Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Rufini purchased his Sonoma residence with a $600,000 loan. Rufini and his fiancée lived in the home until they separated. In June 2009, CitiMortgage approved Rufini for a loan modification and told him he would receive a permanent modification after making timely trial payments of $2787.93 in July, August and September. Rufini timely made the payments at the modified rate through December. In January, 2010, CitiMortgage informed him that his permanent loan modification agreement would be ready in three days. Three months later, with still no written agreement, he rented out his house to offset expenses In August Rufini learned that Citibank was denying his loan modification, because the home was not owner-occupied. He attempted to make timely mortgage payments at the modified level, but CitiMortgage returned his checks. Rufini received a notice of default in September 2010, followed by a notice of trustee’s sale scheduled for January 2011. He contacted CitiMortgage and obtained its agreement to delay the foreclosure. CitiMortgage assigned Semien to Rufini’s account, but Rufini was unable to contact him on the phone for three and a half weeks. On April 11 Rufini was informed his modification was “in final state of completion.” On May 4, his house was sold at auction. The trial court dismissed Rufini’s complaint alleging “breach of contract—promissory estoppel,” breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair business practices, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court reversed and remanded the claims of negligent representation and under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law. View "Rufini v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

Bormes, an attorney, tendered the filing fee for a lawsuit via pay.gov, which the federal courts use to facilitate electronic payments. The web site sent him an email receipt that included the last four digits of his credit card’s number, plus the card’s expiration date. Bormes, claiming that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1) allows a receipt to contain one or the other, but not both, filed suit against the United States seeking damages. In an earlier appeal the Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), does not waive sovereign immunity on a suit seeking to collect damages for an asserted violation of FCRA and remanded for determination of “whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under 1681n.” The Seventh Circuit held that although the United States has waived immunity against damages actions of this kind, it did not violate the statute on the merits. The statute as written applies to receipts “printed … at the point of the sale or transaction.” The email receipt that Bormes received met neither requirement. View "Bormes v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant used NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. to apply for a mortgage and paid NVR Mortgage a broker fee. More than three but fewer than twelve years later, Appelalnt sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (collectively, NVR) for allegedly violating Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Appellant and similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6), which is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question of law in the negative, holding that an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to the default three-year statute of limitations. View "NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of a fraudulent scheme in which he allowed an attorney to take title to his home and strip it of its equity by granting a new mortgage. Plaintiff filed suit against the mortgagee in an effort to avoid foreclosure. A federal district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that the mortgage was void. The district court denied Plaintiff’s subsequent motion to amend his complaint. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and the denial of his motion for leave to amend, holding (1) Plaintiff’s complaint provided no legal basis for making the bank liable for the attorney’s wrongdoing; and (2) Plaintiff failed adequately to plead facts supporting his proposed amendments to his complaint, and therefore, his new claims were also futile.View "Giuffre v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Countrywide and others involved in their residential mortgage, alleging violations of numerous federal statutes. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that plaintiffs can state a claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., without pleading that they have tendered, or that they have the ability to tender, the value of their loan; only at the summary judgment stage may a court order the statutory sequence altered and require tender before rescission - and then only on a case-by-case basis; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' rescission claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, although the limitations period in the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2614, ordinarily runs from the date of the alleged RESPA violation, the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the violation; just as for TILA claims, district courts may evaluate RESPA claims case-by-case; and, therefore, in this case, the court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' Section 8 of RESPA claims on limitations grounds and remanded for reconsideration. View "Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Haddad bought his condominium in 1991 and lived in the unit until 2005, when he began renting it out. In 2008, a law firm, representing the association, sent Haddad a notice of delinquency, stating that Haddad owed $803 in unpaid condominium assessments, $40 in late charges, and $55 in legal fees and costs. Haddad notified the firm that he disputed the amount demanded, that he had never missed a monthly dues payment, but that he had been “singled out and charged with various violations” by the management company. Correspondence continued for several months, with the amount owed increasing each month and Haddad contesting the charges. The law firm ultimately recorded a Notice of Lien, which was discharged about six months later. Haddad sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act, alleging use of a false, deceptive or misleading representation in the collection of a debt, and continuing collection of a disputed debt before verification of the debt. The district court rejected the claims on the ground that the debt was commercial because the unit was rented when collection began. The Sixth Circuit court reversed, holding that an obligation to pay assessments arose from the original purchase and constituted a “debt” under the FDCPA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment, finding that the firm had properly verified the debt and that the collection efforts were not deceptive or misleading. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, based on failure to properly verify the debt.View "Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC" on Justia Law

n November 2005, Appellant Richard Mitchell obtained title to property located in Alpharetta and executed a security deed in favor of MERS, who subsequently assigned the security deed to Wells Fargo as trustee. The property was foreclosed upon after Appellants Richard (and his wife Deborah) became delinquent on their mortgage payments. Wells Fargo purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Since that time, Appellants admitted that they made numerous "dilatory filings," proceeding pro se, in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In May 2010, Mitchell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for a bill of peace pursuant to OCGA 23-3-110 against Mitchell as a measure to end Mitchell's "meritless filings" in state court. The trial court issued an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell had not properly served Wells Fargo. The court also granted Wells Fargo's motion for a bill of peace, finding that the records of Fulton County courts reflected "nothing less than repeated and contemptuous behavior in the courts of this State" and that the lengthy history of filings in federal court showed a pattern of behavior by Mitchell consistent with his state filings. The court permanently enjoined Mitchell from filing any pleading or complaint related to the foreclosure and eviction from the property at issue for a period of five years unless Mitchell first received written approval from the court. Mitchell moved to set aside the order granting the bill of peace, which the court denied. The Mitchells appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently procured a mortgage on her home, and thereafter sought to foreclose on that mortgage, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the New York General Business Law, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, and common law. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, ruling that, because plaintiff failed to disclose these claims in a 2006 proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, her present suit was barred for lack of standing or by collateral estoppel. The court considered all of the parties' arguments and, except to the extent indicated, have found them to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment in regards to the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in her favor and the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing her claims under RICO, ECOA, New York Business Law 349, and for negligent misrepresentation. The court vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of TILA and for common-law fraud, and remanded for further proceedings.View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. As the receiver of the Buckhead Community Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sued nine former officers and directors of the bank, alleging that they were negligent with respect to the making of loans, which, according to the FDIC, led the bank, to suffer nearly $22 million in losses. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the business judgment rule relieved officers and directors of any liability for ordinary negligence. The FDIC responded that such a business judgment rule is no part of the common law in Georgia, and even if it were, it did not apply to bank officers and directors, insofar as the statutory law in Georgia explicitly requires bank officers and directors to exercise ordinary diligence and care. Unable to "discern clear and controlling precedent the federal district court asked: "[d]oes the business judgment rule in Georgia preclude as a matter of law a claim for ordinary negligence against the officers and directors of a bank in a lawsuit brought by the FDIC as receiver for the bank?" The Georgia Court answered that question in the negative. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Nutter, alleging that Nutter was liable for conspiring with Savings First to violate the Maryland Finder's Fee Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-801 to 12-809. Plaintiff borrowed from Savings First in a reverse mortgage transaction and then Nutter purchased the mortgage from Savings First. The court agreed with the district court that Nutter could not be a violator of section 12-804(e) because that statute regulates only mortgage brokers and Nutter was not a "mortgage broker" in the transaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nutter.View "Marshall v. James B. Nutter & Co." on Justia Law