Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

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This case arose when Meritage submitted an administrative claim to the FDIC. The FDIC disallowed Meritage's administrative claim and Meritage then filed suit. Meritage obtained a default judgment against the FDIC and the FDIC provided Meritage with a receiver's certificate in the amount of the judgment. The FDIC also filed with the district court a Satisfaction of Judgment. Meritage sought to have the district court strike the FDIC's Satisfaction of Judgment and instead direct the FDIC to pay the judgment in cash. Subsequently, on appeal, Meritage challenged the district court's judgment and challenged orders denying its motion to strike or, in the alternative, issue a summons to certain third parties to this action and denying its motion for reconsideration. The court held that the district court's denial of Meritage's request for a summons was to be reviewed for clear error. On the merits, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the receiver's certificate satisfied the judgment against the FDIC. The court also held that the district court did not commit clear error in declining to issue a summons to Rescon and Stearns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Meritage Homes of Nevada v. FDIC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff (the customer) filed suit against State Street (the custodian bank), alleging in essence that it had a duty to notify him that the securities in his account were worthless. The district court granted State Street's motion to dismiss the contract claims on the ground that State Street had a merely administrative role in managing plaintiff's accounts and thus owed him no duty to guard against his investment advisor's misconduct. The district court concluded that plaintiff's negligence claims were barred by Florida's economic loss rule and plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged knowledge on the part of State Street in regards to the aiding and abetting claims. The court affirmed, holding that, under these facts, the custodian bank breached no duty, contractual or otherwise, by accepting on behalf of its customer securities that later turn out to be fraudulent and listing those securities on monthly account statements issued to the customer. Plaintiff's allegations failed to state claims for breach of contract; plaintiff failed to establish that State Street owed him an independent duty to monitor the investments in his account, verify their market value, or ensure they were in valid form; therefore, he failed to state valid negligence claims; plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to state a claim for aiding and abetting; and plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation also failed. View "Lamm v. State Street Bank and Trust" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after plaintiffs failed to make the required payments on their home equity loan. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims. Determining that the court had appellate jurisdiction, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to controvert evidence that a letter was indeed sent to them notifying them of the change to their loan servicer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Bank of America's and Deutsche Banks' motion for summary judgment in part on plaintiffs' Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 2 U.S.C. 2605, claim. The court concluded that plaintiffs have made no factual allegations that Morgan Stanley was involved in the alleged unlawful conduct in connection with plaintiffs' home equity loan and the district court did not err in granting Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The district court also did not err in granting Barrett Daffin's motion to dismiss. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Haase, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff obtained a loan secured with a promissory note and mortgage on his Massachusetts home. The mortgage document listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as mortgagee and nominee for the lender’s successors and assigns. MERS subsequently assigned Butler’s mortgage to Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (Deutsche Bank). Deutsche Bank foreclosed on Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff filed suit against Deutsche Bank for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and unfair and deceptive business practices under Massachusetts law, alleging that Deutsche Bank lacked legal possession over both his mortgage and accompanying note, making it an improper party to foreclose. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the foreclosure sales were in accordance with the relevant statutory law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, holding (1) Deutsche Bank need not have possessed Plaintiff’s note, and (2) Plaintiff failed to state any other colorable claim on which relief might be granted. View "Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac, asserting several deficiencies with the foreclosure of his home and seeking to quiet title to the property in himself. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found that Wells Fargo was holder of the note and, thus, was entitled to appoint a successor trustee to the deed of trust; the court rejected plaintiff's argument that Missouri law required Wells Fargo to produce the original note at the time of the foreclosure proceeding; and plaintiff failed to provide clear and satisfactory evidence that the foreclosure sale was conducted improperly, more particularly that the statutory notice requirements were not met. Having determined that plaintiff's wrongful foreclosure action failed, plaintiff cannot show that he has superior title to the property, and therefore, could not succeed on his quiet title action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lackey, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against the Bank seeking to void a mortgage foreclosure sale of their home. Plaintiffs alleged that the Bank represented orally that it would postpone the foreclosure sale, but then proceeded to foreclose anyway. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claim of negligent misrepresentation was barred by the Minnesota Credit Agreement Status, Minn. Stat. 513.33, where any party asserting the existence of a credit agreement must comply with the writing and signature requirements of section 513.33. The court concluded that the complaint alleged a claim of promissory estoppel, rather than equitable estoppel, and was barred by the Minnesota Credit Agreement Statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss. View "Bracewell, et al. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

