Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

The FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, challenged the judgment of the lower courts that the tax sharing agreement between NetBank, the parent company, and its subsidiary, Bank, established a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties and awarding the tax refund to the bankruptcy estate of NetBank. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the FDIC, concluding that the parties to the tax sharing agreement in this case intended to create an agency relationship rather than a debtor-creditor relationship with respect to IRS refunds attributable to the Bank. View "FDIC v. Zucker" on Justia Law

Mortgagors appealed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to their lenders in a dispute regarding a home loan. At issue on appeal was whether mailing a notice of rescission within three years of consummating a loan was sufficient to "exercise" the right to rescind a loan transaction under 15 U.S.C. 1635(a) or, alternatively, whether a party seeking to rescind the transaction was required to file a lawsuit within the three-year statutory period. The court held that a party seeking to rescind a loan transaction must file suit within three years of consummating the loan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the lenders. View "Jesinoski, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The defendants, affiliated companies, owned ATMs in Indianapolis bars that were popular with college students. Plaintiffs filed a purported class action, based on violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693b(d)(3). At the time, the Act required a sticker notice on the ATM and an onscreen notification during transactions. Defendants provided onscreen notice but not, according to the complaint, a sticker. The Act has been amended to remove the sticker notice requirement. The district court decertified the class. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the district judge did not provide adequate explanation. While the compensatory function of the class action has no significance in this case, the damages sought by the class, and, more importantly, the attorney’s fee that the court will award if the class prevails, will likely make the suit a wake‐up call and have a deterrent effect on future violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. View "Hughes v. Kore of IN Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Northern Grain Equipment, LLC entered into contracts with Thimjon Farms Partnership and Hagemeister Farms to construct grain-handling systems on their respective properties. Neither Thimjon nor Hagemeister were customers of First International Bank & Trust. Both Thimjon and Hagemeister made down payments to Northern Grain, which were deposited in Northern Grain's account at First International. Northern Grain never constructed the grain-handling systems and discontinued business. Thimjon and Hagemeister brought separate actions against First International, alleging First International's decision to cease loaning money to Northern Grain resulted in Northern Grain breaching its contracts with Thimjon and Hagemeister and that First International intentionally misled Northern Grain to the detriment of Thimjon and Hagemeister. First International moved for summary judgment. While the motion was pending, Thimjon and Hagemeister moved to amend their complaints to add a claim for deceit and to seek exemplary damages. The district court denied the motion to amend, granted First International's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing Thimjon's and Hagemeister's claims with prejudice. Thimjon and Hagemeister appealed, arguing the district court erred by granting First International's motion and by denying their motion to amend. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First International Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as receiver of the New Frontier Bank, used proceeds from the sale of cattle belonging to a limited liability company (LLC) to pay down a loan of one of the two LLC members. According to the complaint, the FDIC had no authority to do so because the payment was contrary to the members' agreement. Ignoring the separate entity status of an LLC, the other LLC member brought suit in its own name against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for what it claimed to be the FDIC's wrongful disbursement of the proceeds. The LLC sued the government under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The district judge dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Tenth Circuit agreed dismissal was appropriate, the Appellate Court concluded dismissal should have been for lack of jurisdiction as to the member's claims and as to the LLC's claim because the United States Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. View "ECCO Plains, LLC., et al v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action against defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court had authority to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale and related supplemental judgments after title had passed to the purchaser when a series of errors by the court and the parties caused the purchaser to buy a property that, unbeknownst to him but actually known by the second mortgagee, was in fact subject to a first mortgage that was to be foreclosed shortly thereafter. The court concluded that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the purchaser lacked standing under the circumstances of the present case; defendants inadequately briefed the issue of 17 Ridge Road, LLC's standing to intervene as a defendant and, therefore, the issue was deemed abandoned; and the appellate court correctly determined that the passing of title divested the trial court of jurisdiction to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court insofar as that court concluded that the trial court lacked authority to open the supplemental judgments. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland" on Justia Law

Issuer Banks appealed the district court's dismissal of their negligence claim as third party beneficiaries of Heartland's contracts with other entities. This case arose out of a group of hackers' breach of Heartland's data systems, compromising confidential information belonging to customers of Issuer Banks. Mindful that the New Jersey Supreme Court has long been a leader in expanding tort liability, and in light of the lack of a developed record illuminating any contractual remedies available to Issuer Banks, the court held that, in this instance, the economic loss doctrine did not bar Issuer Banks' negligence claim at this stage of the litigation. The court declined to decide on the remaining complex issues that Heartland raised. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Heartland Payment Sys., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Cynthia and Alan Roers, filed suit against Countrywide and others after Countrywide initiated foreclosure proceedings on the ranch property they owned. The court concluded that fact questions existed as to whether the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption on which the mortgage agreements were made; whether the ranch's acreage and corresponding value were material to the finance agreements for Cynthia's separate properties; and whether plaintiffs have been adversely affected and were, therefore, eligible to seek rescission of the mortgage agreements. The court concluded, however, that the district court did not err in granting Countrywide's motion for summary judgment on Alan's claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs have waived their remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al." on Justia Law