Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, as representative of her mother and the estate of her father, filed a breach of contract claim against Chase to recover the amount in her father's bank accounts plus interest and the redemption of the certificate of deposit, which her mother had assigned to her. Between 1966 and 1975, plaintiff's father had deposited money with a branch of Chase bank in Saigon and purchased a certificate of deposit payable to his wife. In anticipation of the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese army, Chase began evacuating its bank personnel in April 1975. Without giving notice to its depositors, Chase then closed its Saigon branch. The court held that plaintiff's claims were time-barred under New York law because the suit was not brought within six years of the bank's closure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Chase's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Consolidated Grain maintains a grain elevator in La Salle County, sold Rogowski’s crops, and gave him the proceeds by checks paid directly to him. The bank had lent money to Rogowski for which he signed a note and granted the bank a security interest in his crops and any proceeds of their sale. The bank notified Consolidated of its lien by two written notices, one covering crop years 2004 and 2005 and the other covering years 2005 and 2006. The notices listed as covered agricultural commodities “all grain on hand, all growing crops,” without listing their amount or location. The bank obtained a deficiency judgment against Rogowski in 2008, which remains unsatisfied, then sought payment from Consolidated. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court affirmed. The Federal Food Security Act of 1985 provides how notices of security interests are to be worded and provides that there must be a statement of “each county or parish in which the farm products are produced or located,” The court rejected a “substantial compliance” argument and held that the notices were insufficient for failing to strictly comply with the Act. View "State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the fallout from the failure of the Fountainebleau development in Las Vegas, Nevada and involved the contract dispute between the Term Lenders, the Revolving Lenders, and the Borrowers. The district court dismissed the Term Lenders' claims against the Revolving Lenders, finding that the Term Lenders lacked standing to sue. The district court also denied the Borrowers' motion for summary judgment against the Revolving Lenders, rejecting the Borrowers' argument that the Revolving Lenders had breached the contract as a matter of law and alternatively finding there were material issues of fact about whether the Revolving Lenders breached the contract. The court held that the Term Lenders lacked standing to enforce section 2.1(c) of the Credit Agreement promise and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The court could not conclude as a matter of law that the Revolving Lenders broke their promise to fund the Borrowers under section 2 of the Credit Agreement and affirmed the district court's denial of the Borrowers' request for turnover of the loan proceeds and specific performance. View "Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., et al v. Bank of America, NA, et al" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her single-family home in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's promissory note was delivered to one party (the lender) and then transferred. The mortgage itself was granted to a different entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and later assigned to the foreclosing entity (Aurora). Three days before the rescheduled foreclosure, Plaintiff sued in state court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. Aurora removed the case to the federal district court. At issue before the court was how MERS's involvement in the chain of title impacted Aurora's authority to foreclose. The district court resolved this question in favor of Aurora, which then foreclosed on Plaintiff property. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure here was not unlawful, as (1) in the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had standing to contest the validity of the mortgage assignment made by MERS to Aurora; but (2) the MERS framework is faithful to the tenants of mortgage law in Massachusetts and was therefore not unlawful. View "Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb." on Justia Law

Appellant Corporation executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on property to Respondents. Appellant did not pay annual property taxes, and a delinquent-tax certificate was issued. Because Corporation also did not make the payments due on Respondents' note, Respondents recorded a notice of default and election to sell. After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Respondents purchased the property and brought this action against Appellants for the deficiency. Because Respondents did not record the trustee's deed until after the two-year period to redeem the property from the delinquent-tax certificate ran out, the county treasurer held the property in trust until Respondents paid the back taxes and penalties due. Appellants argued that Respondents could not validly foreclose while the county treasurer held the property in trust on the delinquent-tax certificate and that, without a valid foreclosure, Respondents were precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The district court disagreed and awarded Respondents a deficiency judgment against Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foreclosure sale was proper, and thus, the deficiency judgment was also proper. View "Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment that the lien on their homestead was void and that the mortgage holder was required to forfeit all principal and interest. Plaintiffs also sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Tex. Const. Art. XVI 50(a)(6); because there was no evidence or allegation of defendants' attempting to conceal information, and because the facts that gave rise to any claims were obvious and not hidden, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply in this instance to estop the lenders' assertion of the limitations defense; because the loan was valid, and plaintiffs were delinquent, the statements at issue were true and no defamation occurred; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations barred only remedies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the amended complaints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Priester, Jr., et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth (the bank) sued HLC and McKee (collectively, Hazelwood), alleging breach of contract against HLC, breach of guaranty against McKee, and asserting a security interest in some of HLC's property. Hazelwood raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue and choice of forum, and a state law contract defense. MPT intervened, claiming priority over real property tax refunds owed to HLC and attached by the bank. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1); the forum selection clauses at issue were permissive and did not prohibit the bank from bringing the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the bank on its breach of contract claim against HLC, or the breach of guaranty claim against McKee; Hazelwood failed factually to contest the bank's damages assessment before the district court, and was not entitled to relief on appeal; and the court declined MPT's invitation to disregard state law and craft an "equitable" solution designed to protect a party who failed to take reasonable steps to protect itself and assumed a known risk. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Hazelwood Logistics Center, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331 et seq., against UBS, alleging that plaintiffs were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in Israel facilitated by UBS's furnishing of United States currency to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs contended principally that the FAC alleged a chain of causation between transfers of funds to Iran by UBS and plaintiffs' injuries at the hands of various terrorist groups sponsored by Iran, sufficient to establish traceability for purposes both of standing and of stating a claim under the ATA. The court concluded that the FAC was sufficient to show Article III standing but insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rothstein v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

For more than 20 years, Kurlemann built and sold luxury homes in Ohio. In 2005-2006 he borrowed $2.4 million to build houses in Mason. When neither sold, he enlisted realtor Duke, who found two straw buyers, willing to lie about their income and assets on loan applications that Duke submitted to Washington Mutual. Both buyers defaulted. Duke pled guilty to seven counts, including loan fraud and making false statements to a lending institution, and agreed to testify at Kurlemann’s trial. A jury convicted Kurlemann of six counts, including making false statements to a lending institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The district court sentenced Kurlemann to concurrent 24-month sentences and ordered him to pay $1.1 million in restitution. The district court sentenced Duke to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy fraud conviction, based on Kurlemann’s concealment of his interest in property, but reversed and remanded his false statements conviction, finding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that concealment was sufficient to support conviction. The court also reversed Duke’s sentence, finding that the court failed to explain the sentence it imposed. View "United States v. Kurlemann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against two entities she claimed illegally foreclosed her home once she defaulted on her mortgage payments. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court then addressed Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated plausible claims for relief, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in deciding that it would be futile to allow an amendment to the complaint. View "Juarez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law