Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Appellant Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates (CTSA) appealed an order of the circuit court finding that CTSA's lien was second in priority to Appellee Metropolitan National Bank's lien on certain property. The circuit court filed an order titled "Final Judgment and Rule 65(b) certificate" stating that certain parties and actions remained unresolved. CTSA then brought this appeal. Although neither party raised the issue, the Supreme Court sua sponte raised the question of whether the order was final and subject to appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that there was no final order or a sufficient Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Crafton Tull Sparks & Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Case appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendant St. Mary's Bank and denied his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims that the bank engaged in trespass and violated state law and the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The matter arose from the bank's foreclosure on property Plaintiff leased from his landlord, Jean Marcelin. Months before the foreclosure sale, pipes burst in an apartment above plaintiff's, causing a flood. The City of Manchester turned off water and electricity to the building. Plaintiff spoke about the problem to Marcelin, who denied that he still owned the property. Plaintiff then spoke about the problem to a Bank representative; the representative asked plaintiff to allow her, a plumber, and an electrician into the building. The plaintiff complied with this request. The City placed a legal notice on the property’s front door, stating that it was unsafe and prohibiting occupancy. Plaintiff had not resided at the property since the flood, though most of his possessions remained at the property. When the Bank allowed him access to the apartment to remove his possessions, plaintiff observed that his apartment door was "wide open" and subsequently alleged that many of his possessions were missing. Finding no error with the superior court order, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. View "Case v. St. Mary's Bank " on Justia Law

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and defendants obtained class certification and settlement approval for a nationwide class action involving three related lawsuits, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p and state law, based on the practice of “robo-signing” affidavits in debt collections. Eight individuals objected. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the disparity in the relief afforded under the settlement to the named plaintiffs (exoneration of debts, $2000, and prospective injunctive relief) and the unnamed class members ($17 and prospective injunctive relief) made the settlement unfair. The class notice was inadequate and, although the class satisfies four of the six certification requirements (numerosity, commonality, typicality and predominance), the representation is not adequate under Rule 23(a) nor is the class action vehicle superior. View "Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as representative of her mother and the estate of her father, filed a breach of contract claim against Chase to recover the amount in her father's bank accounts plus interest and the redemption of the certificate of deposit, which her mother had assigned to her. Between 1966 and 1975, plaintiff's father had deposited money with a branch of Chase bank in Saigon and purchased a certificate of deposit payable to his wife. In anticipation of the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese army, Chase began evacuating its bank personnel in April 1975. Without giving notice to its depositors, Chase then closed its Saigon branch. The court held that plaintiff's claims were time-barred under New York law because the suit was not brought within six years of the bank's closure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Chase's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Consolidated Grain maintains a grain elevator in La Salle County, sold Rogowski’s crops, and gave him the proceeds by checks paid directly to him. The bank had lent money to Rogowski for which he signed a note and granted the bank a security interest in his crops and any proceeds of their sale. The bank notified Consolidated of its lien by two written notices, one covering crop years 2004 and 2005 and the other covering years 2005 and 2006. The notices listed as covered agricultural commodities “all grain on hand, all growing crops,” without listing their amount or location. The bank obtained a deficiency judgment against Rogowski in 2008, which remains unsatisfied, then sought payment from Consolidated. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court affirmed. The Federal Food Security Act of 1985 provides how notices of security interests are to be worded and provides that there must be a statement of “each county or parish in which the farm products are produced or located,” The court rejected a “substantial compliance” argument and held that the notices were insufficient for failing to strictly comply with the Act. View "State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the fallout from the failure of the Fountainebleau development in Las Vegas, Nevada and involved the contract dispute between the Term Lenders, the Revolving Lenders, and the Borrowers. The district court dismissed the Term Lenders' claims against the Revolving Lenders, finding that the Term Lenders lacked standing to sue. The district court also denied the Borrowers' motion for summary judgment against the Revolving Lenders, rejecting the Borrowers' argument that the Revolving Lenders had breached the contract as a matter of law and alternatively finding there were material issues of fact about whether the Revolving Lenders breached the contract. The court held that the Term Lenders lacked standing to enforce section 2.1(c) of the Credit Agreement promise and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The court could not conclude as a matter of law that the Revolving Lenders broke their promise to fund the Borrowers under section 2 of the Credit Agreement and affirmed the district court's denial of the Borrowers' request for turnover of the loan proceeds and specific performance. View "Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd., et al v. Bank of America, NA, et al" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her single-family home in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's promissory note was delivered to one party (the lender) and then transferred. The mortgage itself was granted to a different entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and later assigned to the foreclosing entity (Aurora). Three days before the rescheduled foreclosure, Plaintiff sued in state court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. Aurora removed the case to the federal district court. At issue before the court was how MERS's involvement in the chain of title impacted Aurora's authority to foreclose. The district court resolved this question in favor of Aurora, which then foreclosed on Plaintiff property. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure here was not unlawful, as (1) in the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had standing to contest the validity of the mortgage assignment made by MERS to Aurora; but (2) the MERS framework is faithful to the tenants of mortgage law in Massachusetts and was therefore not unlawful. View "Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb." on Justia Law

Appellant Corporation executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on property to Respondents. Appellant did not pay annual property taxes, and a delinquent-tax certificate was issued. Because Corporation also did not make the payments due on Respondents' note, Respondents recorded a notice of default and election to sell. After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Respondents purchased the property and brought this action against Appellants for the deficiency. Because Respondents did not record the trustee's deed until after the two-year period to redeem the property from the delinquent-tax certificate ran out, the county treasurer held the property in trust until Respondents paid the back taxes and penalties due. Appellants argued that Respondents could not validly foreclose while the county treasurer held the property in trust on the delinquent-tax certificate and that, without a valid foreclosure, Respondents were precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The district court disagreed and awarded Respondents a deficiency judgment against Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foreclosure sale was proper, and thus, the deficiency judgment was also proper. View "Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP" on Justia Law