Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against their sons, their former attorney, a limited liability company (SMP), and others, challenging the validity of their mortgages delivered to SMP. Without first seeking mediation, SMP counterclaimed to foreclose on a mortgage granted by Plaintiffs on their agricultural property. The district court foreclosed the mortgage and denied Plaintiffs' motion to quash or stay the sheriff's sale. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to foreclose on the agricultural property because SMP had not first obtained a mediation release as required by Iowa Code 654A.6(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SMP was not required to obtain the mediation release prior to filing a counterclaim to foreclose its mortgage.View "Schaefer v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained a home loan from Mann Mortgage and executed of deed of trust (DOT) naming the lender. Borrowers also signed a promissory note, which was endorsed to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was identified in the DOT as the beneficiary of the note. Borrowers later defaulted on the note. MERS then assigned its interest in the DOT to Greenpoint, and Greenpoint assigned the servicing rights to Countrywide Home Loans. Following a series of cancelled foreclosure sales, Borrowers filed a complaint against MERS, Greenpoint, and Countrywide (collectively, Lenders), alleging that they lacked the authority to foreclose. The district court granted summary judgment for Lenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lenders because (1) MERS did not qualify as a beneficiary of the DOT under Montana's Small Tract Financing Act; and (2) MERS' agency relationship with the lender was not sufficiently established to warrant summary judgment. View "Pilgeram v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these cases were judgment debtors whose bank accounts were frozen by judgment creditors in anticipation of enforcement of a money judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52. Plaintiffs brought putative class actions in federal court seeking injunctive relief and money damages against their banks on the grounds that their bank accounts were restrained in violation of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA), which requires banks, when served with restraining notices by judgment creditors, to forward certain notices and forms to judgment debtors. In these cases, the banks allegedly failed to send the required forms. The district courts granted the banks' motions to dismiss, concluding that the EIPA does not imply a private right of action. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) a private right to bring a plenary action for injunctive relief and money damages cannot be implied from the EIPA; but (2) a judgment debtor can secure relief from a bank arising from a violation of the EIPA in an Article 52 special proceeding.View "Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The underlying class action here was brought against Southern Financial Life Insurance Company, which sold credit life and disability insurance through lending institutions, by purchasers of Southern Financial's credit life and disability policies. During the discovery phase, the trial court entered an order compelling Southern Financial to produce certain loan information and documents regarding the putative class members and the insurance sold to them. Southern Financial did not comply with the order, arguing that the loan information was not in its "possession, custody or control" within the meaning of Ky. R. Civ. P. 34.01, but rather, the information was in the possession of the individual lenders. After applying principles of general agency law, the trial court overruled the objection. Southern Financial subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court's enforcement of the discovery order. The court of appeals declined to issue a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Southern Financial was legally in control of the information it was compelled to disclose in the trial court's order, and therefore, the trial court committed no error.View "S. Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Pike Circuit Court" on Justia Law

McCluskey executed a promissory note for $330,186, on a Naperville property, with Wells Fargo as the mortgage holder. After service in foreclosure proceedings, McCluskey did not answer or plead. An order of default and judgment of foreclosure entered. After failed negotiations on a loan modification and a rescheduled sale date, Wells Fargo was the successful bidder on the property for a price of $235,985.69. Before Wells Fargo moved to confirm the sale, McCluskey moved to vacate the default judgment and set aside the sale under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the Foreclosure Law (15-1508(b)). The trial court denied her motion and confirmed the sale. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court could exercise discretion under civil procedure law, even after a judicial sale, if the movant could present a compelling excuse for lack of diligence and a meritorious defense. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. After a motion to confirm a judicial sale, foreclosure law governs and provides standards for exercise of discretion in dealing with a motion to vacate. At that point, it is not sufficient under the foreclosure statute to merely raise a meritorious defense to the complaint. In this case, the motion to vacate preceded the motion to confirm, so the trial court could have considered the motion to vacate under civil procedure law. Under these facts, however, the court did not err in denying the motion, even under that more liberal standard. McCluskey admitted her default, was properly served, and had notice of the default, the judgment of foreclosure, and the sale, then later raised pleading defenses for the first time.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v. McCluskey" on Justia Law

After Susan Cavanaugh defaulted on her loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home she shared with her husband, the bank that was the beneficiary of the deed of trust made two forestalled attempts at a trustee's sale. The bank then elected to proceed by judicial foreclosure. The district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure, finding that the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a statutory right of redemption. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a one-year right of redemption because their property was foreclosed by judicial procedure rather than by advertisement and sale; and (2) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a right of redemption because their property was a multi-family residence, as the Cavanaughs' home was a single family residence at the time the deed of trust was executed.View "Cavanaugh v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case.View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Edwin Miller Investments, LLC ("EMI") owned twelve acres of real estate used to secure a loan from BCBank, which assigned the note and deed of trust to CGP Development Co. ("CGP"). The State became the legal owner of eight acres of EMI's property after it paid $241,000 into court following a condemnation action. EMI defaulted on its loan, and CGP purchased the remaining four acres at a foreclosure sale. The circuit court ordered release of the $241,000 paid into court to CGP in partial satisfaction of CGP's lien. EMI and CGP disagreed as to which party was entitled to additional proceeds paid as damages to the four-acre residue as well as additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight acres. The circuit court concluded that CGP was entitled to all of the condemnation proceeds and dismissed EMI from the condemnation proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that CGP was entitled to all sums awarded for damage to the four-acre residue purchase by CGP; but (2) reversed the circuit court's finding that CPG was entitled to any additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight-acre tract and the court's dismissal of EMI from the condemnation proceedings. Remanded.View "Edwin Miller Invs. v. CGP Dev. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents, the Castro family, executed a mortgage encumbering their property that was assigned to Petitioner, U.S. Bank. When the Castros defaulted on their loan, U.S. Bank purchased the property at a foreclosure auction. Because the Castros failed to vacate the property as instructed, U.S. bank filed a two complaints for summary possession and ejectment against the Castros. The district court entered a judgment for possession and a writ of possession in favor of U.S. Bank and a separate order granting summary judgment for U.S. Bank. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the action was one in which title to real estate would come into question. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the Castros failed to demonstrate the action was one in which title to the subject property would come into question. View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Castro" on Justia Law

In post-judgment proceedings, a judgment creditor garnished the funds in bank accounts held by the judgment debtor jointly with the debtor's nondebtor children. The children petitioned for relief, claiming that the garnished funds belonged to them alone. The district court summarily denied the children's petition and claims, concluding that the claims were not properly made and were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment creditor may garnish only a debtor's funds that are held in a joint bank account, not the funds in the account owned solely by the nondebtor; and (2) because the children's claims to the funds were timely and properly made, the district court erred in dismissing their petition without a hearing. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the garnished funds actually belonged, and thus must be returned, to the nondebtor children.View "Brooksby v. Nev. State Bank" on Justia Law