Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. He claimed that he was injured after purchasing and trading a Euroyen TIBOR futures contract on a U.S.-based commodity exchange because the value of that contract was based on a distorted, artificial Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).   The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Here Plaintiff failed to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. As such, the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Finally, Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law

A qui tam plaintiff alleged that two banks violated the California False Claims Act (CFCA) by failing to report and deliver millions of dollars owing on unclaimed cashier’s checks to the State of California as escheated property. The trial court denied the banks’ motions to dismiss. The banks sought writ relief.The court of appeal denied relief, upholding the denial of the motions to dismiss. The court rejected the banks’ argument that a qui tam plaintiff may not pursue a CFCA action predicated on a failure to report and deliver escheated property unless the California State Controller first provides appropriate notice to the banks under Code of Civil Procedure section 1576. For pleading purposes, the complaints adequately allege the existence of an obligation as required under the CFCA: the plaintiff adequately alleged that the banks were obligated to report and deliver to California the money owed on unredeemed cashier’s checks, Allowing this action to proceed does not violate the banks’ due process rights. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Mohamad and Ahmed Hammoud, father and son, each filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, just over a year apart using the same attorney. The petitions contained their similar names, identical addresses, and—mistakenly—Ahmed’s social security number. Although the attorney corrected the social security number on Mohamad’s bankruptcy petition the day after it was filed, Experian failed to catch the amendment and erroneously reported Mohamad’s bankruptcy on Ahmed’s credit report for nine years. Ahmed learned of the uncorrected mistake while attempting to refinance his mortgage. He sued Experian and Equifax, alleging that each had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of his reported information, 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b). Equifax and Ahmed settled.The district court granted Experian summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ahmed had standing to sue but cannot establish that Experian’s procedures were unreasonable as a matter of law. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ahmed, his cognizable injury was fairly traceable to Experian’s actions. A credit reporting agency’s reliance on information gathered by outside entities is reasonable if the information is not “obtained from a source that was known to be unreliable” and is “not inaccurate on its face” or otherwise inconsistent with information already had on file. Experian was not required to implement additional procedures for collecting and verifying corrected information from bankruptcy proceedings. View "Hammoud v. Equifax Information Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that the court of appeals erred.Plaintiffs brought this complaint against Bank alleging fraud and other related claims. The trial court granted Bank's motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case because the trial court did not make findings of fact and the court could not "conduct a meaningful review of the trial court's conclusions of law." The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred by not conducting a de novo review of the sufficiency of the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Taylor v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court appointing a receiver in an interlocutory appeal occurring during litigation between solar energy companies and the bank that funded the companies' development and expansion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the bank's motion to appoint a receiver.The companies filed an amended complaint against the bank claiming that the bank breached certain contracts with the companies. The bank, in turn, initiated a federal action against the companies alleging breach of contract and other claims. The companies filed an answer and asserted several counterclaims, including claims based on the same allegations as in the other case. After consolidating the two cases the district court granted the bank's motion for the appointment of a receiver. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the bank's motion to appoint a receiver. View "Green Earth Energy Photovoltaic Corp. v. Keybank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

Page sued Alliant Credit Union under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693–1693r, and state law on behalf of herself and other similarly situated customers, alleging that Alliant charged fees in violation of its contract. Alliant charges a nonsufficient fund (NSF) fee when it rejects an attempted debit because an account lacks sufficient funds to cover the transaction. Page argued that the contract requires Alliant to assess NSF fees using the “ledger-balance method” and only allowed one NSF fee per transaction, while Alliant claimed that the contract permits it to use the “available-balance method.”The district court dismissed Page’s claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Analyzing the contract under Illinois principles of construction, it is not ambiguous and it does not prohibit Alliant from using the available-balance method to charge NSF fees. Alliant does not promise not to charge multiple fees when a transaction is presented to it multiple times. View "Page v. Alliant Credit Union" on Justia Law

