Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Defendants gave a promissory note to Bank and secured a loan with a trust deed on real property. Defendants defaulted on the note, and Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The property was sold after a sheriff's sale. Bank subsequently filed a complaint to recover the deficiency. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that because Bank filed its complaint ninety-nine days after the sheriff's sale, the action was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the special three-month statute of limitations on actions for deficiency set forth in the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applies where a lender elects to judicially foreclose upon the real estate, but the special limitation applies only where the property has been sold by exercising the power of sale set forth in the trust deed; and (2) because the judicial foreclosure of the trust deed in this case did not result in the sale of property under a trust deed, it did not fall under the statutory language in section 76-1013, and the deficiency action was governed by the general statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. Remanded. View "First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Davey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action alleging that defendants participated in a global Internet conspiracy to sell illegal prescription drugs, in violation of the laws of the United States and Virginia. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against four foreign banks for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Rule 4(k)(2) did not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the banks because exercising jurisdiction over them would not, in the circumstances here, be consistent with the United States Constitution and laws. Subjecting the banks to the coercive power of the court in the United States, in the absence of minimum contacts, would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders dismissing the complaint against the banks. View "Unspam Technologies v. Chernuk" on Justia Law

The CEO and sole shareholder of Zee decided to expand his chemical sales business into the water treatment industry and hired employees who were currently working or had previously worked in the industry. Four employees came from GE and were bound by non-compete agreements. GE sued Zee and its former employees in North Carolina state court for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and unfair trade practices. The state court found the agreements enforceable and held Zee and the employees jointly and severally liable for $288,297.00 in compensatory damages as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practices and for $5,769,903.10 in attorney fees, $864,891.00 in punitive damages, and $257,931.44 in costs. GE discovered that Zee had tied up virtually all of its assets in a credit facility agreement with BMO Harris Bank before entry of judgment; registered the judgment in Illinois, Harris’s principal place of business; and served Harris with a citation to discover Zee’s assets. GE objected to removal to federal court, but the district court dismissed GE’s case entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that GE raised a timely and sound objection to removal under the forum-defendant rule, and the district court should have remanded the case. View "GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Regents Bank issued two loans to Appellant. After Appellant failed to repay either loan, Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The district court stayed the proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan documents. The arbitrator ultimately ruled in Regents' favor. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) Regents employed undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award, holding (1) Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct; and (2) the arbitrator's refusal to void one of the loans was not a manifest disregard of the law. View "Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking damages and declaratory relief, brought a diversity action against two national banking associations, alleging violations of Louisiana consumer protection law in connection with a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The district court dismissed the action in part pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and in part for failure to state a claim of a statutory exemption under Louisiana law. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims, which were "independent claims" for Rooker-Feldman purposes. However, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed nonetheless for failure to state a claim where the Louisiana consumer protection law did not provide plaintiff with an avenue of relief because both banks were exempt and where plaintiff had not disputed that her declaratory judgment could be dismissed under Louisiana's preclusion principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands obtained two tax judgments in the U.S. district court against the Millars for unpaid taxes. The Millards, who previously resided in the Commonwealth, relocated before the Commonwealth was able to obtain the judgments. The Commonwealth commenced proceedings as a judgment creditor asseking a turnover order against garnishees holding assets of the Millars. The Commonwealth named a Canadian bank (Bank) headquartered in Toronto, with a branch in New York, as a garnishee under the theory that the Millards maintained accounts in a foreign subsidiary of Bank. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a turnover order against Bank. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law, holding (1) for a court to issue a post-judgment turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) against a banking entity, the entity itself must have actual, not merely constructive, possession or custody of the assets sought; and (2) therefore, it is not enough that the banking entity's subsidiary might have possession or custody of a judgment debtor's assets. View "Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Manning, a lawyer who served as the executor of Barney’s estate and the trustee of a trust for Mrs. Barney, set up accounts at National City Bank, one for the estate and one for the trust. He then wired funds, totaling about $1,250,000, from the bank accounts into the account of his business in violation of his fiduciary duties. Manning’s business failed and Manning confessed to Mrs. Barney that he had absconded with the money from the two accounts. The estate, trust, and Mrs. Barney sued Manning’s law firm in state court, but the suit was rejected on summary judgment. The Barneys then sued the successor to National City Bank to try to recover the money Manning stole. The district court dismissed, citing the affirmative defense of Ohio’s version of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Barneys failed to plead facts giving rise to an inference that the Bank committed any wrongdoing. View "Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Lender made loans to Borrower that were secured by deeds of trust describing real estate owned by Borrower. As additional security for the loans to Borrower, Guarantor promised payment of the indebtedness on the promissory notes. Borrower subsequently defaulted, and Lender sought payment of the indebtedness from Guarantor. Guarantor moved to amend his answer to assert he was not liable to Lender because Lender was barred by section 76-1013 of the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act (Act) from pursuing a deficiency action against Borrower. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lender. At issue on appeal was whether a guaranty of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is subject to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Guarantor's guaranty was not subject to the Act, and under the terms of the guaranty, Guarantor was liable for the total amount of Borrower's debt, less the trustee's sale price. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Murante" on Justia Law

American sued Mercantile, claiming it aided, abetted, and conspired with Louis J. Pearlman to perpetrate a large fraud. The jury found for American, awarding one-half of the requested damages. Mercantile and American appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not err by denying Mercantile's Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the aiding and abetting claim and the conspiracy claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in excluding other banks' reactions to Pearlman's fraud. The district court properly denied Mercantile's proposed jury instructions. Additur was not appropriate in this case because the question of damages was properly left to the jury; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying American's Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, and because damages were a jury issue, the district court's prejudgment interest calculation was correct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Bank of St. Paul v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law