Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was Ind. Code 6-1.1-24-3(b), which provides that a mortgagee annually request by certified mail a copy of notice that a parcel of real property is eligible for sale under the tax sale statutes. Here a bank, which held a mortgage on certain property, failed to submit a form affirmatively requesting from the county auditor to mail notice of a pending sale of the real property. Therefore, the bank was not notified that its mortgaged property was tax delinquent until after the property had been sold and the buyer requested a tax deed. The buyer filed a petition to direct the county auditor to issue a tax deed for the property, and the bank filed a response challenging the tax sale notice statutes as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court issued an order holding that the statute was unconstitutional and denying the buyer's petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 6-1.1-24-3(b) was constitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded. View "M & M Inv. Group, LLC v. Ahlemeyer Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee Pamela Vukman appealed a superior court order that affirmed the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. That order granted appellees motion to set aside judgment and sheriff's sale, and dismissed appellant Beneficial Consumer Discount Company's praecipe without prejudice. Beneficial moved to foreclose appellee for being in default of her mortgage. The parties agreed to a settlement whereby Beneficial received judgment for the accelerated amount due on the mortgage as long as appellee made regular payments. Appellee eventually defaulted according to the terms of the settlement; Beneficial filed for a writ of execution. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale, and Beneficial was the successful bidder. Appellee then moved to set aside the sale, arguing Beneficial failed to comply with the requirements under the Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Act. The court concluded that Beneficial did not follow the Act's requirements, and as a result, it id not have jurisdiction. Therefore the court set aside the sale and dismissed Beneficial's original complaint. Beneficial appealed; the superior court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's notice requirement did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Beneficial Consumer Discount Company v. Vukman" on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

Mortgage-backed securities, known as the MASTR Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, were offered to the public in 2007. UBS, the sponsor of the Certificates, purchased the underlying loans from originators, including Countrywide Home Loans and IndyMac Bank, then sold the loans to MASTR, which placed the loans into the MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust, the issuer of the Certificates. UBS Securities, the underwriter, sold the Certificates to investors. The Certificates were issued pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form S-3 Registration Statement filed in 2005 and an SEC Form 424B5 Prospectus Supplement filed in 2007. Those documents assured investors that the underlying loans were originated pursuant to particular underwriting policies and in compliance with federal and state laws and regulations. The district court dismissed a purported class action by investors, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77, for failure to plead compliance with the one-year statute of limitations and dismissed an amended complaint as untimely under an inquiry notice standard. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a Securities Act plaintiff need not plead compliance with Section 13 and that Section 13 establishes a discovery standard for evaluating the timeliness of Securities Act claims, but the claims were, nonetheless, untimely. View "Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc." on Justia Law

AmEx is the world’s largest issuer of traveler’s checks, which never expire. AmEx and third-party vendors sell the checks at face value, and AmEx profits by investing the funds until the TC is redeemed. Although most are cashed within a year, AmEx uses the remaining uncashed checks for long-term, high-yield investments. Until recently, every state’s abandoned property laws presumed abandonment of uncashed traveler’s checks 15 years after issuance. This presumption requires the issuer to transfer possession of the funds to the state. In 2008 Kentucky amended KRS 393.060(2) to change thes abandonment period from to seven years. AmEx claims violation of the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause. Following a remand and amendment of the complaint to add a dormant Commerce Clause argument and a claim that the legislation did not apply retroactively to checks that were issued and outstanding prior to the effective date, the district court granted the state summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Hollenbach" on Justia Law

Spring Street, seeking to recover against Bayou and its owner Douglas Lam on defaulted promissory notes, claimed that certain transfers that defendants made were fraudulent: (1) Bayou's transfer of "hard assets" to LT Seafood when LT Seafood took over Bayou's retail operations at the 415 East Hamilton location; (2) Douglas Lam's transfer of his 49% interest in LT Seafood to DKL & DTL; and (3) DKL & DTL's subsequent transfer of this 49% interest to Vinh Ngo. The court concluded that Spring Street could pierce DKL & DTL's corporate veil on the basis of fraud and impose individual liability on the LLC members. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Spring Street with regard to these claims. However, the court concluded that Ten Lam and Ngo have raised a genuine dispute of fact as to both which "hard assets" Bayou transferred to LT Seafood and the value of those assets on the date of the transfer. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in regards to Spring Street's fraudulent transfer claim against Lam and Ngo for the amount of $150,000 and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spring Street Partners v. Lam, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that various foreign investment vehicles secretly funneled investors' assets to Madoff Securities. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against JPMorgan and BNY on the ground that the claims were precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f), and, alternatively, by New York's Martin Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 352 et seq. In this instance, the allegations were more than sufficient to satisfy SLUSA's requirement that the complaint alleged a "misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiffs' claims against JPMorgan and BNY were properly dismissed as precluded by SLUSA. View "Trezziova v. Kohn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated two cases for the purposes of this opinion. Each of the plaintiffs in these cases attended a foreclosure auction, was the successful bidder at that auction, paid money for the auctioned property, and received a foreclosure deed to the property. Each plaintiff brought an ejectment action under Alabama law, claiming good title to the property at issue and the right to eject the original debtor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases, including any issue as to the validity in fact of the plaintiffs' title to the property (this being one of the elements of proof required in an ejectment action). The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in the "Strudivant" case, but affirmed in the "Harris" case. View "Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

U.S. Bank appealed the bankruptcy court's order authorizing AMR and American (collectively, "Debtors") to obtain postpetition financing; authorizing Debtors to repay certain prepetition notes held by U.S. Bank and secured by aircraft; and denying U.S. Bank's request to lift an automatic stay. The court concluded that: (1) under the language of the Indentures, American's voluntary petition for bankruptcy triggered a default and automatically accelerated the debt, the satisfaction of which required no make-whole payment; (2) ipso facto clauses in a nonexecutory contract were not unenforceable under 11 U.S.C. 365(e) or any other Bankruptcy Court provision identified by U.S. Bank; Debtors complied with its 11 U.S.C. 1110(a) elections to perform its obligations under the Indentures and cure any nonexempt defaults by making regularly schedule principal and interest payments; it was not required to cure its Section 4.01(g) default; and (4) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying U.S. Bank's motion to lift the automatic stay. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: AMR Corp." on Justia Law