Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages against the Bank after it filed an unlawful detainer action against her in state court without giving 90 days notice to vacate the foreclosed property. At issue on appeal was whether the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA), Pub. L. No. 111-22, 701-04, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-62, provided a private right of action. The court concluded that dismissal of the state unlawful detainer proceedings did not moot plaintiff's claim; the court agreed with the Third Circuit that the regulation of eviction proceedings "does not implicate an important state interest" under Younger v. Harris; but plaintiff had no cognizable interest under the PTFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Logan v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, mortgagors who defaulted on their note, appealed the district court's motion to dismiss their suit seeking to enjoin a bank from foreclosing. Plaintiffs argued that the assignments by which the bank obtained the note and corresponding deed of trust were "robo-signed" and therefore invalid. Concluding that plaintiffs had standing, the court reaffirmed that, under Texas law, facially valid assignments could not be challenged for want of authority except by the defrauded assignor. View "Reinagel, Jr., et al. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals brought claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., related to their mortgage transactions. The court held that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of section 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court. Because neither plaintiffs accomplished rescission in this way within three years of their respective transactions, their right to rescind expired and the district court correctly entered summary judgment on these claims. Further, plaintiffs were not entitled, as a matter of law, to money damages for the banks' refusal to rescind, although their claim was cognizable, where the violation - that each set of plaintiffs were given one, rather than two TILA disclosures - was not facially apparent on the loan documents as set forth in section 1641. View "Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Karla Brown brought a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank and others seeking rescission of a note and first mortgage securing that note, alleging that she was the victim of a predatory lending scheme. The mortgage was originated by Deutsche Bank's predecessor in interest in connection with the purchase of Brown's home. Deutsche Bank requested that First American Title Insurance Company defend Deutsche Bank's mortgage interest pursuant to the terms of its title insurance policy. First American refused coverage, claiming the lawsuit did not trigger its duty to defend because Brown was claiming she was misinformed as to the terms of the note rather than challenging that she granted the mortgage. Deutsche Bank subsequently brought this action seeking a judgment declaring First American had a duty to defend it in Brown's lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Brown's complaint did not trigger First American's duty to defend because the complaint's claims were not specifically envisioned by the terms of the title insurance policy. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the circuit court entered a final summary judgment of foreclosure against Borrowers regarding their shared residence. One month before the scheduled judicial foreclosure sale, Chase Home Finance, Borrowers' mortgagee, offered Borrowers an opportunity for the reinstatement of their mortgage and dismissal of the foreclosure action conditioned on Borrowers making a lump-sum payment no later than May 6. Borrowers sent a cashier's check for the full reinstatement amount to Chase's counsel, who received the cashier's check on May 4. However, Chase's counsel failed to arrange for the cancellation of the foreclosure sale, and the sale took place as scheduled. Borrowers filed a motion to vacate the sale. The third-party purchaser (Purchaser) intervened. The trial court granted Borrowers' motion and ordered all funds paid by Purchaser to be returned. The final judgment of foreclosure was also vacated and the foreclosure case dismissed. Purchaser appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Borrowers alleged and proved adequate equitable grounds for the trial court to set aside the judicial foreclosure sale and dismiss the foreclosure action; and (2) proof of an inadequate bid price is not a necessary requirement to set aside a judicial foreclosure sale. View "Arsali v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Signature Properties executed a promissory note payable to JPMorgan Chase Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage and security interest on Signature's commercial property. The loan was guaranteed by Signature's members (guarantors). JPMorgan later assigned Signature's note and mortgage to LaSalle Bank National Association. A pooling agreement established a mortgage back security wherein LaSalle was identified as trustee and paying agent and J.E. Robert Company as loan servicer for Signature's mortgage loans. After Signature ceased to make payments on the loan, J.E. Robert brought a foreclosure action against Signature. LaSalle subsequently assigned the note to Shaw's New London, and Shaw's was substituted as the plaintiff. The guarantors were then added as defendants. The trial court ordered strict foreclosure of Signature's property and a deficient judgment against the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that, under the facts of this case, J.E. Robert had standing to institute this foreclosure action in its own name. The Court rejected the remainder of the defendants' claims. View "J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC" on Justia Law

The Palomars filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The trustee reported that the estate contained nothing that could be sold to obtain money for unsecured creditors. A discharge of dischargeable debts was entered and the bankruptcy case was closed. The day before the trustee issued his report, the Palomars had filed an adversary action against the bank that held a second mortgage on their home. The balance on their first mortgage, but the house was valued at $165,000. The Palomars argued that the second mortgage should be dissolved under 11 U.S.C. 506(a). Deciding that the adversary action was meritless, the judge refused to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the only debts normally extinguished are those for which a claim was rejected. The bank made no claim; this was a no-asset bankruptcy. Failing to extinguish the lien only deprives the debtors of the chance to make money should the value of their home ever exceed the balance on the first mortgage. View "Palomar v. First Am. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law

In each of these consolidated cases, JPMorgan attempted to use the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act (SFA), Ark. Code Ann. 18-50-101 - 18-50-117, to foreclose on the borrower's home. At issue was whether a national banking association chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but not registered to do business with the Arkansas Secretary of State or the Arkansas Bank Department could use the non-judicial foreclosure procedure provided by the SFA. The court concluded that an entity could be authorized to do business in Arkansas for SFA purposes pursuant to either state or federal law. In JPMorgan's case, federal law provided such authorization. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that JPMorgan was authorized to do business in Arkansas and could avail itself of the benefit of the SFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law