Justia Banking Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, Inc.
Intervenors, financial institutions that held junior notes issued by trust defendant Soloso, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, the senior noteholder of Lansuppe. Intervenors also appealed the district court's denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of their cross-claims.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 does not provide a private right of action. However, the court agreed with the district court that Lansuppe has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment ordering distribution of Soloso's assets according to the terms of the indenture and that Intervenors' cross‐claims failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order distributing the assets of the trust according to the terms of the trust's governing indenture. View "Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, Inc." on Justia Law
Benzemann v. Houslanger & Associates, PLLC
A Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) violation "occurs," for the purposes of the FDCPA's one‐year statute of limitations, when an individual is injured by the alleged unlawful conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's FDCPA claim. The court held that plaintiff's claim was time-barred because plaintiff filed suit one year and one day after Citibank froze his accounts. Furthermore, even if the discovery rule applied to FDCPA claims as a general matter, plaintiff's claim was still time-barred. Finally, plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not diligently pursue his rights. View "Benzemann v. Houslanger & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law
Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc.
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of Vermont and federal law when the terms of their loan agreements provided for interest rates well in excess of caps imposed by Vermont law. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against tribal officers in charge of Plain Green and an award of money damages against other defendants.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to compel arbitration. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar this suit because plaintiffs may sue tribal officers under a theory analogous to Ex parte Young for prospective, injunctive relief based on violations of state and substantive federal law occurring off of tribal lands. The court also held that the arbitration clauses of the loan agreements were unenforceable and unconscionable. View "Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc." on Justia Law
Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
US Bank appealed the district court's dismissal of its second amended consolidated complaint as untimely. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that ACE Secs. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25 N.Y.3d 581 (2015), and Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861, 868 n.8 (2d Cir. 2015), governed U.S. Bank's contractual claims in this case.The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to GreenPoint where the first two causes of action for breach of contract were untimely under settled New York law, because they were filed over six years after the statute of limitations began running. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed the third cause of action for indemnification under section 9 of the Flow Mortgage Loan Purchase and Warranties Agreement, because U.S. Bank's claim was in reality a repackaged version of its breach of contract claims. Finally, the court held that the fourth cause of action for breach of the indemnification agreements did relate back to the original filing for claims based on any of the Trusts, and was therefore untimely asserted. View "Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law
Doe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a judgment creditor's request for attachment and turnover of blocked electronic funds transfers (ETF) under Section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. In Calderon-Cardona v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 770 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 2014), and Hausler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 770 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam), the court held that blocked wire transfers held at an intermediary bank are subject to execution under Section 201(a) only if the judgment debtor or an agency or instrumentality of the judgment debtor "transmitted the EFT directly to the bank where the EFT is held pursuant to the block."In this case, the court held that neither Grand Stores nor Tajco had any attachable property interest in the blocked funds at JPMorgan since they were not the entities that directly passed the EFTs to JPMorgan. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the blocked funds were not attachable under Section 201(a). View "Doe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law
National Credit Union Administration Board v. US Bank National Association
NCUA, an independent federal agency responsible for regulating and insuring federal credit unions, liquidated five corporate credit unions and succeeded to ownership of their assets, including residential mortgage-backed securities trusts (RMBS Trusts). NCUA subsequently brought common law and statutory claims against the trustees of the RMBS Trusts. The district court twice dismissed the derivative claims and subsequently denied NCUA's motion for leave to supplement its Second Amended Complaint (SAC).The Second Circuit followed the plain language of the contracts under which NCUA transferred the RMBS Trust certificates, and held that the district court correctly found that NCUA lacked derivative standing to bring claims based on those certificates. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied NCUA's motion for leave to supplement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Credit Union Administration Board v. US Bank National Association" on Justia Law
Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza
Because existing New York law does not clearly settle whether claims for interest on principal continue to accrue after a claim for the principal itself is time‐barred, the Second Circuit certified questions pertaining to that issue to the New York Court of Appeals: 1. If a bond issuer remains obligated to make biannual interest payments until the principal is paid, including after the date of maturity, see NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 17 N.Y.3d 250, 928 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2011), do enforceable claims for such biannual interest continue to accrue after a claim for the principal of the bonds is time‐barred? 2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," can interest claims arise ad infinitum as long as the principal remains unpaid, or are there limiting principles that apply? View "Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza" on Justia Law
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp.
Schwab filed suit seeking to recover for harm allegedly resulting from a conspiracy among major banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The district court dismissed Schwab's state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed both federal and certain state-law claims for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit vacated portions of the district court's judgment that dismissed Schwab's state-law claims concerning products sold in California for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissed Schwab's Securities Exchange Act claims premised on misrepresentations and omissions that induced the purchase of floating-rate instruments on or after April 27, 2008; and dismissed Schwab's unjust enrichment claims against counterparties or a wrongdoer's affiliates as time-barred. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law
Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Judgment creditors of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security sought to enforce underlying judgments obtaining the turnover of $1.68 billion in bond proceeds allegedly owned by Bank Markazi. The Second Circuit held that the settlement agreements released plaintiffs' non-turnover claims with respect to some but not all of the banks; the assets at issue were in fact located abroad, but that those assets may nonetheless be subject to turnover under state law pursuant to an exercise of the court's in personam jurisdiction, inasmuch as the district court has the authority under New York State law to direct a non‐sovereign in possession of a foreign sovereignʹs extraterritorial assets to bring those assets to New York State; and those assets will not ultimately be subject to turnover, however, unless the district court concludes on remand that such in personam jurisdiction exists and the assets, were they to be recalled, would not be protected from turnover by execution immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law
Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc.
FHFA, as conservator for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and analogous "Blue Sky laws," the Virginia Securities Act, and the D.C. Securities Act. The FHFA alleged that representations regarding underwriting criteria for certificates tied to private-label securitizations (PLLs) was a material misstatement. The district court rendered judgment in favor of the FHFA under Sections 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act, and analogous provisions of the Virginia and D.C. Blue Sky laws. The district court also awarded rescission and ordered defendants to refund the FHFA a total adjusted purchase price of approximately $806 million in exchange for the certificates. The Second Circuit found no merit in defendants' argument and held that defendants failed to discharge their duty under the Securities Act to disclose fully and fairly all of the information necessary for investors to make an informed decision whether to purchase the certificates at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc." on Justia Law