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The Bank sought to vacate an arbitration award in favor of 21st Century. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the Bank had actual or constructive notice of the arbitration; the record contained several communications showing that various bank organizers knew of the forthcoming proceedings; and because the Bank had actual or constructive notice and Bernstein Seawell & Kove v. Bosarge requires no more, the court did not need to decide whether 21st Century failed to comply with section 15.2 of the Agreement. The court also concluded that the contract did not expressly require senior management to engage in negotiations; even if senior management were required to engage in a second round of negotiations, the Agreement did not expressly condition the ability to arbitrate a dispute on failed senior management negotiations; and the record supported the district court's finding regarding good-faith negotiations on the operational level. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "21st Century Financial Services v. Manchester Financial Bank" on Justia Law

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After Westernbank of Puerto Rico was ordered closed in the late 2000s and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) was appointed receiver, the FDIC discovered that certain bank directors and officers had breached their fiduciary duty by jeopardizing the bank’s financial soundness, causing over $176 million in damages to the bank. The directors and officers asked their insurer, Chartis Insurance Company, to confirm coverage under a directors’ and officers’ liability-insurance policy issued by Chartis to Westerbank’s owner, W Holding Company, Inc. Chartis denied coverage. The directors and officers and the FDIC sued Chartis. In this “procedurally complicated” case, a district judge eventually issued an order requiring Chartis to advance defense costs to the directors and officers. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to hear the parties; and (2) the district judge did not err in making its cost-advancement ruling. View "W Holding Co., Inc. v. AIG Ins. Co. - P.R." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff refinanced his residential home mortgage, taking out a loan secured by his home. The mortgage listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the mortgagee of record. MERS subsequently transferred the mortgage. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee for RMAC Pass-Through Trust, eventually obtained the mortgage. After Wells Fargo sold Serra’s property at foreclosure, Serra brought suit in Massachusetts state court asserting, among other claims, claims for wrongful foreclosure and unfair or deceptive business practices based on his theory that MERS lacked the authority to transfer his mortgage. Serra’s suit was removed on the basis of diversity, and summary judgment as to all claims was entered against Serra. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under Massachusetts law, MERS may validly possess and transfer a legal interest in a mortgage; (2) subsequent mortgage assignees cannot incur liability for the allegedly predatory practices of their predecessor-in-interest; and (3) Plaintiff’s argument that his right to rescission was improperly cut short by the sale of his property was without merit. View "Serra v. Quantum Servicing Corp." on Justia Law

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Malone owned a cattle feedlot. He cared for cattle, including some owned by GLS, and worked as an agent of GLS to buy cattle. Anderson was president of GLS, which was owned by others. GLS’s cattle were collateral for its loans. In 2008, the feedlot started losing money, jeopardizing Malone’s business and GLS’s loans. Malone and Anderson began kiting checks; one would write a check to the other, and before it was collected, the other would write a check back to the first. Malone was overdrawn by $400,000 in 2009. Malone and Anderson arranged to sell O’Hern 700 cattle. O’Hern paid $400,000, which Malone deposited to his overdrawn bank account. In reality, there were no cattle. Malone gave O’Hern $115,000. Unsatisfied, O’Hern visited the feedlot and removed cattle that did not belong to Malone; obtained liens on property owned by Malone and Anderson; and filed a state court civil suit. Malone pled guilty to bank fraud and money laundering. He urged the district judge to refrain from ordering restitution, arguing that O’Hern had already received full recovery and that the judge exercise her discretion under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(3)(B), because the need to compensate O’Hern was outweighed by the burden of determining complex issues regarding his losses. The judge imposed restitution of $285,000, stating that she had no discretion under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as supported by the preponderance of the evidence regarding O’Hern’s loss and the cash returned to him, the only relevant factors. It would have been error for the judge to consider other amounts O’Hern may be adjudged to owe Malone or Anderson in the state court litigation. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law