Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment that the lien on their homestead was void and that the mortgage holder was required to forfeit all principal and interest. Plaintiffs also sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Tex. Const. Art. XVI 50(a)(6); because there was no evidence or allegation of defendants' attempting to conceal information, and because the facts that gave rise to any claims were obvious and not hidden, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply in this instance to estop the lenders' assertion of the limitations defense; because the loan was valid, and plaintiffs were delinquent, the statements at issue were true and no defamation occurred; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations barred only remedies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the amended complaints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Priester, Jr., et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth (the bank) sued HLC and McKee (collectively, Hazelwood), alleging breach of contract against HLC, breach of guaranty against McKee, and asserting a security interest in some of HLC's property. Hazelwood raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue and choice of forum, and a state law contract defense. MPT intervened, claiming priority over real property tax refunds owed to HLC and attached by the bank. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1); the forum selection clauses at issue were permissive and did not prohibit the bank from bringing the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the bank on its breach of contract claim against HLC, or the breach of guaranty claim against McKee; Hazelwood failed factually to contest the bank's damages assessment before the district court, and was not entitled to relief on appeal; and the court declined MPT's invitation to disregard state law and craft an "equitable" solution designed to protect a party who failed to take reasonable steps to protect itself and assumed a known risk. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Hazelwood Logistics Center, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331 et seq., against UBS, alleging that plaintiffs were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in Israel facilitated by UBS's furnishing of United States currency to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs contended principally that the FAC alleged a chain of causation between transfers of funds to Iran by UBS and plaintiffs' injuries at the hands of various terrorist groups sponsored by Iran, sufficient to establish traceability for purposes both of standing and of stating a claim under the ATA. The court concluded that the FAC was sufficient to show Article III standing but insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rothstein v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

For more than 20 years, Kurlemann built and sold luxury homes in Ohio. In 2005-2006 he borrowed $2.4 million to build houses in Mason. When neither sold, he enlisted realtor Duke, who found two straw buyers, willing to lie about their income and assets on loan applications that Duke submitted to Washington Mutual. Both buyers defaulted. Duke pled guilty to seven counts, including loan fraud and making false statements to a lending institution, and agreed to testify at Kurlemann’s trial. A jury convicted Kurlemann of six counts, including making false statements to a lending institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The district court sentenced Kurlemann to concurrent 24-month sentences and ordered him to pay $1.1 million in restitution. The district court sentenced Duke to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy fraud conviction, based on Kurlemann’s concealment of his interest in property, but reversed and remanded his false statements conviction, finding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that concealment was sufficient to support conviction. The court also reversed Duke’s sentence, finding that the court failed to explain the sentence it imposed. View "United States v. Kurlemann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against two entities she claimed illegally foreclosed her home once she defaulted on her mortgage payments. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court then addressed Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated plausible claims for relief, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in deciding that it would be futile to allow an amendment to the complaint. View "Juarez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

Bank brought an action against Defendant for foreclosure on a residential mortgage. In this case, Bank was a holder entitled to enforce the mortgage note and currently had possession of the note, which was endorsed in blank, and therefore had the power to enforce the note. After mediation, Bank moved for summary judgment. Before acting on the motion, the superior court reported a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The question was: "What is the proof that is required for a party to prove 'ownership' of the mortgage note and mortgage for purposes of foreclosure?" The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action must identify the owner or economic beneficiary of the note and provide certain other evidence as described in 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 6321. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

Defendant, who had defaulted on his mortgage, sought to have a notice of voluntary dismissal of the mortgage foreclosure action struck and the case reinstated for the trial court to then dismiss the action with prejudice as a sanction to the mortgage holder for allegedly filing fraudulent documentation regarding ownership of the mortgage note. The court of appeal held that a trial court lacks the authority to set aside a plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal at the request of a defendant where the plaintiff has not obtained any affirmative relief before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of public importance and held that when a defendant alleges fraud on the court as a basis for seeking to set aside a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, the trial court has jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed action only when the fraud, if proven, resulted in the plaintiff securing affirmative relief to the detriment of the defendant and, upon obtaining that relief, voluntarily dismissing the case to prevent the trial court from undoing the improperly obtained relief. View "Pino v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American citizens, had bank accounts in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, in 2008 when the UBS tax-evasion scandal broke. The accounts were large and the plaintiffs had not disclosed the existence of the accounts or the interest earned on the accounts on their federal income tax returns, as required. Pursuant to an IRS amnesty program, they disclosed the interest and paid a penalty. They brought a class action to recover from UBS the penalties, interest, and other costs, plus profits they claim UBS made from the class as a result of the fraud and other wrongful acts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the “plaintiffs are tax cheats,” and rejecting an argument that UBS was obligated to give them accurate tax advice and failed to do so. Plaintiffs did not argue that they asked UBS to advise them on U.S. tax law or that the bank volunteered advice. The court stated that: “This is like suing one’s parents to recover tax penalties one has paid, on the ground that the parents had failed to bring one up to be an honest person who would not evade taxes.” The court noted, but did not decide, choice of law issues. View "Thomas v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Theodore L. Hansen, Interstate Energy Corp. and Triple M, L.L.C., appealed a district court’s judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. ("BNI"). Plaintiffs sued BNI and various other defendants based on BNI's refusal to honor certain bank guaranties and letters of credit. Eventually, the district court granted BNI's motion for summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Finding no error or abuse of the district court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Hansen, et al v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia, et al" on Justia Law