Riegel, seeking to build a condominium development in Isla Mujeres, formed ISLA and borrowed millions of dollars from the Hovdes. The project failed. More than 10 years later, the Hovdes sued ISLA and Riegel.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the claim based on the Mortgage Note, citing the 10-year limitations period, and later holding that the limitations defense could be asserted against Riegel as the guarantor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An acceleration clause provided that if a Default occurred, the outstanding unpaid principal and interest would automatically become immediately due, triggering the 10-year limitations period. One such “Default” was an “Act of Bankruptcy,” defined to include admitting in writing the inability to pay debts as they mature. Two emails sent by Riegel to the Hovdes constituted an admission in writing of inability to pay debts: an August 7, 2008 email, asking for an advance to pay a tax bill, and a subsequent email indicating that all construction workers had been suspended. The language does not require actual insolvency; it merely requires an admission of an inability to pay the debts, whether or not true. The terms “continuing, absolute, and unconditional” are terms of art when used in guarantees and do not waive the limitations defense. View "Hovde v. ISLA Development LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, Foster, a real estate investor, purchased Florida property, with a $1.1 million loan secured by a PNC mortgage. Foster and PNC had multiple disputes. PNC acquired force‐placed insurance. While the parties disputed that issue, Foster only made payments in the amount originally specified in a 2010 modification although the payments had increased as a result of the force‐placed insurance policies. In 2012, PNC began returning Foster’s payments as incomplete payments. As of May 2019, PNC claimed Foster owed more than $1.75 million. PNC reported delinquent payments to credit agencies; Foster’s credit score dropped.Foster’s lawsuit included a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for PNC’s failure to investigate the two credit reporting disputes; a breach of contract claim regarding the force‐placed insurance policies; a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim for the insurance; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim for the alleged mishandling of the escrow account. PNC counterclaimed to seek judgment on the loan. After determining that Foster’s affidavit was conclusory and speculative as to proof of insurance and his loan payments and that his evidence of damages was too general and conclusory, the district court granted PNC judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but found that the FCRA claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. Foster did not establish an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to PNC’s conduct. View "Foster v. PNC Bank, National Association" on Justia Law

Young claims her employer told her that it had received a wage garnishment order in 2019. Young then discovered the existence of a 2010 default judgment against her, in favor of Midland, for a purported debt of $8,529.93 plus interest. Young sued to set aside the 2010 default judgment, based on extrinsic mistake or fraud. She sought damages, penalties, and reasonable attorney fees and costs under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, 1788), arguing that Midland was a debt collector of consumer debt and had engaged in false and deceptive conduct in attempting to collect that debt, citing her contention that she was never served with process. Midland denied Young’s allegations, asserted affirmative defenses, and filed an anti-SLAPP motion (section 425.16) to strike Young’s claims.The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motions, finding Young did not show she would probably prevail on the merits of her claims and awarded Midland attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal vacated. Young showed she would probably prevail on the merits of her Rosenthal Act claim, producing prima facie evidence that Midland falsely represented substituted service on her was accomplished. She was not required to show that Midland knowingly made this false representation. Young’s Rosenthal Act cause of action was not time-barred. View "Young v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Lightning, a Delaware start-up company that owns intellectual property protecting designs for a pallet used for transporting cold foods, sought $26 million in outside funding to retire debt, cover operational expenses, and purchase equipment to begin production. GrowMI, an entity created by the Michigan Economic Development Corporation, agreed to loan Lightning $5 million and used its relationship with Flagstar Bank to secure an additional $7 million loan. GrowMI and Flagstar conditioned their loans on Lightning’s securing the rest of the $26 million by selling equity and securing lines of credit from Lightning shareholders. Lightning’s creditor LT sent GrowMI a letter indicating that Lightning owed LT $3.3 million, secured by an interest in Lightning’s intellectual properties. GrowMI allowed Lightning to use a portion of GrowMI’s loan to repay LT, ensuring GrowMI’s first secured position on Lightning’s intellectual properties.GrowMI subsequently became aware of wrongdoing at Lightning, which defaulted on its debt to GrowMI. GrowMI sued LT and its principals, Lightning shareholders, Lightning employees, and a consulting company, alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962, by a pattern of racketeering activity that included bank fraud, transactions involving money derived from that bank fraud, trade secrets misappropriation, and wire fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. GrowMI’s claims rest on its status as Lightning’s creditor, making its injury derivative of the harm incurred by Lightning. GrowMI does not plausibly allege that it was directly injured by reason of the alleged racketeering activities. View "Grow Michigan, LLC v. LT Lender, LLC" on Justia Law