’s knowledge of Sentinel’s business practices, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The essential issues were whether Sentinel had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud and whether the bank’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify equitable subordination, and the district court made the necessary credibility determinations. Even if the contract with the bank enabled illegal activity, the provisions did not themselves cause the segregation violations. View "Grede v. Bank of NY Mellon Corp." on Justia Law