Justia Banking Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
First Midwest Bank v. Reinbold
The debtor obtained a commercial loan from Bank. The agreement dated March 9, 2015, granted Bank a security interest in substantially all of the debtor’s assets, described in 26 categories of collateral, such as accounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and all proceeds of any assets. Bank filed a financing statement with the Illinois Secretary of State, to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9, 2015.” Two years later, the debtor defaulted and filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Bank sought to recover $7.6 million on the loan and filed a declaration that its security interest was properly perfected and senior to the interests of all other claimants. The trustee countered that the security interest was not properly perfected because its financing statement did not independently describe the underlying collateral, but instead incorporated the list of assets by reference, and cited 11 U.S.C. 544(a), which empowers a trustee to avoid interests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition date. The bankruptcy court ruled that ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any description of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice” required by UCC Article 9. The trustee sold the assets for $1.9 million and holds the proceeds pending resolution of this dispute. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the plain and ordinary meaning of the Illinois UCC statute, and how courts typically treat financing statements. View "First Midwest Bank v. Reinbold" on Justia Law
Fifth Third Mortgage Company v. Kaufman
Ahmed co‐owned an LLC that owned a condominium building. Ahmed recruited individuals to pose as buyers for the building's units and to submit fraudulent loan applications to lenders, including Fifth Third. The participants split the loan proceeds; no payments were made on the loans. Kaufman was the seller's attorney for every closing. The closings were conducted by Traditional Title at Kaufman’s law office. Traditional received closing instructions from Fifth Third to notify it immediately of any misrepresentations and to suspend the transaction if “the closing agent has knowledge that the borrower does not intend to occupy the property.” Kaufman concealed the buyers’ misrepresentations and instructed closing agents to complete closings even when buyers were purchasing multiple properties. Ahmed and Kaufman extended the scheme to other buildings. Although Kaufman testified that he was not aware of the fraud, Ahmed testified that Kaufman knew the buyers were part of the scheme. Two closing agents testified that they informed Kaufman about misrepresentations in loan applications. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a fraud judgment for Fifth Third. Kaufman participated individually in each closing as counsel and personally directed Traditional’s employees to conceal the fraud from Fifth Third, for his personal gain. The judgment against Kaufman was not derived solely from Traditional’s liability, based on his membership in the LLC, so the Illinois LLC Act does not bar his liability. Kaufman is not shielded by being the attorney for the seller in the fraudulent transactions. View "Fifth Third Mortgage Company v. Kaufman" on Justia Law
Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C.
Attorney Kohn, on behalf of Unifund, filed suit against Burton in Brown County, Wisconsin for failure to make payments on a Citibank credit agreement. In his answer, Burton stated, “I have never had any association with Unifund ... and do not know who you are or what you are talking about, so I strongly dispute this debt.” He asserted counterclaims, alleging that his personal information had been compromised; that Unifund had failed to provide him notice of his right to cure the default before filing suit; and that there was a “Lack of Privity” because he “ha[d] never entered into any contractual or debtor/creditor arrangements” with Unifund. While that action was pending, Burton sued in federal district court, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, and the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA). The state court dismissed Kohn’s action against Burton on the basis of Burton’s denial that he was the individual who had incurred the underlying debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of Kohn and Unifund, finding that the FDCPA or WCA claims could not proceed because Burton failed to present sufficient evidence that the debt incurred on the Citibank account was for personal, family, or household purposes and therefore a “consumer debt.” View "Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C." on Justia Law
Doherty v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Doherty and Farano formed Worth. The bank loaned Worth $400,000, with their personal guaranties. The bank extended the loan’s maturity date multiple times. Worth defaulted. The bank sued Worth, Farano, and Doherty. Doherty, an attorney, filed an appearance on behalf of himself and Worth and raised affirmative defenses, including that the bank extended the loan without authorization and charged fees and an interest rate not agreed upon. The court entered a default judgment for the loan balance against Farano. Doherty later received a report from a forensic document examiner, opining that his signature had been forged on loan extension paperwork. The bank dismissed its claims against Worth and Doherty without prejudice. Over a year later, Doherty sued the bank and individuals, alleging breach of contract, forgery, excessive fees, fraud, legal malpractice, and malicious prosecution. The trial court dismissed, holding that most of Doherty’s claims were barred by res judicata because he should have brought them in the guaranty action. Before Doherty’s appeal was heard, the bank went into the FDIC receivership. The FDIC removed this action to federal district court, which adopted the Illinois court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Res judicata does not bar Doherty’s claims. None of the cited Illinois cases address this situation; similar cases suggest that applying the doctrine would be inappropriate. Applying res judicata here neither advances the purposes of res judicata nor meaningfully serves the interests of judicial economy. View "Doherty v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law
Bernal v. NRA Group, LLC
Bernal bought a monthly pass to Six Flags amusement parks. The contract said that if he fell behind on his payments, he would “be billed for any amounts that are due and owing plus any costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) incurred by [Six Flags] in attempting to collect amounts due.” After Bernal missed several monthly payments, Six Flags hired AR, a debt collector. Under their contract, AR could charge Six Flags a 5% management fee plus an additional amount based on the number of days the debt was delinquent (in this case, an additional 20%), as is common in the market. AR hired NRA, a subcontractor, which sent Bernal a collection letter asking for the $267.31 he owed, plus $43.28 in costs. Reasoning that it could not have cost $43.28 to mail a single collection letter, Bernal filed a class-action lawsuit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that NRA charged a fee not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for NRA. A debt collector’s fee counts as a collection cost under that language. The contract unambiguously permits Six Flags to recover any cost it incurs in collecting past-due payments, and that includes a standard collection fee. View "Bernal v. NRA Group, LLC" on Justia Law
Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union
Carello is blind. To access online visual content, he uses a “screen reader,” which reads text aloud to him from websites that are designed to support its software. Carello claims that the Credit Union website fails to offer such support. The Illinois Credit Union Act requires that credit union membership be open only to groups of people who share a “common bond,” including “[p]ersons belonging to a specific association, group or organization,” “[p]ersons who reside in a reasonably compact and well-defined neighborhood or community,” and “[p]ersons who have a common employer.” The Credit Union limits its membership to specified local government employees. Membership is required before an individual may use any Credit Union services. Carello is not eligible for, nor has he expressed any interest in, Credit Union membership. He is a tester: he visits websites solely to test Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance, which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of [their] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,” and requires them to make “reasonable modifications” to achieve that standard, 42 U.S.C. 12812(a), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Carello’s claim. Carello lacked standing to sue because he failed to allege an injury in fact. View "Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union" on Justia Law
Builders Bank, LLC v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
After a 2015 examination, the FDIC assigned Builders Bank a CAMELS (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk) rating of 4, which exposed the bank to extra oversight. After the Seventh Circuit concluded that some components of a CAMELS rating are open to judicial review, Builders merged into a non-bank enterprise and left the banking business. The district court dismissed the remanded suit as moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim for damages based on paying too much for deposit insurance. The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, waives the government’s sovereign immunity but establishes a right of review only when “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” There is a potential remedy under 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)(1), which says: In the case of any payment of an assessment by an insured depository institution in excess of the amount due, the Corporation may refund the amount of the excess payment to the insured institution or credit such excess amount toward the payment of subsequent assessments. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, waives immunity for such a suit but limits venue to the Claims Court. Builders did not cite the FDIC’s sue-and-be-sued clause, 12 U.S.C. 1819(a), as an alternative waiver. Apart from those that affect subject-matter jurisdiction, legal contentions must be presented in the district court. This suit was litigated on remand under the APA, so it fails. View "Builders Bank, LLC v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law
Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC
In 2006 Trinity borrowed about $2 million from a bank, secured by a mortgage. The bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin, which relied on Midland to collect the payments. In 2013, Midland recorded a “satisfaction,” stating that the loan had been paid and the mortgage released. The loan was actually still outstanding. Trinity continued paying. In 2015, ColFin realized Midland’s mistake and recorded a document canceling the satisfaction. Trinity stopped paying. ColFin filed a state court foreclosure action. Trinity commenced a bankruptcy proceeding, which stayed the foreclosure, then filed an adversary action against ColFin, contending that the release extinguished the debt and security interest. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected that argument and an argument that the matter was moot because the property had been sold under the bankruptcy court’s auspices. There is a live controversy about who should get the sale proceeds; 11 U.S.C. 363(m), which protects the validity of the sale, does not address the disposition of the proceeds. Under Illinois law, Trinity did not obtain rights from the 2013 filing, which was unilateral and without consideration; no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on the release, so ColFin could rescind it. ColFin caught the problem before Trinity filed its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected on the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to ColFin’s interest. View "Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC" on Justia Law
Bunn v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
After its appointment as receiver for Valley Bank Illinois, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) disaffirmed a benefits agreement between Valley Bank and Bunn, a bank executive. Bunn sued the FDIC to recover a “change of control termination benefit” he claims he is entitled to receive pursuant to that agreement. The district court granted the FDIC summary judgment, finding the benefit Bunn sought was a “golden parachute payment” prohibited by federal law, 12 U.S.C. 1828(k)(4)(A)(i). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The benefit is a contingent payment that Bunn could only receive upon his termination of employment with Valley Bank; any payment of the benefit would be after a receiver was appointed for Valley Bank. Bunn presented no evidence sufficient to establish the benefit qualifies for the bona fide deferred compensation plan exception to such a golden parachute payment. View "Bunn v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law
Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605 (RESPA), requires that a loan servicer, no later than 30 days after receiving a borrower's “qualified written request” for information, take one of three specific actions and provides a private right of action for actual damages resulting from violations. Wis. Stat. 224.77 prohibits mortgage brokers from violating "any federal or state statute.” Terrence purchased his house in 2006 with a Deutsche Bank mortgage, serviced by Wells Fargo. His wife, Dixie, used an inheritance to help buy the house but was never named on the title, mortgage, or promissory note. Despite a forbearance plan and two loan modifications, Terrance defaulted. Deutsche Bank filed a second foreclosure action. In 2012, the Wisconsin court entered a foreclosure judgment. Terrance filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, resulting in an automatic stay. In 2015, the parties entered into a third modification. Terrance again failed to make payments and converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, triggering another stay. In 2016 the bankruptcy court entered a discharge. The sheriff’s sale was rescheduled. In August 2016, Terrance sent Wells Fargo a letter, asking 22 wide-ranging questions about his account. Wells Fargo confirmed receipt immediately, indicating that it would respond on September 30. Two days before the RESPA deadline for response, the owners moved to reopen the foreclosure case and obtained another stay. They also filed a federal suit under RESPA and state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Dixie lacked standing. Terrance failed to show that he suffered out-of-pocket expenses as a result of any alleged RESPA violation. View "Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law